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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation probes the role of the media in Lebanon, a plural democracy, character-
ized by a deeply divided society and a fragmented political culture. By using case study research 
and critical discourse analysis of television texts, the dissertation investigates the degree to which 
the media, which operate relatively freely, reflect social and political divisions, and whether they 
work to exacerbate these deep divisions or attenuate them.  
The study makes the case that, because the media reflect the "precarious" sociopolitical 
framework within which they operate, Lebanese media discourse is naturally inclined to be po-
larized in stories of identity and power struggle and neutral in stories devoid of identity issues.  
In contrast to a general tendency to view all media through a normative Western lens, this study 
argues against this normative appraisal in the case of the Lebanese media. It contends that the 
role of the Lebanese media can be better understood if analyzed in conjunction with the media's 
sociopolitical framework and in the way the media reflect conflicting and overlapping communal 
norms. 
INDEX WORDS: Plural society, Plural democracy, Consociational democracy, Lebanese media, 
Political sectarianism, Social sectarianism, Identity conflicts, Lebanese television, Media battles 
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 CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
The more than half century following the publication of Four Theories of the Press has 
witnessed a proliferation of scholarship addressing questions about the form and function of the 
media in society.1 While scholars have attempted to answer these questions by looking at differ-
ent forms of political and cultural environments, particular attention has been focused on the re-
lationship between media and democratic government, as the media are, what Mughan and Gun-
ther call, "the connective tissue of democracy…the principal means through which citizens and 
their elected representatives communicate in their reciprocal efforts to inform and influence."2 
Despite a growing literature, scholars have bemoaned the paucity of media typologies that can 
provide accurate and reliable explanations of media systems, especially those outside the West-
ern world. The reason is not only because of the complexities of media systems,3 but more im-
portantly, because the theorizing, which is largely normative, has complicated the study of the 
media outside the Western world, as it has normally assumed an evolutionary mode of media 
systems measured against Western libertarian and social responsibility theory.4  
While scholars who advocate normative theory insist on the need to distinguish between 
the “what is” and “what ought to be,” maintaining that normative theory "inspires,"5 this study 
supports a descriptive and explanatory rather than prescriptive approach to media behavior, 
                                                           
1
 Some of these models include Hachten's 'Western' and 'Developmental' models; Mcquail's models: Liberal Plural-
ist; Social Responsibility or Public Interest; Professional, and Alternative models; Picard's Democratic Socialist 
Theory of the press; Altchull's three models based on first, second and third worlds: Market; Marxist or Communi-
tarian; Developed or Western; Christians et al's Pluralist, Administrative, Civic and Direct Democracy models, 
among others.   
2
 Anthony Mughan and Richard Gunter, "The Media in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes: A Multi-Level 
Perspective," In Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective, eds., Richard Gunther and Anthony 
Mughan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1. 
3
 Karol Jakubowicz, "Media Systems Research: an Overview," In Comparative Media Systems: European and 
Global Perspectives, ed., Boguslawa Dobek-Ostrowska et al (Budapest, Hungary: Central European University 
Press, 2010), 8.  
4
 Jennifer Ostini, "Beyond Four Theories of the Press: A New Model of National Media Systems," Mass Communi-
cation & Society 5, no.1 (2002): 45.   
5
 Clifford G. Christian et al., Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies (The University 
of Illinois, 2009), 99. 
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mainly because political culture, which is an important determinant of media behavior, varies 
greatly from one country to another. 6 In other words, understanding the nature of the sociopoliti-
cal environment within which media operate would be useful to our understanding of the reasons 
behind media behavior and would, therefore, be instructive when comparing between media sys-
tems.  This approach was undertaken by Hallin and Mancini in a seminal study on the relation-
ship between the political systems and media systems in 18 Western democracies. In highlight-
ing the differences between majoritarian and consensus democracies, they argue that, in the 
former, journalists tend to be more neutral and public-service oriented rather than endorsing a 
particular ideology or group because "it is part of the political culture of a majoritarian system... 
that the parties compete not to gain a greater share of power for their particular segment of socie-
ty, but for the right to represent the nation as a whole." 7 Consensual democracies, on the other 
hand, are usually multiparty systems, and party-press partisanship is more likely to occur.8  
In line with this conversation, I propose to study the role of media in a plural democracy. 
A plural democracy is where society is deeply divided, where political culture is fragmented as a 
result of ethnic, sectarian, racial, linguistic, or religious cleavages, and where a democratic gov-
ernment guarantees a fair level of representation of the various segments of the society.9 Using 
Lebanon as a case, this study joins the scholarship on the media outside the Western world. It is 
concerned with media that operate within a democratic framework, but where social and political 
cleavages are segmented to the extent of instability. The aim is to investigate the degree to which 
                                                           
6
 According to Gabriel Almond, "Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to politi-
cal action." In other words, political culture embodies the norms, values and beliefs that give meaning and order to 
the political system.  See G. Almond, "Comparing Political Systems," The Journal of Politics, p. 396.  
7
 Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press), 51. 
8
 Ibid.  
9
 See Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in a Plural Society: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Co-
lumbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972).  
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the media, which operate relatively freely, are reflective of social and political divisions and 
whether media discourse works to exacerbate these divisions or attenuate them.  
1.1.Significance of the Study 
The media and democracy: The media are a powerful agency of political socialization that 
plays an intrinsic role in people's identity construction. 10 A journalist's conduct in disseminating 
information and impacting public opinion is, thus, central to any discussion of the media and its 
role in society. This conduct becomes particularly exposed in a democratic sociopolitical frame-
work, where the media, operating in a supposedly “free and independent” environment, are "ex-
pected" to perform certain responsibilities towards the public, which are set against certain ethi-
cal standards. Such standards, as J.A. Stephen maintains, are "concerned both with advancing 
free and independent media while stressing responsible use of that freedom; responsible media 
foresee the consequences of their actions and attempt to minimize harm.”11 Thus, matters of ac-
curacy, truth, objectivity, balance, code of ethics, and advocacy, are paramount to any assess-
ment of socially responsible media conduct.  
The plural democracy and the problem with normative theory: Despite the almost universali-
ty of the need for responsible journalism, empirical evidence has revealed an inconsistency be-
tween the responsibilities journalists ought to perform theoretically and their actual conduct in a 
real scenario; hence the problem with normative press theories. The gap between the "ought" and 
the "is" becomes wider in a plural democracy, where the media's responsibility to the public is 
put to a thornier test: the media may either actively partake in conflicts by siding with the feud-
ing parties and, thus, exacerbate divisions, or remain neutral and work to alleviate tensions.  
                                                           
10
 This is related to the Agenda Setting theory associated with Maxwell McComb and Donald N. Shaw, and which 
refers to the ability of the news media to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda. 
11
 Stephen J. A. Ethics and the Media (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 54.   
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The role of political culture: While many factors contribute to the nature of media conduct in 
a particular system, this study starts from the premise that political culture is a crucial determi-
nant of media behavior; in other words, to investigate media behavior in any system necessitates 
an understanding of whether political culture naturally produces and easily digests widely ac-
cepted norms about socially responsible media that ought to "minimize harm," or whether any 
normative appraisal would be futile in systems characterized by deeply-rooted societal cleavages 
and fragmented political cultures. A brief comparison with Anglo-American media is a good ex-
ample to illustrate this point (this comparison is brought up again in the theoretical framework). 
While in no way does the study contend that the media in the Anglo-American world have been 
impeccably responsible, it argues, from a fact, that social responsibility theory emerged from 
Western scholarship, specifically from American scholars. John Dewey, for example, argues that 
the media should “interest the public in the public interest,” because the basis of democracy is 
not information, but conversation—and the cultivation of a "culture of communication."12 Theo-
dore Peterson maintains that “the newspaper should not be politically neutral, but neither should 
it owe allegiance to any political party or faction; rather it should furnish political leadership by 
setting the public good above duty to a party.”13Why did such normative theorizing emerge from 
American scholarship? Is it because scholars were accidentally interested in the need for respon-
sible journalism, or is it because American political culture produces and legitimizes values of 
"accountability," which are part of the American democratic culture and process? The question 
about the nature of political culture should, thus, be addressed when studying the media in any 
sociopolitical system.  
                                                           
12
 See John Dewey, The Pubic and its Problems: An Essay in Political Enquiry (Ohio University Press, 1927). 
13
 Theodore Peterson, "Social Responsibility: Theory and Practice," In The Responsibility of the Press, ed. Gerald 
Cross (University of Chicago Press, 1966), 41.   
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The Lebanese case: The Lebanese case examines how the nature of the Lebanese political 
culture shapes media behavior. By probing the Lebanese media landscape, in general, and televi-
sion discourse, in particular, it investigates whether a normative evaluation of the operation of 
the media within such political culture would be appropriate. The research, however, is not con-
cerned with assessing whether the Lebanese media are socially responsible, as such investigation 
would necessitate basing the analysis on a generally accepted and clearly defined code of jour-
nalism ethics in Lebanon, which, to date, is nonexistent. Because as part of the analysis is con-
cerned with investigating the Lebanese media's role in exacerbating or attenuating divisions, the 
normative question cannot be abandoned altogether. However, the study is more interested in 
describing and analyzing the way the media present themselves through the discourse they use; 
whether the discourse is heavily biased and inflammatory, or whether it leans towards modera-
tion.  
Lebanon is a compelling case study for four reasons: 
1. Lebanon is democratic: Lebanon is a democratic country with the freest media in the Ar-
ab world; its investigation, thus, pushes research on media and democracy, which is 
mostly West-centered, outside the confines of the Western world.  
2.  Lebanon is a plural democracy: Lebanon is a country where society is deeply divided 
along religious, sectarian, and political lines, but where the democratic political system 
accommodates pluralism. Unlike other Arab countries where governments have tradi-
tionally suppressed societal pluralism by forcing national integration through a state ide-
ology often resulting in media control, the Lebanese political system integrated sectarian 
pluralism into the polity. This formula, known as Consociational Democracy, has guaran-
teed community representation and cultural autonomy and allowed a high degree of me-
6 
 
 
dia freedom. Its purpose, however, is not necessarily to bring about national integration. 
As Arend Lijphart explains, consociationalism is designed to "turn a democracy with a 
fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.”14 The stability of the system, thus, 
largely depends on the relationship among the ruling elite; whenever they reach a dead-
lock, there is always risk of an institutional void, populist reactions, and sectarian clash-
es. 15 This state of affairs has resulted in a weak government whose stability has often 
been precarious. In such an environment, and with the relative freedom given to the me-
dia, it would be relevant to examine the degree to which the media reflect the 
consociationalism of the polity, and whether they are inclined to be enmeshed in disputes 
or geared towards appeasement, and, perhaps, encouraging national integration. 
3.  Lebanon is unique: Lebanon combines two elements whose continuous concurrence is 
the main factor behind its "unique" character and constant state of precariousness: its plu-
ral society and polity and the strategic geographic setting in which it is located. Both 
Lebanon's sociopolitical divisions and unstable, yet strategic, geographical location, ren-
der the country prone to interventions and manipulations from outside. Interventions re-
sult from religious, sectarian, political, and ideological affiliations of the Lebanese sec-
tarian groups forming Lebanon's social and political systems with foreign governments 
and movements.16 As Michael Hudson maintains, "Both socio-cultural parochialism and 
external intervention tend to be functionally disintegrative for the political system, inso-
far as they perpetuate loyalties that conflict with identification with a modern Lebanese 
                                                           
14
 Arend Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice (New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 31. 
15
 Ibid., 32. 
16
 Adnan Fawaz, "The Lebanese Predicament," Conference Speech, The Lebanese American University, November 
1998. 
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entity.17 Lebanese sociologist Farid El-Khazen explains that, "What sets Lebanon apart 
from other divided societies is the regional order within which it has had to interact." He 
maintains that, "The Middle East is one of the most unstable regional orders in the post-
second world international system. Other divided societies in Europe, Asia, or Africa 
have not had to deal with kinds of regional conflicts that have affected Lebanon, notably 
frequent inter-Arab disputes and the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict."18 The sectarian 
divisions among the Lebanese groups coupled with allegiances by some to foreign actors 
make it impossible for Lebanon to remain neutral regarding conflicts taking place beyond 
its borders. Commenting on the involvement of Lebanese and other Arab religious 
groups in the Syrian war next door, Talal Salman, from the Lebanese pan- Arab daily 
Assafir (The Ambassador), rightfully contends that, "The citizen has never had his reli-
gion put to the test as much as it is today, whether he belongs to the overwhelming ma-
jority of Muslims, or to the religious minorities — particularly Christians— who are part 
of the indigenous peoples of the region."19 He calls the Lebanese experiment "unique" in 
the way minority groups lack a common identity, referring to them as "entities created 
and recreated by foreign will and for foreign purposes." Thus, the role of geopolitics in 
influencing local politics and national allegiance has its bearing on the media, which de-
serves even closer attention during this period of heightened religiosity and ethnic 
awareness, surging not only in Lebanon, but also in the entire Middle East.  
                                                           
17
 Michael C.  Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968), 17.  
18
 Farid El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon: 1967-1976 (New York: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000),33.  
19
 Talal Salman, "Rise of Sectarianism Threatens Arab Societies," Assafir, January 9, 2013.  
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4. Lebanese sects run the media: Lebanon is the only country in the Arab world where the 
sectarian communities are stronger than the state.20 This has prevented the government 
from controlling the media, which allows for media freedom not available in any other 
Arab country. The leading Christian and Muslim sects all have political leaders and me-
dia outlets that represent their communities. Lebanon's Shiite speaker of parliament, 
Sunni prime minister, the Hezbollah party, and Christian deputies and party leaders own 
television, radio networks, newspapers, and online media. It is not that the media reflect 
conflicting party ideologies, as would be the normal case in other democracies; they are 
actually owned or controlled by political leaders who lead the country and speak on be-
half of their religious communities. The identification with the sect rather than the state, 
and the ability of sectarian leaders to influence public opinion through their media high-
lights the importance of the media's role in identity construction.  
As an agency of political socialization, the media's status and role within such a complex en-
vironment becomes more critical. Following Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm's premise that the 
media take on the form and coloration of the social and political systems within which they op-
erate,21 the media in the Lebanese plural democracy are, thus, expected to exhibit signs of con-
flict and accommodation reflective of the social and political system within which they operate. 
However, instead of analyzing Lebanese media against a normative Western media model, the 
investigation focuses on the interplay of sociopolitical pluralism, geopolitics, and the media—
hence, a focus on the context within which the media operate. To understand why the media op-
erate the way they do, it is necessary to understand the nature of political culture by tracing it 
                                                           
20
 Michael Young, The Ghosts of the Martyr's Square: An Eye Witness Account of Lebanon's Life Struggle (New 
York: Simon & Shuster, 2010), 26.    
21
 Fred S. Siebert et al. Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet 
Communist Concepts of what the Press Should Be and Do (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1956), 1.  
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back to the social system that gave birth to it. As Lazarsfeld et al rightfully point out, "Social 
characteristics determine political behavior."22 The sociopolitical context would, therefore, pro-
vide a more comprehensive understanding of the operation of the media and expose and explain 
the complexities associated with their status and behavior.  This will provide suggestions about 
the nature, operation, and limits of the media in the Lebanese plural democracy, which may be 
helpful for analyzing the media in other plural democracies.  
It should be emphasized that the unit of analysis in this research is the nation-state. In the 
midst of global media proliferation and the rapid transformations in the media climate in the Ar-
ab world, some scholars, including Marwan Kraidy, Mohammed Ayish, March Lynch, and Adel 
Iskandar, are calling for abandoning the nation-state as a unit of analysis and looking for ap-
proaches that are transnational. As Iskandar puts it, "Other trends have complicated state-based 
views of the region’s media. These include, [among others] the growing economic nexus be-
tween Saudi financiers and Lebanese talent in entertainment television, the growth of production 
locales across the region, and the increasingly galvanizing issue-based coverage of Arab af-
fairs."23  Kraidy argues that the rise of pan Arab media makes the nation-state a problematic unit 
of analysis because such media "consist of an unevenly integrated regional (pan Arab market), 
superimposed onto national systems and increasingly integrated into the global media market, 
although in many respects distinct from both."24 Mohammed Ayish joins this thrust of thought by 
                                                           
22
 Paul Felix Lazarsfeld et al., The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 27.  
23
 Adel Iskandar, "Lines in the Sand: Problematizing Arab Media in the Post-Taxonomic Era," Arab Media & Socie-
ty (May 7, 2007), 7. 
24
 Marwan Kraidy, "The Rise of Transnational Media Systems: Implications of Pan-Arab Media for Comparative 
Research," In Comparing Media Systems beyond the Western World, eds., Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 180.  
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pointing out that "A host of national, regional, and global developments seem to have given rise 
to new patterns of political communication in the Arab world since the end of the 1990s.25 
The arguments advanced by these scholars are valid in the sense that a global media trend 
is, to varying degrees, influencing local media environments in several countries of the Arab 
world; however, this study supports William Rugh's view that, "Important themes of continuity 
overlay this rapid change [as] national politics still play the crucial role in shaping the media en-
vironment of any given Arab country."26 Moreover, the investigation of the impact of global me-
dia on national media would be more relevant in Arab countries that have traditionally had 
closed media systems and are slowly opening up, rather than in Lebanon, which has always had a 
relatively open media system. This is not to say that the transnational dimension is insignificant 
in the Lebanese case; on the contrary, it plays a major role in the development of the media in-
dustry in Lebanon and would, therefore, necessitate a separate study. Finally, the use of the term 
"geopolitical" should not be confused with the terms "transnational" or "global." It is used strict-
ly to explain the sectarian, political, and ideological associations between local Lebanese sects 
and foreign actors as well as the political and strategic aims of the latter in Lebanon.   
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
Understanding the Lebanese political culture and how it impacts media behavior requires 
an explanation of how social and political factors intersect and reinforce each other. In the 
framework of a plural democracy, two related concepts need to be defined: the plural society and 
the consociational government. These concepts will be associated with what will be referred to 
                                                           
25
 Mohammad Ayish, "Political Communication on Arab World Television: Evolving Patterns," Political Communi-
cation, 19 (2002): 139-140. Also See Marc Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle 
East Politics Today (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
26
 William Rugh, "Do National Political Systems Still Influence Arab Media?" Arab Media & Society (May 2007): 
2. 
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as "social sectarianism" and "political sectarianism" when applied to the Lebanese case. These 
concepts will be first defined; then, the Lebanese case will be fitted into these definitions.  
Pluralism in democratic political theory is generally used to describe societies composed 
of different groups with competing interests. Divisions could be societal as well as structural, as 
in the structure of the government, where decision making is decentralized.27 David Held ex-
plains that some American pluralists, who expounded the concept, were interested in the problem 
of "factions in society" and their competition for power. 28 They agreed that the role of the state 
was to protect the freedom of factions and further their interest while preventing any individual 
faction from undermining the freedom of others. Held points out that, it is "the existence of di-
verse competitive interests [which provides] the basis of democratic equilibrium and the favora-
ble development of public policy."29 But how are equilibrium and stability achieved amidst an 
amalgam of competing interests? This question necessitates a distinction between the pluralistic 
society and the plural society.  
In a pluralistic society, "overlapping group memberships" and "cross-cutting" cleavages 
severely limit the ability of groups to maximize their interests at the expense of others and cause 
instability. These propositions advanced by theorists such as Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and 
Seymour Martin Lipset, state that cross-pressures resulting from memberships in different groups 
with dissimilar interests produce moderate attitudes. 30 More importantly, M.G. Smith, who 
makes the distinction between the plural and the pluralistic society, maintains that, although 
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there are different subcultures in a pluralistic society, peoples' value systems are "compatible 
with the national political consensus."31   
Shared political values mean there is a homogenous political culture which plays an im-
portant role in political stability. A good example would be Anglo-American political systems, 
which Gabriel Almond describes as "characterized by a homogeneous, secular political culture… 
There is a sharing of political ends and means. The great majority of the actors in the political 
system accept as the ultimate goals of the political system some combination of the values of 
freedom, mass welfare, and security. There are groups which stress one value at the expense of 
the others; there are times when one value is stressed by all groups; but by and large the tendency 
is for all these values to be shared, and for no one of them to be completely repressed."32  
This sharing of political ends makes it conceivable to relate some Western media models 
to this political culture. For example, one of the models that Christian et al. advance is The Plu-
ralist Democracy Model, also known as Liberal Pluralism, characterized by a decentralization 
and dispersal of power to best guarantee against conflict that might emerge as a result of the plu-
rality of groups. In such a democracy, the media are often segmented and partisan, with each 
group having their own media outlet for mobilization, advocacy and recruitment. However, safe-
guarded by the state, the media play the role of sustaining the “constructive conflict which fuels 
the process of competition, which allows citizens to decide what choices and decisions best suit 
their needs."33  Similarly, Hallin and Mancini's North Atlantic or Liberal Model, characterized by 
strong commercialism, limited state intervention, and moderate pluralism applies to Anglo-
American systems. In Hallin and Mancini's words, "social divisions [in the United States] have 
not been expressed in distinct political ideologies or political party systems organized around 
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such ideologies. The American political party system is organized around two catchall, centrist 
parties, both committed to a liberal political culture that is essentially taken for granted." 34 
A plural society, on the other hand, is one which lacks national political consensus and as 
J.S.  Furnivall describes it, lacks "a common social demand."35 The concept originated when 
Western sociologists and anthropologists were studying people under colonialism. According to 
Leo Kuper, the plural society refers to "the many new states that achieved independence after 
World War II and now seek to transform from state to nation the medley of peoples inherited in 
arbitrary combinations from the colonial powers."36 However, the term need not necessarily be 
connected with colonialism. Kuper explains that the term generally denotes "societies character-
ized by certain conditions of cultural diversity and social cleavage... [where] stability is seen as 
precarious."37  
M. G. Smith, who refined the concept, maintains that plural societies are heterogeneous 
to the point that the different segments composing them, which have internally homogenous cul-
tural traditions, are incompatible. While members of these segments mix socially, they are inca-
pable of cultural unity since they have basically contradictory core institutions, such as kinship, 
religion, education, and other elements of social structure.38 The only place where the different 
segments are able to meet, as Furnivall maintains, is the marketplace, because people are similar 
in economic needs. 
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In such a society, Lijphart explains, the agents of socialization tend to be organized along 
lines of segmental cleavages, which may be religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, 
racial, or ethnic in nature. The plural society is also associated with the concept of the "non-
national state," where more than one society exists within the same political unit, but do not 
agree on their national entity.39 Terms related to plural societies include "vertical pluralism," 
"segmented pluralism," "social fragmentation," "ideological compartmentalization, or in the Leb-
anese case, "confessional/sectarian pluralism." 40 
This incompatibility between the different institutional systems in a plural society neces-
sitates in both Furnivall and Smith's view the use of force to maintain order.41  Therefore, as 
Rabushka and Shepsle maintain, "The plural state cannot be organized for social normative ends, 
since these ends vary with the different cultural norms of the respective communities."42  
How can a stable democracy, then, function in plural societies? The fact that cleavages 
are not likely to cross-cut but reinforce one another implies that immobilism, conflict, and civil 
war— in extreme cases— are likely to result. However, Lijphart maintains that a homogenous 
political culture is not the only determinant of stability. It may be achieved through a power shar-
ing formula by the leaders of the different segments. This is what he refers to as Consociational 
Democracy. This political arrangement can be devised to rule such societies to prevent conflict 
without necessarily resulting in social integration.43 Lijphart defines a Consociational Democra-
                                                           
39
 The concept was used by Manning Nash in his study of Guatemala. See "Political Relations in Guatemala," Social 
and Economic Studies 7, no.1 (1958): 65-75. 
40
 Hanz Daadler, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," World Politics 26, no. 4 (1974): 606. 
41
 Emphasis mine; it is meant to point out the fact that although the authors stressed the need for the use of force in 
their cases, in the case of Lebanon, force has not been used to maintain order despite the fact that elements of the 
plural society apply. 
42
 Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in a Plural Society: A Theory of Democratic Instability, 11. 
43
 Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy, 28. 
15 
 
 
cy in terms of four basic characteristics:"grand coalition, cultural autonomy, proportionality, and 
mutual veto."44   
For a Consociational Democracy to work, the political elite consciously seek to stabilize 
a divided society by counteracting the destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation. Hans 
Daadler explains that "patterns of inter-elite accommodation, therefore, form an independent var-
iable that may impede and reverse the centrifugal forces at the level of the masses."45 Generally, 
the ruling elite should avoid a government by majority rule and seek grand coalitions and forms 
of proportional representation to secure everybody's share in government.  Also, sub-groups 
must be allowed a degree of cultural autonomy to arrange their own affairs. There should also be 
mutual vetoes on vital matters that are of high importance to the subgroups.46  
Among the criticisms marshaled at Consociational Democracy is that it has not succeeded 
at preventing conflict in many cases—an argument that precludes any solid connection between 
this form of government and stability. It was also considered by some to be non-democratic, not 
only because it limits rule to an elite of leaders, but also because it might exacerbate rather than 
ameliorates inter-communal tensions by institutionalizing ethnic differences.47 While some 
scholars have disqualified consociationalism as the appropriate form of government for Lebanon, 
this study is of the view that this system remains the only suitable formula for governance in 
Lebanon today. However, the study does not examine whether consociationalism is appropriate 
or inappropriate for Lebanon. It is only concerned with studying the media within their present 
plural and consociational setting. 
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How Lebanon fits into the plural model: Lebanon fits into the plural society model by 
relatively meeting certain criteria set by Lijphart. First, the segments dividing the society and 
their sizes must be exactly identifiable: the 18 Lebanese sects divided between Christians and 
Muslims are identifiable and their sizes, despite the absence of an updated census, known. More-
over, each geographic region in Lebanon has a predominance of one or more sects.  Second, 
there should be coincidence between "segmental boundaries and the boundaries between the po-
litical, social, and economic organizations:" social and cultural boundaries among the sects, for 
example, are evident in personal status laws, where sects—not the state— regulate personal sta-
tus issues, like marriage and divorce, and where religious marriage takes precedence over civil 
marriage. This makes inter-sectarian marriages rare and complicated. Other social boundaries are 
evident in the education system, where the majority of private schools are run by religious insti-
tutions attended by students of the same religion or sect. Third, since party and segmental loyal-
ties should coincide, "there should be little or no change in the voting support of the different 
parties from election to election:"48 the Lebanese sects are known to affiliate with political par-
ties with diverging agendas and to owe loyalty to sectarian leaders, exhibiting a patron-client re-
lationship. Followers of sect leaders regularly vote for the same leaders from election to election.   
In almost every publication on Lebanon, the Lebanese society, with its predominantly 
Maronite, Shiite, and Sunni communities,49 is described as "plural" in which "religious sects 
have had rather separate histories and different outside affiliations in the past and present;"50 a 
society characterized by "overlapping sectarian, ideological, economic, regional, and cultural 
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cleavages."51 Lebanese-British historian Albert Hourani gives an accurate depiction of the "idea" 
of Lebanon. "The urban idea of Lebanon," contends Hourani, "was neither a society closed 
against the outside world, nor of a unitary society in which smaller communities were dissolved-
but something between the two: a plural society in which communities, still different on the level 
of inherited religious loyalties and intimate family ties, coexisted within a common frame-
work."52 As the historical origins as well as the forms of this pluralism are elaborated in the next 
chapter, the present discussion will be limited to the presentation of basic definitions related to 
the concept.  
Aspects of the plural society manifest themselves through what is known in the Lebanese   
sociological dictionary as "social sectarianism" or "confessional pluralism." Lebanese political 
scientist Adnan Fawaz defines social sectarianism as pertaining "to the sect's autonomy in ad-
ministering for its members— through its recognized religious officials— matters that are re-
garded as falling within the domain of 'personal status,' such as marriage, divorce, custody, 
etc."53 Thus, the basic patterns of social organization, Lebanese sociologist Samir Khalaf ex-
plains, are based on what he calls "primordial ties," including kinship, fealty, and religion.54 
They play the role in consolidating social sectarianism, which in turn prevents social cohesion. 
Fawaz argues that, "Social sectarianism in Lebanon is instrumental in steering the socialization 
process, in general, and the political process, in particular, in the direction of social fragmenta-
tion. The socializing agencies involved in this process—the family, the peer group, the school, 
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the religious institution, and the mass media—have had a tremendous divisive impact on the 
Lebanese people."55 Moreover, religious affiliation in Lebanon, as one Associated Press journal-
ist notes, "is often tied to where one lives, how one speaks, and which TV station one watches. 
Many Lebanese seem to have a sixth sense for [guessing] others' sects based on dress, 
hometown, and other factors."56 
Lebanese sociologist Halim Barakat among other scholars, maintains that Lebanese soci-
ety lacks extensive open dialogue among the groups, as there is precedence of "private loyalties 
and interests" over "public loyalties and interests."  Other factors that contribute to social divi-
sions include the geographic concentration of the different religious communities, the non-
separation of religion from the state, and the legitimization of confessionalism."57 
The political culture resulting from this social system is clearly fragmented.   The "mosa-
ic" nature of the Lebanese society, as Barakat explains, is characterized by a lack of consensus 
on the fundamentals. Particularly, the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon do not agree on their 
national identity: whether Lebanon is actually Lebanese or Arab.58 This disagreement has been 
translated into a ravaging inter-sectarian civil war that was manipulated by foreign actors back-
ing the warring factions. Even during post-war periods of relative stability, sectarian and political 
tensions have persisted, not only between Christian and Muslims, but also among sects within 
these two communities. In Khalaf's words, "The political blocs and fronts are so absorbed with 
parochial and personalistic rivalries that they fail to serve the larger national purpose of mobiliz-
ing the population for the broader aims of society."59 
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The sectarian rivalries among the different groups, along with the strong interference by 
religious authorities in Lebanese and social affairs, have hampered efforts towards the eradica-
tion of social sectarianism. One recent example concerns legalizing civil marriage in Lebanon. 
Until April 25, 2013, when the first non-religious marriage in Lebanon was officially recognized, 
inter-sectarian marriages required (and still do) either conversion by one of the parties or seeking 
a civil marriage abroad. In his efforts to promote coexistence, Lebanese President Michel Sulei-
man proposed a civil marriage law, considering it "a very important step in eradicating sectarian-
ism and solidifying national unity."60 However, his attempts were hampered by a blatant refusal 
by religious figures. The country's highest Sunni authority fiercely opposed the law, threatening 
Muslims who accept it with damnation.  While Christian clerics have been more lenient, they 
have been careful about civil marriage proposals on the grounds that if a civil marriage law were 
passed, personal status issues, like divorce and inheritance, would still be handled by religious 
authorities, and changing them would be very complicated and unlikely to take place.61 
The pluralism distinctive of the Lebanese social structure would necessitate a democratic 
form of government that would guarantee representation of the different groups. The founding 
fathers of modern day Lebanon attempted to do so since the Lebanese got their independence 
from French colonial rule in 1943. The formula was a National Pact that guarantees mutual coex-
istence by dividing power among the three largest communities—the Christian Maronites, Sun-
nis, and Shiites. This system, referred to as "Political Sectarianism," explains Fawaz, "pertains to 
the sectarian quota system which distributes the legislative, executive, and administrative posts 
of the state among the religious sects that comprise the Lebanese society."62 This translates into a 
consociational form of democracy, aspects of which the Lebanese government has exhibited ever 
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since its creation after independence. The first consociational government established in post-
independence Lebanon, however, gave more powers to the Maronites, who constituted a slight 
majority over others sects. The demographic changes in favor of the Muslims, mutual sectarian 
alienation, as well as geopolitical factors were among the reasons that led to the outbreak of the 
civil war in 1975. This necessitated an amendment to the Lebanese constitution in the post-civil 
war government, guaranteeing equal distribution among the sects depending on their size and 
political role. While this formula has been on the whole precarious, it has managed to maintain 
the country's survival.  
The Lebanese media landscape. The Lebanese media landscape is reflective of the plural-
ism characterizing the sociopolitical landscape.  While the media are highly profit-driven and 
operate in the freest democratic environment in the Arab world, they are often used as political 
and sectarian instruments. For example, Hezbollah, a very powerful political and military party, 
both leads the majority of the Shiites in Lebanon as well as owns Al-Manar TV (The Beacon) 
and Annour Radio (The Light), among others. Their agenda is highly pro-Iranian, anti-Israeli, 
and anti-American. Their critics accuse them of aiming to institute an Islamic republic in Leba-
non on the model of the Islamic Republic of Iran.63 Both Rafik Hariri and his son, Saad Hariri, 
were prime ministers of Lebanon. At the same time, the Hariri family leads the majority of the 
Sunni sect and owns Future TV, Radio Orient, and, Al-Mustaqbal daily (The Future). Their 
agenda is pro-Saudi Arabian, presently pro-Western, and fiercely anti-Syrian. Although their dis-
course is "national," they are regarded as a "political station with Sunni persuasion."64 Nabih 
Berri, the Shiite speaker of parliament, leads another Shiite group affiliated with the movement, 
Amal (Hope). He owns NBN and is known to be pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian.  Christian leaders, 
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too, have their media networks. Two powerful leaders, among others, rule the Christian 
Maronites: Samir Geagea, who had, at one time, owned LBCI network, lost it, and recently 
claimed it in a lawsuit, and Michel Aoun, another Maronite leader, whose Orange TV network 
has been the "mouthpiece" of his Free Patriotic Movement.65 While LBCI's discourse has oscil-
lated between objectivity and bias, it has, on the whole, been the mouthpiece of the Maronites.66 
Other stations include Murr TV (MTV), owned by an influential Greek Orthodox politician, and 
Al-Jadeed (New TV), owned by a Sunni businessman. These networks, namely, Al-Manar, Fu-
ture TV, and Al-Jadeed, are said to be sponsored by competing regional forces: Iran, Qatar, and 
Saudi Arabia.67 Equally, the press, although less sectarian, has been sponsored by foreign, main-
ly Arab, powers and has also joined the anti-Syrian, pro-Syrian debate. While newspapers tend to 
have more diversity in their opinion pieces, they may be categorized as pan-Arab or generally 
pro-Syrian, such as Assafir, Addiyar, and Al-Akhbar, or anti-Syrian, pro-Western, like Annahar, 
founded by a Christian Orthodox political family, and Al-Mustaqbal, Hariri's newspaper, to name 
a few.  
Fitting the Lebanese media into a specific typology is problematic. William Rugh, who 
advanced a typology of the Arab press, placed Lebanon within the "diverse press" typology 
alongside Kuwait and Morocco. Rugh's main thesis is that, "The most important causal variable 
affecting the political role of the mass media in [Arab countries] is the underlying political sys-
tem that prevails in every country. Other factors such as geography turned out to be not very im-
portant."68 Rugh's typology is supposedly based on the similarities in the political systems in dif-
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ferent Arab countries.69 He argues that the "diverse" press is characterized by competing political 
parties or groups who can express their views relatively freely. Some restrictions on freedom of 
expression exist, but they are relatively minimal. Also all newspapers are owned by private indi-
viduals or political parties, and they differ in their editorial policies. They may be critical of the 
government, although some newspapers tend to defend the policies of the government.70 
This typology is only partly accurate. Not only are the governments of these countries 
different; the sociopolitical contexts of these countries vary greatly. Therefore, what might seem 
similar on the surface may be caused by a multitude of factors and is, therefore, an unreliable 
indication. Moreover, the uniqueness of the Lebanese case makes other factors such as geogra-
phy extremely important, unlike what Rugh argues. Lebanon's geographic position is its strength 
as well as its Achilles Heel. Foreign intervention in Lebanon's political affairs has a significant 
bearing on its media.  
Nor does a Western model entirely apply to Lebanon. Marwan Kraidy, in assessing the 
Hallin and Mancini models over the Lebanese case, maintains that Lebanon has aspects from 
both the Polarized Pluralist Model and North Atlantic Model.71 The former applies to countries 
of Continental Europe and is characterized by strong political parallelism manifested in partisan 
and ideological media. The latter applies to Anglo-American countries and is characterized by 
moderate pluralism and commercial media. While Lebanon does have aspects of both, it diverges 
from the Polarized Pluralist Model in the nature of media partisanship. The pluralism in Leba-
nese media is not rooted in conflicting ideological orientations as is the case in the Continental 
European model. In Continental Europe, it was mostly ideological rifts between Left and Right 
                                                           
69
 Ibid., 5. 
70
 See William Rugh, Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 2004), 89-120. 
71
 Kraidy, 199.  
23 
 
 
that were translated into ideological politics, with newspapers "identifying with ideological 
tendencies, and [where] traditions of advocacy and commentary-oriented journalism were often 
strong."72 The Lebanese media, although reflective of disparate and opposing political orienta-
tions, are not primarily ideologically driven; they follow politico-sectarian agendas. Lebanese 
Media scholar, Nabil Dajani, puts it rightfully:  
Lebanese media institutions do not fit either the Third World model or the Western Mod-
el of media operation, for the existing societal forces in every state determine the struc-
ture, content and operation of media institutions. The mass media, therefore, are unique 
to their society. They cannot have identity or effects outside the concrete instances within 
which the different forces operate.73 
It is against this background that the study of Lebanese media discourse should take place. The 
sociopolitical framework provided has emphasized three important considerations: that the Leb-
anese Christian and Muslim groups are divided to the point of lacking a "common social de-
mand," a fact which has created a fragmented political culture that has continuously hampered 
national integration; that the Lebanese plural polity is shaky as a result of its presence in a vola-
tile, yet strategic, geographic setting, which has invited intervention and manipulation of the 
Lebanese sects by foreign actors; that the Lebanese media are reflective of this sociopolitical set-
ting  and placing them within a specific media typology would be problematic.  
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1.3 Research Questions 
This section begins with a hypothesis. Starting from the premise advanced by Hallin and 
Mancini, and Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm that the media reflect the social and political envi-
ronment in which they operate, the study supposes that, in the case of the Lebanese plural de-
mocracy, the media reflect the pluralism characteristic of the sociopolitical system, but their sta-
tus and role are affected by parochially sectarian and regional considerations. In the light of the 
above hypothesis, the following research questions are posed:  
1. How have sociopolitical and geopolitical factors shaped the Lebanese plural democracy?  
 
2. How does the consociationalism of the Lebanese polity shape the media landscape?  
 
3. Does Lebanese television discourse exacerbate sectarian divisions or attenuate them? 
 
4. Should the role of Lebanese media be appraised normatively or should it be evaluated in 
relation to the socio-cultural and political framework within which they operate?  
1.4 Methodology 
Why case study-research. The in-depth case study is an appropriate method for this re-
search primarily because it provides the researcher with the possibility of using a combination of 
data collection tools to explore, describe, explain, and predict processes associated with one or 
more phenomena.74 Robert Stake defines this method as "the study of the particularity and com-
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plexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances,"75 
while Robert Yin emphasizes that the enquiry should take place "especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident."76 This means that the case is not an 
isolated variable but a dynamic process which is shaped by a variety of factors. By probing the 
Lebanese media in their real-world context, the study aims to gain new insight which might be 
instructive for developing, extending, or reversing theory on the media in plural democracies.77  
While the case study does have a descriptive component, it is mostly explanatory.  For it 
attempts to answer how and why the media in Lebanon operate the way they do. However, since 
it is only focused on one media system, the selection of this particular case raises questions as to 
whether its significance lies in its "intrinsic" value, to use Robert Case's term, or in its "instru-
mental" ability to provide insight into a larger issue.78 It is reasonable to contend that this case is 
mostly intrinsic since its unique attributes make it hard to compare to other cases. Yet, the ability 
of the case to play a supportive role in understanding the relationship between the media and so-
ciopolitical factors makes it instrumental in providing insight on how the media operate in a plu-
ral society with a consociational form of government, which might help elucidate future research 
in this direction.   
A holistic approach. Since the aim of the research is to study the media within a particu-
lar sociopolitical context, a holistic and comprehensive approach has been adopted; it ranges 
from historical description and explanation, to observation and analysis of media behavior, to 
discourse analysis of television texts.  The relation between media and their context is crucial for 
                                                           
75
 Robert Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (CA: Sage Publications, 1995): XI.  
76
 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009): 18.  
77
 D.B. Bromley, The Case Study Method in Psychology and Related Disciplines (Great Britain: Wiley, 1986), 1.  
78
 Stake, The Art of Case Study Research, 3-4.  
26 
 
 
this research because it is precisely this closeness to the context that helps explain and predict the 
phenomena under study.  
Sources of evidence. As a holistic examination covers a not so small range of topics, the 
relevant data, as Yin maintains, come from multiple and not singular sources of evidence."79 Ac-
cording to Stake, sources of evidence may come from a historical background, a physical setting, 
economic, political, legal and aesthetic settings, other factors through which the case is recog-
nized, or informants through whom the case can be known.80  Yin names these sources "direct 
observation" (of human actions or of a physical environment); "documentation" (of newspapers 
articles, letters, etc.); "archival records" (including library records stored in search engines such 
as LexisNexis and Proquest; mass media records, both electronic and print); "interviews" (open-
ended conversations with key participants); "participant observation"(being part of the case being 
studied); and physical artifacts." 81  
With the exception of direct interviews—which were not essential since the study is 
mostly based on media discourse analysis—the research tools include almost all of the above 
mentioned. The study used archival records, including broadcast bulletins and newspaper edito-
rials. The broadcast material was retrieved directly from the following news networks' websites: 
namely: www.otv.com.lb; www.mtv.com.lb; www.almanar.com.lb; www.lbcgroup.tv; and 
www.futuretvnetwork.com.  Recent newspaper articles (December 2012-April 2013) were re-
trieved directly from the Arabic newspapers' archive section available on their websites. These 
are: www.annahaonline.com; www.assafir.com; www.almustaqbal.com; and www.al-
Akhbar.com. English newspaper articles were retrieved from www.dailystar.com.lb. Older arti-
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cles were retrieved from LexisNexis and other search engines. Primary data also include statis-
tics from research institutes, including the Association of Religious Data Archives, the Beirut 
Center for Research and Information, and Information International. While the analysis focuses 
on current events, it also pays very close attention to historical, political, and sociological ac-
counts that are instrumental in explaining these events. Some of these accounts come from his-
torical documents; others from public statements, or public interviews or speeches.  
The researcher has also been a direct observer of the media situation in Lebanon, having 
lived there all her life, and a participant observer, by working at one of the leading television 
networks for many years. For example, the researcher was working at Future TV in 2008, when 
Hezbollah gunmen stormed and unplugged the station. This incident serves as evidence in the 
discussion of the tendency of the media to be a destabilizing factor when political and sectarian 
interests of the leaders who run them are jeopardized.  
The units of analysis. The case contains what Yin calls embedded sub-cases. It is, there-
fore, referred to as an embedded single-case study. 82 This means that, while particular attention 
has been given to the overall context of the case—historical, social, political— and how it inter-
acts with the overall media system, sub-units of analysis, namely media texts, were, among oth-
ers,  used, to establish the proposed link between the sociopolitical environment and media be-
havior. Thus, the media landscape is the main unit of analysis and television discourse is the sub-
unit of analysis.  
The sample. After providing the sociopolitical context, all of the media networks that 
form the Lebanese mediascape are briefly laid out. However, the research focuses on four TV 
networks that serve as a sample for the purpose of the study. This sample is not random. It is  
"purposive:" the units are of interest because "they are important for the times and play a key 
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role in history."83 The function of these units is to present the main sectarian and political players 
whose role is significant in the present sociopolitical and media landscapes. The media networks 
selected are: 
1. Orange TV (OTV), representing Maronite discourse 
2. Al-Manar (The Beacon), representing Hezbollah (Shiite) discourse 
3. Future TV, representing Sunni discourse 
4. Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI), representing Maronite dis-
course 
Why this sample. These units have been selected because they fill categories and polar 
types. Kathleen Eisendhardt maintains that cases may be selected to "fill theoretical categories 
and provide examples of polar types… in which the process of interest is transparently observa-
ble." 84 Therefore, case study research relies on "theoretical sampling" and not statistical sam-
pling. 85 First, these stations represent the three largest sects in Lebanon, or "categories," namely 
the Maronites, the Shiites, and the Sunnis. These communities are the main players in the socio-
political game. While other stations also represent sects, including National Broadcasting Net-
work (NBN), the pro-Amal Shiite network, and Murr TV (MTV), the Christian Orthodox net-
work, the selected networks, especially Al-Manar, OTV, and Future TV, stand out for their ag-
gressive role in being the mouthpieces of their communities and their political agendas. Second-
ly, these networks, grouped two by two, reveal the present political rift and alliances in the coun-
try. On one "pole," OTV and Al-Manar represent one political group, namely the pro-Syrian, 
March 8 forces, and on another pole, LBCI and Future TV represent the pro-Western, March 14 
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forces.86 Other stations would fall on either side of this spectrum.   The reason why two Maronite 
stations were selected is not only because the Maronites are the most influential sect within the 
Christian community and their stations are highly popular, but also because the Maronites, them-
selves, are divided. This division tilts the balance of power in the country in favor of one camp or 
the other. These cases are "paradigmatic" in the sense that they provide an "exemplar" or proto-
type of the larger problem facing Lebanon. They are also "extreme" in some instances, especially 
with Future TV and Al-Manar, and understanding them requires a deeper analysis of their causes 
and consequences.   
The time frame. The overall discussion of the media landscape in this study covers the pe-
riod that extends from 2005, the year influential Sunni leader and Prime Minister Rafik Hariri 
was assassinated, to the present. This period is significant because Hariri's assassination theoreti-
cally ended Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, a fact which helped restore relative media free-
dom.87 For the first time since the end of the civil war, the media are relatively free to operate but 
are equally affected by the very thorny sociopolitical situation that resulted after Hariri's assassi-
nation. The period covered for the selection of the analyzed television texts extends from De-
cember, 2012 to April, 2013.  This period witnessed major developments in Lebanon and the re-
gion, most notably preparations for parliamentary elections, the war in Syria bordering Lebanon, 
and the Arab Spring affecting the whole Middle East region. These events provide rich material 
for analysis.  
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The media texts. The texts were retrieved from the prime-time news bulletins broadcast 
on the four networks mentioned above. Four news stories, which are believed to be representa-
tive of the current sociopolitical and media situation in Lebanon, were selected. Three of the sto-
ries are political and one is socioeconomic. They are named as follows:  
Story 1: "Sectarian Fears." This story revolves around a debate over a new electoral law. 
The debate raised sectarian tensions, mostly between Sunnis and Maronites, as well as Sunnis 
and Shiites, because the law, if passed, would promote the interests of some sects over others.88 
The story occupied the headlines for months and is likely to continue until elections are held in 
June 2013. The analysis looks at the coverage of OTV, Future TV, Al- Manar, and LBCI con-
secutively.  
 Story 2: "Reporting the Syrian War." The importance of this story lies in its ability to 
show how Lebanese media report an outside event with geopolitical significance. It is meant to 
probe how local sectarian and political divisions in the Lebanese society take a geopolitical di-
mension, which in turn manifests itself locally. The analysis compares the coverage of the Syrian 
war as done by Future TV, Al-Manar, OTV, and LBCI consecutively and how the coverage var-
ies depending on political and sectarian considerations.  
Story 3: "Sunni Radicals." This story is significant because it illustrates how local and 
geopolitical factors intersect to impact stability and sectarian coexistence in Lebanon. Sunni and 
Shiite groups in Lebanon are clashing because some militants from these two communities have 
associated themselves with the war in Syria: Hezbollah has been fighting alongside the Assad 
regime, and the Sunnis alongside the Syrian opposition. The Syrian war has prompted the rise of 
radical Sunnis, known as Salafists, who have pledged Jihad on the side of their co-religionists in 
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Syria—a fact which has antagonized Shiites and alarmed other Lebanese groups. The analysis 
looks at LBCI, Future TV, Al-Manar, and OTV consecutively.  
Story 4: "Wage Protests." This story revolves around marches and sit-ins organized by 
public sector employees and school teachers in demand for wage increases. It is significant be-
cause it illustrates an issue that is of high importance to the Lebanese: socioeconomic conditions 
and their struggle with poverty. Unlike the first three stories, this story is not about identity and 
power struggles; it is about a basic human need.  The purpose of the analysis, which looks at all 
four stations, is to see whether the media discourse resembles the one used in their previous sto-
ries or whether it diverges from it.  
Translation. Each news story was transcribed and translated by the researcher from Ara-
bic to English. There is a palpable difference between Lebanese news reporting in Arabic and 
news reporting in English, especially in news leads and news bulletin introductions. While An-
glo-American news reporting is known to be short, concise, and devoid of rhetorical flourish, 
Lebanese news reporting is full of argumentation and figures of speech. A verbatim translation 
would result in very awkward language, which, in the eyes of American or British journalists or 
academics, would require polish. However, performing such polish might kill the substance and 
characteristic of the language, which is purposefully based on argumentation and rhetorical 
flourish. Therefore, care was taken to translate the discourse as clearly and accurately as possible 
while retaining its "Lebanese characteristics." For example, a news lead informing that the Syri-
an regime is making the Syrian people hungry may be stated as simply as "the Syrian regime is 
starving its people." However, Future TV put it in a more "sophisticated" way:  "The Syrian re-
gime is resorting to the starvation of what is left of a Syrian people who withstood the monstrosi-
ty of its brigades." As will be shown in the discourse analysis in chapter four, phrases such as 
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"resorting to," "what is left of," "withstood the monstrosity of its brigades," are, among others, 
drama enhancing tools, which, if polished, would kill the idea Future TV is trying to communi-
cate. Moreover, some parts of the unusually long news leads were cut because keeping them in 
their original form would be repetitive and nonessential. Some parts, due to their redundant lan-
guage, were shortened and translated more "holistically," without affecting their central idea.  
Presentation of the stories. Each story is laid out in three parts: the first part describes 
what the story is about; the second part provides the context against which the story should be 
analyzed; the third part is a discourse analysis of the media texts on the story as presented on the 
different channels, where argumentative structures of the texts are probed.  
The stories are analyzed by using excerpts from one or more news reports, with a focus 
on the story leads. Focus on leads was made not only because the lead is usually the most news-
worthy element of the story, but, most importantly, because the lead, in the case of Lebanese 
news reporting, is the venue where the news anchor provides an interpretation of the news. It is 
the place where he or she makes strong arguments, normally reserved for newspaper editorialists 
and opinion writers. Since leads do not show any images, no visual analysis is included. Howev-
er, in some cases where full news reports are used, such as "The Syrian War" and "Wage Pro-
tests," reference to the images used is made.  
Discourse Analysis. The media texts analyzed are referred to as the media discourse. 
While it has been common to use text with written language and discourse with spoken language, 
it is commonplace regard the concept of text in today’s modern Linguistics as including every 
type of utterance; therefore, a text may be a magazine article, a television interview, or a conver-
sation, to give a few examples.89 It is important to note that Discourse Analysis considerably 
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overlaps with Textual Linguistics. However, Linguistics tends to focus more on the internal 
structures of a text, or is text-internal, while Discourse Analysis focuses more on the context in 
which the text takes place, or is text-external. 90 For example, an analysis of language would look 
for structures such as "nominalization," or the use of passive rather than active forms of verbs, 
among others, to explain how discursive practice can hide the agent and promote the interests of 
certain groups in society. On the other hand, social science analysts who rely less on linguistics 
use their skill and erudition to study a text by focusing on the context. They are more interested 
in the function the discourse is supposed to achieve.  The present analysis considers both linguis-
tic and contextual elements. Particularly, it studies the internal structures of the texts taking into 
account the function they are supposed to achieve in their proper context. This is one of the ap-
proaches to Discourse Analysis that Potter and Wetherell present: to find patterns associated 
with the activity of language use, performing a certain function, within broader contexts, such as 
society or culture.91 The present analysis is also critical because it attempts to expose the power 
struggles that take place through media discourse. It examines how the discourse produces or 
perpetuates sectarianism, fear, domination and resistance.  
Teun Van Dijk, the main exponent of Critical Discourse Analysis, maintains that social 
power can manifest itself through control of the forms of the media, the form and content of dis-
course, including persuasion and indoctrination. He maintains that once one is able to understand 
how the processes of representation take place, he or she will be able to show how, for example, 
racist reporting about immigrants can lead to the formation or confirmation of prejudices and ste-
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reotypes, which, in turn, can lead to racist ideologies that reproduce racist talk.92 Following Van 
Dijk's method, a critical reading of the texts will be performed as follows:  
An analysis of semantic macrostructures: a study of "global meanings," topics or themes. 
These themes are what discourses are about: they are mostly intentional and easily memorized by 
audiences. Discursively, topics or themes are expressed in titles, abstracts, summaries and an-
nouncements, and, in my case, news leads; 
A focus on microstructure or local meanings: this includes an analysis of sentence struc-
ture. To unpack the persuasive elements of the discourse, the study looks at rhetorical techniques 
that include imagery, overstatements, hyperbole, euphemisms, and mitigation among others. It 
also considers naming choices to show the way each group is called or referred to and explain 
how in-group and out-group identities are created; 
Identification of context models: context models serve as the link between discourse and 
context. Context models make sure that language users adapt their discourse to the social envi-
ronment so that it is socially appropriate. By laying out the context within which each story is 
told and the role each sect and media outlet play in it, the study aims to establish the connection 
between the context and the discourse and explain why the media behave the way they do.93 
Advantages and limitations of the method. The multiplicity of data collection sources in 
case study research allows for triangulation, which involves "the comparison of two or more 
forms of evidence with respect to an object of research interest, [with the goal of seeking] con-
vergence of meaning from more than one direction."94 By relying on a variety of sources, the 
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study attempts to establish stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses. For example, the 
discussion of the political leaning of the Hariri-owned media looks not only at their television 
discourse, but also at the statements from their political leaders and opinions from their newspa-
per editorialists. The convergence of meaning from these various sources corroborates the argu-
ments on this topic. 
To what extent, however, is this study able to provide solid propositions and build theo-
retical constructs that may be applicable over other similar cases? This is one of the concerns that 
skeptics have raised: the presupposed inability of the case study to provide generalizable results. 
This skepticism comes from a tendency in scientific research to give more value to "theoretical 
context-independent knowledge" than to "practical, context-dependent knowledge," and to con-
sider the case study biased toward the researcher's pre-conceived ideas.95 However, to many ad-
vocates of this method, this is only a misleading misconception.  For example, Donald Campbell 
defends this method by stressing the fact that "qualitative common-sense knowing is not replaced 
by quantitative knowing."96 This implies that Social Science theories are not infallible. Bent 
Flyvbjerg maintains that "in the study of human affairs, there appears to exist only context-
dependent knowledge [as]… there does not and probably cannot exist predictive theory in Social 
Science [because] it has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory."97 
Moreover, Flyvberg argues that closeness to context increases expert activity. It is crucial for 
"the development of a nuanced view of reality… and [is] important for the researcher's own 
learning processes in developing the skills needed to do good research."98 This implies that case 
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study research is not primarily concerned with generalizability as much as it is with falsification, 
which may result from the proximity of the researcher to the case under study and its context.  
Generalizability, however, may be increased through the strategic selection of the case.  
For example, some cases are to be "representative" or "typical" and, therefore, use "random sam-
ples." The sample size here is decisive for generalization for the entire population. Other cases 
are more atypical or "extreme," where explanation of deeper causes behind a problem and its 
consequences is needed; hence a smaller sample chosen for its validity to the study would be 
more appropriate. Other types include the critical case, selected depending on its strategic im-
portance in relation to a general problem; or the paradigmatic case, one that is prototypical, 
whose role is to "highlight more general characteristics of the societies in question."99 As was 
mentioned earlier, the cases selected in this study are examples of both the paradigmatic case and 
extreme case.   
While case studies do not allow for statistical generalization, they do allow for "analytical 
generalization," which refers to the generalization from empirical observations to theory, rather 
than to a population.100  In Yin's words, case studies "depend on using a study's theoretical 
framework to establish a logic that might be applicable to other situations."101 In order to do so, 
the investigator should be able to show internal validity, i.e., how the results of the study can es-
tablish a logical connection between concepts, and theoretical constructs or sequence of events 
within the study; and external validity, i.e., how the same theoretical propositions could be ap-
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plied over cases outside the study, where "similar concepts, constructs, or sequences might be 
relevant."102 
As will be shown in the conclusions of this study, the internal validity, achieved through 
the compatibility of the final results with the concepts and theoretical framework established at 
the beginning of the study, is proof that analytical generalization has been established. While the 
study does not assess the extent to which its results are externally valid, as it is only concerned 
with one case and does investigate whether its arguments apply over other cases, it is possible to 
draw from the study conclusions which may be applicable over other cases with similar sociopo-
litical and media frameworks.  
1.5 Outline of the Chapters 
Chapter 1: Introduction: The present chapter has provided the conceptual foundations 
and methodological procedures necessary for an understanding of the arguments formulated in 
this study. The concepts include the plural society, the consociational plural democracy, social 
sectarianism and political sectarianism, as well as case study research.  
Chapter 2: Some Aspects of the Lebanese Plural Democracy: This chapter establishes 
the sociopolitical framework against which the analysis of the Lebanese media landscape should 
take place.  It provides an elaborate and detailed account of the factors that have contributed to 
creation of the Lebanese plural democracy and the institutionalization of social and political sec-
tarianism. It includes some historical background that explains the nature of the Lebanese plural 
society; who the Lebanese communities are; their cultural and religious background; their ideo-
logical and sectarian affiliations; their demographic size, etc. The chapter elaborates on the iden-
tity issues that hamper their national integration. Similarly, the chapter highlights Lebanon's ge-
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ographic position as an attractive venue for foreign intervention and shows how the sects have 
associated themselves with foreign actors on sectarian, ideological, and political grounds. This 
section equally introduces the most recent and significant events that are happening in the Leba-
nese and regional scenes, which are used for the media discourse analysis.  
Chapter 3: Lebanese Media Pluralism and the Politico-Sectarian Divide: This chap-
ter maps out the Lebanese broadcast media networks and the main print media publications. By 
focusing on ownership, funding, and content, the chapter establishes a link between politico-
sectarian identity and media discourse. Topics discussed include media regulation, coverage of 
important events since 2005, the year Syrian hegemony over Lebanon officially ended. Similar-
ly, this chapter gives a detailed account of four television networks, namely Orange TV, Al-
Manar, Future TV, and LBCI, the discourse of which will be analyzed in chapter four. The chap-
ter briefly discusses the print media in Lebanon.  
Chapter 4: A Discourse Analysis: How Four News Stories Are Reported in Lebanese 
Media: This chapter delves deeper into media reporting and critically analyses four re- 
cent and significant news stories as they are reported on four different TV channels representing 
the different sects. The purpose of the analysis is to assess whether television discourse exacer-
bates or attenuates sectarian beliefs.  
Chapter 5: The Role of the Media in the Lebanese Existential Crisis: This chapter 
presents interpretations and findings. It also discusses limitations and proposes suggestions for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: SOME ASPECTS OF THE LEBANESE PLURAL DEMOCRACY 
A walk through Lebanon's capital city, Beirut, is more than just a visit to one of the Arab 
world's most cosmopolitan cities; it is an unparalleled encounter with the remarkable union be-
tween Christianity and Islam. Old churches and mosques stand amid ruins that date from Roman 
times; church bells are heard against the echoing sound of the minarets. On the streets, in the ba-
zaars, and in every corner of the city, an assortment of different ways of life exhibits a kaleido-
scopic array of often contradictory cultural influences: women in fitted tops and designer jeans, 
others with long loose dresses and veils; mullahs and bearded men strolling one side of the street; 
youth with spiky hair and Ray Bans, another; night clubs and beach resorts where alcohol and 
rap music are consumed in abundance; restaurants and coffee houses where alcohol sale is pro-
hibited because it contradicts the values of Islam.  To the beholder, this cultural variety is rich-
ness itself. It bestows upon Lebanon a distinctive character. It shows that this tiny Middle East-
ern country is a "crossroads of civilizations,"103 as it has come to be known, "a buffer zone be-
tween Christianity and Islam, a point of contact between East and West."104  
Beneath this façade of cosmopolitanism, however, lie problems of an almost irreconcilable 
nature. The events that have shaped the character of Lebanon, both in its antiquity and its more 
recent history, are evidence that the Lebanese are a plural society that lacks, what M.J. Furnivall 
calls, a "common social demand."105 Their continuous disagreements over the "fundamentals"—
their national identity and the political mechanisms that should rule them—106 have been the 
main reasons behind a devastating civil war and the perpetual uncertainty plaguing their polity 
                                                           
103
 Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2004), 
131.   
104
 Marwan Kraidy, "The Global, Local, and the Hybrid: A Native Ethnography of Glocalization," In Ethnographic 
Research: A Reader, ed., Stephanie Taylor (London: Sage Publications, 2002): 188.  
105
 J. S. Furnivall used this phrase to describe communities in divided societies under colonialism. 
106
 Halim Barakat, "Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic," Middle East Journal, 27, 
no. 3 (1973): 304.  
46 
 
 
and everyday lives. Talal Salman, of Assafir (The Ambassador), rightfully puts it: "The blatant 
truth is that the Lebanese are not one people; not a people in the first place but conflicting sects 
and confessional groups that have been so since the beginning of time."107  Why is there such 
disagreement over Lebanon's identity? Why does the Lebanese society lack a "common social 
demand"? This chapter explains how a combination of historical, sociopolitical, and geopolitical 
factors have collectively contributed to shaping the Lebanese plural democracy and have caused 
its constant state of precariousness.  
2.1 The Lebanese Sectarian Mosaic 
Any comprehension of Lebanon's cultural and sociopolitical character and the eventual 
understanding of its media climate should begin by considering two important constants: that the 
Lebanese people are a mosaic of religious and sectarian communities who have emerged from a 
history of conflict and mutual apprehension; and that Lebanon's geographical position in a turbu-
lent region— bordering Syria on the north and east and Israel on the south—renders it continu-
ously susceptible to instability and intervention by foreign actors. To understand how these con-
stants coincide, a very brief mention of Lebanon's ancient and recent past is necessary. Before 
Lebanon became a state in 1920, it existed as "Mount Lebanon," a land of the Greater Syria, 
which witnessed the rise and fall of several Christian and Muslim empires. Between the first cen-
tury B.C. and the seventh century A.D., Lebanon (as part of Syria) was a province of the Roman 
Empire. From the seventh century until the early 20th century, Lebanon witnessed a succession of 
Arab and Islamic empires ruled by caliphs and sultans, with the exception of the period between 
the 11th and 13th century, when the Crusades dominated coastal and northern parts of Syrian terri-
tory. The Muslim empires that ruled were mostly Sunni, with the exception of the Fatimid dynas-
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ty that ruled in the 10th and early 11th century, which adopted Ismai'li Islam.108 The last Sunni 
empire to rule almost all of the Middle East was the Ottoman sultanate, which extended from the 
14th century until the end of the First World War. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 
opened the door for Western powers into the region. Consequently, the area became under Brit-
ish and French mandate and was later divided into artificial states.109 Lebanon was separated 
from Syria after it was placed under French mandate. It became the state of Greater Lebanon in 
1920. It achieved independence from the French in 1943.110  
The result of this confluence of cultures and histories is a mosaic of groups of different 
religions, ways of life, and outlooks. Before the creation of the Greater Lebanon, Mount Lebanon 
had served as a refuge for persecuted minorities. Christian groups sought the mountain to escape 
persecution by the established Byzantine churches in Greater Syria. Shiite and Druze communi-
ties, on the other hand, also sought the mountain range to escape conformism to Sunni ortho-
doxy. Elie Salem maintains that these groups "held fast to their religious doctrines and fiercely 
defended their autonomy in the rugged and strategically commodious terrains."111  
Lebanon’ largest communities are the Maronites, the Sunnis, and the Shiites.112 Other 
minorities include Druze, Alawites, Catholic and Orthodox Greeks and Romans, and Armeni-
ans.113  In the absence of an updated official census, it is estimated that 28 percent of the popula-
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tion are Sunni, 28 percent Shiite, 22 percent Maronite, 8 percent Greek Orthodox, 5 percent 
Druze, 4 percent Greek Catholic, and  the rest are other minorities.114 If each sect is counted sep-
arately, none of the large communities—the Maronites, the Sunnis, or the Shiites— would make 
a majority. However, being all minorities with a persecution mentality, their coming together in-
to a nation-state raises questions as to their ability to form a functioning and stable polity. As P.J. 
Vatikiotis maintains, "When a country is composed of minorities, these invariably have conflict-
ing interests, fears, and aspirations. If they are not successfully integrated into a national com-
munity defined by a law of the land and workable institutions that transcend minority bounda-
ries, they are apt to lead to violent conflict."115 How, then, bring a plurality of minorities with no 
common vision to coexist in a viable body politic?  
Lebanon opted for a pragmatic approach which institutionalized sectarianism in the polit-
ical system. Its political structure is an example of Arend Lijphart's Consociational Democracy. 
Lijphart maintains that a homogenous political culture is not a necessary pre-requisite for stabil-
ity. The latter may be achieved through cooperation and bargaining among the ruling elite. This 
type of governance does not necessarily bring about national or social integration; its role is to 
guarantee representation of the different communities to prevent conflict.116  
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The National Pact, reached among the Lebanese leaders in 1943, established the founda-
tion the multi-sectarian, consociational state in Lebanon with the purpose of securing representa-
tion of all groups and preventing an oppressive majority.117The parties to this Pact agreed that the 
president would always be a Maronite; the prime minister always a Sunni, and the speaker of 
parliament always a Shiite. In order to accommodate the fragile sectarian balance, other govern-
ment and public administration offices were also distributed on a sectarian basis with sects hold-
ing positions in proportion to their presumed demographic size.118 As the Christians and the 
Muslims had diverging views on Lebanon's identity and role in its Arab milieu, the Pact provid-
ed that Christians and Muslims would drop their mutual vetoes in return for the acceptance of an 
independent Lebanon who has an "Arab face" but who would disassociate itself from inter-Arab 
conflicts.  
In the first three decades after independence, this system functioned with varying success. 
However, it fell short of keeping lasting stability amid the regional Arab-Israeli conflict. The as-
sociation of Lebanese Muslim and leftist groups with the pan-Arab cause promoted by Egyptian 
President Jamal Abdel Nasser dragged Lebanon into the protracted struggle. Moreover, the de-
mographic shifts in favor of the Muslim population raised their feeling of underrepresentation 
and resentment of Maronite domination, triggering, in 1975, a 15-year civil war. In 1989, the 
signing of the Taef Agreement under Saudi, American, and Syrian auspices ended the war. The 
Agreement placed Lebanon under a 15-year Syrian guardianship and modified the consociational 
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formula in order to accommodate demographic shifts in favor of the Muslims. Emphasizing "mu-
tual coexistence" and "fair representation" of the sects, the Agreement adjusted power sharing by 
increasing the number of Muslim deputies in parliament so that Muslim-Christian representation 
would be equal.119 It also reduced the powers of the Maronite president, who had enjoyed privi-
leges under the French mandate, and increased those of the Sunni prime minister. This state of 
affairs, however, did not prevent deadlock and conflict in the post-civil war era. While Syrian 
control over Lebanon was able to keep peace and stability in return for total Lebanese allegiance, 
its end in 2005 paved the way for turbulent episodes that persist to this very day, which are proof 
that the Lebanese republic, as Michael Hudson calls it, was and remains "precarious."120  
While this state of uncertainty has been often blamed on the sectarian political system, 
this study supports the argument that the political system, despite its loopholes and weaknesses, 
is not the main problem behind the precariousness of the Lebanese plural democracy. "The main 
problem,” as Adnan Fawaz contends, “is the fragmentation of the social system and the strategic 
location of the country which invites intervention by foreign actors."121 Michael Hudson shares 
this line of thought and maintains that "the fragmentation of Lebanon's political culture has two 
dimensions: one is socio-cultural and reflects the multiple, diverse, and often contradictory iden-
tifications of its peoples. The second derives from the area's vulnerability to and attraction for 
foreign political interests. The two are interrelated through the dynamics of internal security and 
external rivalries." 122 Fawaz further points out that the Lebanese state is not a natural entity: 
while it is a territorial state, it is not a nation-state. There are deep cultural divisions between the 
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groups that compose the social system to the extent that it is almost impossible for them to inter-
act in depth. The nature of this plurality necessitates a political system that provides the neces-
sary mechanisms that will regulate the relationships among the groups and make the conse-
quences of their interactions predictable."123 In other words, the reason why the consociational 
system has not succeeded at preventing conflict is not because it is sectarian; it is because the 
disagreements among the various sects, which, although political on the surface, are rooted in 
identity struggles.  As will be demonstrated, the Lebanese plural democracy is the byproduct of 
three interrelated phenomena: a plural society regulated by social sectarianism; a plural polity, 
regulated by consociationalism, and geopolitical factors that interfere with the first two. A good 
way to grasp the nature of this plural democracy is by, first, understanding the divergent out-
looks of its main communities—the Maronites, the Sunnis, and the Shiites—and how these have 
defined inter-sectarian relations and impacted the fate of Lebanon. 
 
Figure 1: The Lebanese Plural Democracy    
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2.1.1 The Ihbat (frustration) of the Maronites  
As the largest Christian community who has traditionally played the leading role in Leb-
anese politics, the Maronites, as all Christians in post-civil war Lebanon, bemoan their marginal-
ization as a minority caught between Sunni and Shiite powers and rivalries. Despite the fact that 
their cultural and economic influence has not withered, the Christians, and the Maronites specifi-
cally, have repeatedly complained of Ihbat (frustration)—a state resulting from the loss of the 
political predominance they once enjoyed. The decline in their power began with the end of the 
civil war and the signing of the Taef Agreement. It was not only that the Agreement reduced 
their constitutional powers; it was also Syria's domination of Lebanon that excluded anti-Syrian 
Christians. Throughout all the period of its domination of Lebanon, Syria established loyal pup-
pet Lebanese governments who would defer to Damascus on all political and economic matters. 
All Maronite presidents during the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon bowed to Syrian orders. Pop-
ular leaders within the Maronite community who rejected Syria's domination of Lebanon were 
suppressed: Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces, was incarcerated, and Michel 
Aoun, an army general who attempted to "liberate" Lebanon from Syria by force in 1989, was 
sent into exile. The political elite that operated at the time did not represent true Maronite aspira-
tions.124  Even after Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, the Christians' relatively dimin-
ished role persisted. It was mostly the result of divisions within their own ranks which have con-
siderably weakened their status and role vis-à-vis other sects.  While the Maronites follow sever-
al leaders, the main polarization is between followers of Geagea and followers of Aoun. The an-
imosity between these two poles has divided Christians of the post-Syrian era: Geagea and his 
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followers have joined the anti-Syrian, March 14 alliance, and Aoun and his followers have joined 
the pro-Syrian, March 8 alliance, headed by Hezbollah.  
The Christian Ihbat also stems from existential fears associated with their dwindling 
numbers in relation to the Sunnis and Shiites and the power shifts in favor of the latter. Some of 
them are so fearful for the loss of their identity that they are even proposing to revive the lan-
guage they spoke in their antiquity, Syriac, or "the language of Christ."125 The Maronites find it 
hard to come to terms with the fact they are no longer the most powerful group they once were.  
The early manifestations of their power began in the 19th century, particularly after 1860, when 
they ruled Mount Lebanon under the supremacy of the Ottoman Empire. Their role increased 
during the French mandate as they were the French's most favored group. In fact, the Maronites 
were the ones who lobbied for the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. They saw the state of 
Lebanon as an extension of their power already established in Mount Lebanon, almost disregard-
ing the fact the Greater Lebanon, unlike Mount Lebanon, now had areas with Sunni and Shiite 
predominance.  
The Maronites' conception of Lebanon did not historically coincide with that of their 
Muslim counterparts. After the creation of Greater Lebanon, they wanted their state to be distinc-
tively Lebanese, not part of Syria. As Kamal Salibi explains, the Maronites wanted a Lebanon 
"under their paramount control, separate, distinct, and independent from the rest of Syria."126 
They did not want to treat the Muslims as their political equals because they believed the Mus-
lims, in Salibi's words, "were naturally susceptible to the strong influence of their co-religionists 
in other Arab countries and could therefore not be trusted in the more sensitive political and ad-
ministrative positions in Lebanon, such as those which involved national security and ultimate 
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decision making."127  This stress on Lebanese particularism as opposed to Arabism angered the 
Maronites' main rivals at the time, the Sunnis, who had tenaciously defined their identity and the 
history of their country as being part of a broader Arab and Islamic history.128 
The discourse of Lebanese particularism also emerged from the conviction among 
Maronites (and other Christians) that they are not Arab, but of Phoenician descent with a Greco-
Roman heritage that precedes Arab history by thousands of years. 129  Their refusal to be associ-
ated with an Arab heritage is mainly due to the connection between Arabism and Islam.130 This 
partly explains the good relations they have historically built with the Western world, particular-
ly the Vatican and France, whom they call "the tender mother."131  
This stress on Lebanese particularism is also partly associated with the idea that Lebanon 
has always been a haven for persecuted religious minorities. The Christians' view of Lebanese 
nationhood, as John Entelis maintains, is "the constant identification of Lebanon as a place of 
refuge, a territorial enclave serving to protect the oriental Christians from Muslim attempts to 
subjugate and disperse them."132 The continuous feeling of persecution was a "unifying link" be-
tween the Christian sects in Lebanon. Entelis explains that because the Maronites were the larg-
est group that had identifiable patterns of community consciousness, they were able to "initiate 
and inspire a generally acceptable nationalist ideology among Christians."133  
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The loss of political prerogatives has not prevented the Christians, in general, and the 
Maronites, in particular, from retaining considerable influence and an important role both domes-
tically and internationally. In the midst of Sunni-Shiite rivalries in Lebanon, the Maronites are 
the catalyst that keeps the balance of power or tips it in favor of one group or the other. As will 
be shown in later paragraphs, the Maronites are divided in their alliances between the Sunnis and 
the Shiites. These alliances are not only based on strategic political and electoral considerations; 
they are also associated with fears stemming from the rise of Sunni fundamentalism, particularly 
in the course of the Arab Spring, and the rise of Shiite Iran and the extension of its power into 
Lebanon. 
2.1.2 The "Persecution" of the Sunnis 
Despite being the dominant group in the Middle East and playing a prominent role in 
Lebanese politics, the Sunnis have complained of humiliation and marginalization, particularly 
since 2005, the year their influential leader, Rafik Hariri, was assassinated.134 They have accused 
the Syrian regime, ruled by Bashar Al-Assad, and its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, of perpetrating 
the crime. This, along with attempts by Hezbollah to weaken their power in Lebanon, has alien-
ated many Sunnis and triggered sporadic fights with Shiites across Lebanon, which have intensi-
fied since the beginning of the war in neighboring Syria. Despite the Sunnis' historical associa-
tion with a broader Arab and Syrian identity, the Sunnis are divided today between those whose 
loyalty to Syria abides and those who see themselves as belonging to Lebanon as an entity sepa-
rate from Syria. The Hariri-Sunnis' slogan today is "Lebanon first." Some even say that the Sun-
nis have "Lebanized themselves." 135 
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The Sunnis' relationship with a segment of the Christians improved after Hariri's assassi-
nation.136 The two communities, who had historically disagreed over Lebanon's relation to Syria, 
have, for the first time, converged on a common cause: that Lebanon should be free from Syrian 
intervention. This relative solidarity had not been experienced in the past. Prior to 1920, the Sun-
nis, unlike Maronites, Druze, and Shiites, were privileged subjects of the Ottoman state. They 
were not involved in the communal Maronite-Druze politics of Mount Lebanon as they had 
mainly inhabited the interior and coastal cities of Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli. It was only after the 
creation of Greater Lebanon that they experienced communal and political coexistence. They and 
the Maronites had not only divergent political outlooks; they also had, in Farid El-Khazen's 
words, "a radically different historical development both as rulers and ruled."137 The Sunnis 
could not see themselves detached from Syria, as their interests, with rising Maronite dominance, 
were jeopardized. This explains Maronite-Sunni rivalry during the mandate period. Until the ear-
ly 1940s, the Sunnis had been persistent in their call to incorporate the territories that were an-
nexed to Greater Lebanon into Syria. However, their call was temporarily put on hold when they 
agreed with their Christian counterparts on the National Pact.138 
While both communities had agreed that Lebanon was a country with an "Arab face," 
they did not necessarily agree over the content of Arabism. For the Christians, it was enough for 
Lebanon to have an "Arab face;" for the Sunnis, it depended on how Arabism was defined by 
pan-Arab leaders. The rise of Nasserism in the 1950s, for example, disrupted the status quo in 
almost all Arab countries, and many Sunnis in Lebanon wanted to unite with Egypt and Syria 
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under the framework of a United Arab Republic.139 It was not surprising that the Sunnis sided 
with the Palestinians in the Lebanese civil war and supported Syrian hegemony over Lebanon in 
the post-Taef period.    
The change in the Sunnis' outlook resulted from a strong conviction among the majority 
of them that the Syrian regime was behind the assassination of Hariri. For the first time since the 
end of the Lebanese civil war, the Sunnis were adamant to see an end to Syria's military and po-
litical role in Lebanon. The shared hostility toward Syria created a rapprochement between Sun-
nis and Christians opposed to Syria, which was translated into an alliance between the Future 
Movement, led by Hariri's son, Saad Hariri, and major Christian parties, such as Geagea’s Leba-
nese Forces and the Phalanges party. However, this alliance excludes the significant Christian 
group led by Michel Aoun. In fact, Aoun and his followers are, along with Hezbollah, the Hariri 
Sunnis' main opponents.   
Despising the Syrian regime and fearing the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon as an extension 
of Iranian power, the Lebanese Sunnis saw the Arab Spring as an opening to assert their power. 
Paul Salem contends that Sunnis "saw the uprising in Syria as an opportunity not only to support 
fellow Sunnis to rise up against a regime dominated by Alawites that had politically marginal-
ized Syria's Sunnis, but also to bring down a regional power that stood behind Hezbollah's power 
in Lebanon."140 Their discontent with the Syrian regime and Hezbollah has taken more radical 
manifestations through the rise of Salafists, who have joined their fellow Sunnis in Syria in their 
war against the Alawite regime, and who are believed to receive funding from Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. 141 Robert Rabil argues that, "By operating freely in northern Lebanon, Salafists have in-
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creased their political power among Sunnis by standing out as the most potent group supporting 
the [Syrian] opposition."142 This has backfired in Lebanon, where episodes of Sunni-Shiites 
clashes have repeatedly taken place. Salafists do not only antagonize Shiites; they also alarm 
Christians, who fear that the rise of Sunni fundamentalism in Syria would have repercussions in 
Lebanon. 143 Such fears become stronger when Sunnis, such as Ahmad Kassas, the speaker of the 
Sunni Islamic Freedom Party, openly states: "What is Lebanon but a small part of the land of 
Damascus…no one will stop us from joining our Damascus that sheltered us and sheltered you 
through the ages."144  Or when inhabitants of the Sunni-dominated city of Bab Al-Tebbaneh in 
North Lebanon, proudly state: “To us, Lebanon remains an artificial construct with which we 
simply could not identify."145 Moreover, the close relationship between the Sunnis of Lebanon 
and Saudi Arabia alarms Christians, who see it as an extension of Saudi influence and culture 
into Lebanon; and Shiites, who see Saudi power as a threat to their guardian and sponsor, Iran.146  
2.1.3 The Rise to Power of the Shiites 
Since the end of the civil war in 1990 and Syria's seizing of power in Lebanon, the Shi-
ites' ascendance to the Lebanese throne has been in crescendo. Their enhanced role in Lebanese 
politics contrasts with earlier years when they were the most neglected, underrepresented, and 
marginalized group in Lebanon. During the mandate and independence years, they were, in the 
words of Martin Kramer, "the despised stepchildren of a state governed by (and for) Maronite 
Christians and Sunni Muslims."147 However, their state of submission was reversed when influ-
ential leaders and clerics, most notably the Iran-born Imam Musa Al-Sadr, succeeded at mobiliz-
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ing them. Al-Sadr was the prime mover behind Shiite awakening in Lebanon in the 1960s and 
1970s and the founder of the Amal movement (Hope), now headed by the Shiite speaker of par-
liament, Nabih Berri.  Al-Sadr was able to transition the Shiites from political isolationism into 
political involvement.148 While their mobilization was initially intended to make them partake in 
the Lebanese body politic, some Shiites were influenced by the 1979 Iranian revolution and opt-
ed for a more radical route. They joined Hezbollah, the Islamic party founded in 1982 with the 
help of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Fouad Ajami points out that the Shiites "had always 
maintained cultural and religious traffic between the hinterland of Shiite Lebanon and Persia."149 
Hezbollah's adversaries even accuse them of aiming to establish the Wilayat Al-Faqih (the guard-
ianship of the jurist) in Lebanon— a concept advanced by Ayatollah Kohmeini in the 1970s and 
constitutes today the basis of the constitution in Iran. According to this concept, people are to be 
ruled by a Faqih (jurist) or a number of jurists who act as custodians over the people while 
awaiting the return of Imam Mahdi.150 The jurist is the supreme leader in the country and rules 
on all aspects of life including governance of the country. The Shiite's awaiting of their revered 
Imam is a manifestation of the feeling of persecution that has continuously shaped their culture. 
Before the creation of the Greater Lebanon, the Shiites found refuge in Mount Lebanon, escaping 
persecution by Sunnis.151 Their main break with the Sunnis dates back to the 7th century and was 
the result of a feud over the leadership of the Muslim Umma. The Shiites believe that the Sunnis 
stripped them of their legitimate right to rule, as they consider themselves to be the direct 
descendents of the Prophet. Kramer describes the legacy of Shi'ism as one of "martyrdom and 
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suffering, resting on an ancient grievance: the belief that Islamic history was derailed when polit-
ical power passed out from the hands of the family of the Prophet Mohammed."152 Constant per-
secution in the past led the Shiites into a state of "melancholic introspection" or persecution 
complex. As they did not approve of the rule of Sunni Muslims, they have been awaiting the 
God-sent change which should materialize with the coming of Imam Mahdi, who will be "sin-
less" and will bring justice to the world. To protect themselves against orthodox Sunni rule, the 
Shiites had historically practiced Takiyya (dissimulation), by accepting the doctrine in public but 
rejecting it in private. 153  
What mostly boosted Hezbollah's confidence in Lebanon has been its armed resistance of 
the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. Unlike other Lebanese militias who were forced to dis-
band after the civil war, Hezbollah was allowed to keep its arms by virtue of the Taef Agreement 
and was transformed from a militia into a legitimate "resistance." The party succeeded at driving 
the Israelis out of Lebanon in 2000 after 18 years of occupation. Another war with Israel in 2006, 
although devastating to Lebanon, gave the Islamic party another boost while alarming other Leb-
anese groups. With Syrian and Iranian backing, Hezbollah became powerful militarily and politi-
cally. The strategic connection between Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran has been geared toward con-
taining and fighting local, regional and international foes such as the anti-Hezbollah groups in 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and France, believed to be intent on defeating the Syr-
ian-Iran-Hezbollah axis.154 The rise in Hezbollah's military strength, its political bargaining pow-
er, and its close relation with Iran and Syria have antagonized the majority of the Sunnis, the 
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Maronites, and the Druze, who see Hezbollah's power as an extension of Iran's influence in the 
region. In showing its commitment to its allies and fear over its very existence, Hezbollah has 
joined the war in Syria to fight along the Alawite Syrian regime against the Sunni-led Syrian op-
position.155   
The Lebanese communities were not only divided before and during the civil war; their 
divisions were evident during the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. The majority of Christians 
were opposed to Syria's dictatorial maneuvering of Lebanese affairs while the majority of Mus-
lims—Sunnis, Shiites, and Druze, were, on the whole, supportive of Syria's role in Lebanon.156 
Their discourse justified Syria's role in Lebanon and the region as the pioneer of Arabism and the 
drive of the resistance against Israeli oppression of the Palestinian people. Syria gave Hezbollah 
in Lebanon the green light to conduct operations against Israel. It facilitated the passage of 
weapons which the Islamic party received from Iran. Although the rise in Hezbollah's power was 
alarming to the other sects, it was not a subject for discussion at the time, as Lebanon's politics—
the election of the president, the parliament, the formation of the cabinet, and Lebanon's foreign 
policy—was a Syrian decision.157 
As demonstrated in the above section, the Maronites, the Sunnis, and the Shiites have had 
divergent outlooks since they formed a state. While the consociational structure of the Lebanese 
polity has been crucial in preventing a total breakdown of the state in times of conflict, it has not 
led to lasting peace or to social integration. The problem, however, lay not primarily in the 
consociational formula but in incompatible identity narratives among the sects. The fragmented 
political culture resulting from the divergence in outlooks prevented allegiance to a strong state; 
instead, people across sects owed allegiance to leaders and warlords from within their own 
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communities. The prominence of these leaders and their influential role in persuading followers 
is a phenomenon very specific to Lebanese culture, which has been in practice since feudal 
times. Known in the Lebanese dictionary as clientelism, this relationship between patron and fol-
lower is based on the former providing services in return for the latter's loyalty. Types of 
clientelism include Zu'ama clientelism, where leaders have inherited their status from their 
prominent political and sectarian families; party-led clientelism, where loyalty is to a political 
party or militia; and Islamist communitarian clientelism, where Islamic leaders win followers' 
support by providing services and creating, through religion, a stronger sense of belonging to the 
same community.158Moreover, the shaky plural sociopolitical system operating in an extremely 
volatile environment has invited foreign intervention in Lebanese affairs—a factor which has 
been detrimental to Lebanon's stability. The reason why foreign intervention was possible was 
because foreign powers could use Lebanese groups who identify with them religiously, cultural-
ly, or ideologically in the promotion of their own interests. Throughout Lebanon's past and pre-
sent, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the PLO, Israel, France, the Unit-
ed States, Iran and Russia have intervened in Lebanese affairs and have pitted Lebanese groups 
against each other.  As Maroun Keserwani maintains, "In nearly all cases, Lebanese discord has 
been used by external powers, in one way or another, to serve diverse aims which have little to 
do with the Lebanese themselves. Factors within the Lebanese society have always been there 
not only to produce conflict, but also to encourage and even invite outside intervention in Leba-
nese affairs."159As will be shown in the next paragraphs, the period that ensued after Rafik 
Hariri's assassination was yet another critical, even dangerous, episode in Lebanon's saga of plu-
ral politics of the post-Syrian era.  
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Table 1. The Three Main Sects 
Maronites 
 
Generally Pro-West 
 
See Lebanon as having a 
"Lebanese" identity 
 
Their power declined in the 
post-civil war period 
 
Retain strong political, cul-
tural and economic influence 
 
Divided between pro-Syrian 
and anti-Syrian alliances  
 
Rival leaders include Michel 
Aoun allied with Hezbollah; 
Samir Geagea, allied with the 
pro-Hariri Future Movement 
 
Fear rising Islamic funda-
mentalism, particularly radi-
cal Sunni movements 
 
 
Sunnis 
 
Generally Pro-Saudi Arabia 
 
Have traditionally conceived 
Lebanon as "part of Syria" 
 
After Hariri's assassination, 
they became divided between 
loyalists and opponents to the 
Syrian regime 
 
Important leaders include 
Rafik Hariri and his son, 
Saad Hariri 
 
Accuse Hezbollah and the 
Syrian regime of undermin-
ing their community 
 
Have joined co-religionists in 
fighting against the Syrian 
regime 
 
 
 
Shiites 
 
Generally Pro-Syria, Iran 
 
Are culturally, politically, 
ideologically, religiously and 
strategically connected with 
Iran and Syria 
 
Most  important player: Hez-
bollah led by Hassan 
Nasrallah 
 
Their relationship with Sun-
nis deteriorated after Hariri's 
assassination 
 
Are competing with Sunnis 
for power 
 
Have joined their co-
religionists in Syria in 
fighting against the Syrian, 
Sunni-led opposition 
 
2.2. The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and the March 8, March 14 Divide 
On February 14, 2005, Rafik Hariri, an influential Sunni leader and prime minister, was 
assassinated along 21 others in a massive car bomb in Beirut. Thousands of angry people of all 
sects and political affiliations converged on Martyrs' Square in Downtown Beirut to protest the 
crime. It was the beginning of a chain of demonstrations that unfolded over several weeks, 
known as the "Beirut Spring," or the "Cedar Revolution." For the first time since the end of the 
civil war, Lebanese Christians and Muslims were united against a common "enemy:" the Syrian 
regime. They raised Lebanese flags and banners reading Hurriya, Siyada, Istiklal (freedom, sov-
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ereignty, independence) and Haqiqa, Hurriya, Wihda Wataniya (truth, freedom, national unity). 
They demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, the formation of a new govern-
ment free from Syrian intervention, and an international investigation into the Hariri's assassina-
tion. The popular outrage coupled with international pressure on Damascus prompted the Syrians 
to withdraw on April 26, 2005.  
While the fervor for independence was unprecedented, the hope for national unity was 
short lived. In retaliation for the Beirut Spring demonstrations, Hezbollah organized a massive 
rally on March 8, 2005, where supporters of the Islamic party vowed their abiding loyalty to Syr-
ia. Thousands of protestors held pictures of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and placards read-
ing, "No for the American Intervention." They accused America and Israel of meddling in Leba-
nese affairs, implicitly accusing them of the crime. This impelled the anti-Syrian camp to organ-
ize a counter-demonstration on March 14, 2005, reiterating their fierce condemnation of Syria 
and insisting on an international inquiry into Hariri's assassination. The outcome of these demon-
strations was a clear polarity between two camps: a pro-Syrian camp, known as the March 8 alli-
ance, and an anti-Syrian, Western-backed, camp, known as the March 14 alliance.160 As will be 
shown in later chapters, this polarity does not only define the political climate in Lebanon, but 
also—and largely so—its media climate.  
The pro-Syrian, anti-Syrian polarization was also reflected in public opinion polls. 
Eighty-six percent of Maronite citizens interviewed a month after the assassination said they 
were convinced that the Syrian regime orchestrated Hariri's assassination. This was followed by 
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80 percent, Druze, and 49 percent, Sunnis. Only 9.4 percent of the Shiites accused Syria of the 
crime. Instead, they were convinced that Israeli and American intelligence services were behind 
it. 161 
Irrespective of public opinion or personal conviction, political and sectarian leaders 
joined alliances that secured their role and position in the political equation. Michel Aoun, once 
the most vitriolic critic of Syria and Hezbollah, sided with the March 8 alliance hoping that such 
a move would weaken his Christian and Sunni opponents and boost his position as a Christian 
leader. Hezbollah, on the other hand, needed a powerful Christian ally to weaken his political 
adversaries in the March 14 alliance. The Hezbollah-Aoun alliance had no ideological grounds; it 
was merely a settlement that would serve the interest of both parties.162 Similarly, the Lebanese 
Forces and the Phalanges joined an alliance with the Sunnis, once their most vicious enemies. 
However, the alliance was possible because Hariri's assassination presented them with a common 
enemy. The Druzes, led by Walid Jumblatt, have bounced back and forth between the coalitions 
and have settled with the March 8 group.163  
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Figure 2: The March 18, March 8 Divide 
The events that have unfolded in the eight years since Hariri's assassination have only ex-
acerbated the March 8-March 14 divide.164 Between 2005 and 2012, at least ten anti-Syrian 
Christian and Muslim politicians were assassinated in car bombs, increasing the apprehension of 
Syria and Hezbollah. 165A war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 caused the death of more 
than one thousand civilians and severe destruction of the country's infrastructure—a fact which 
alienated the March 14 camp, who accused Hezbollah of acting unilaterally and dragging the 
country into war. In 2008, clashes between Sunnis and Shiites left one hundred people dead. 166  
In 2011, Hezbollah ministers and their allies toppled the government headed by Hariri's son, 
Saad Hariri, and imposed a government headed by a Hezbollah ally—a move which angered pro-
Hariri Sunnis, leading to protests against the Hezbollah-led government.167 The rift between the 
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two camps deepened further after a United Nations-backed international tribunal implicated four 
suspects in Hariri's assassination—all connected to Hezbollah.  168  
2.3 The Association with the Syrian War and Sunni-Shiite Hostilities 
Amid this polarization, the Syrian war presented an opportunity for Lebanese Shiites and 
Sunnis to push their political and existential battles beyond the Lebanese borders. Despite the 
decision of the Lebanese government to remain neutral vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict, Sunnis and 
Shiites from Lebanon have been reported to be crossing the border into Syria to fight along their 
respective communities. Each sect has power brokers: the Syrian regime and Hezbollah are 
backed by Iran, while the Sunni opposition is backed by Sunni powers including Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, and Qatar.169  This has exacerbated tensions between the two communities in Lebanon, 
and they have been fighting each other in several areas of the country, including Tripoli, Sidon, 
and Beirut.  
Hezbollah acknowledged that the Islamic party is fighting in Syria "to protect the 30,000 
Lebanese Shiites who live in the border region"170 and that Hezbollah "has an obligation to train 
and arm Lebanese citizens residing in Syria to prevent their displacement to Lebanon."171 Some 
have even described the Sunni-Shiite fight as "existential." The Syrian opposition has accused 
Hezbollah of pushing the Sunnis away from the border "to create a sectarian enclave linking the 
Shiite villages to the traditional Alawite heartland in Western Syria," while Syrian Shiites at the 
border voiced fears from radical Sunnis fighting in the Syrian opposition.172 
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Experts have interpreted Hezbollah's behavior as prompted by fear over its very exist-
ence. A report by the International Crisis Group states that "Hezbollah views any threat to the 
Assad regime as a threat directed at its principal ally, Iran. [it is] a country without which Teh-
ran's ability to supply the Shiite movement would be severely constrained."173  
On the other hand, Sunni militant groups from Lebanon have provided the Syrian opposi-
tion with weapons and logistical support. While the Hariri-led Future Movement has accused the 
Syrian regime and Hezbollah of "trying to push the Syrian conflict into Lebanon…by causing 
instability in Tripoli, Sidon and other regions,"174 the Sunnis are betting on the eventual fall of 
the Syrian regime, which would weaken Hezbollah considerably and boost the March 14 alli-
ance. The Future Movement will also benefit from the fall of Syria on the regional level: in their 
logic, it will result in "a rupture in the Syrian-Iranian axis, stretching from Iran to Iraq, to 
(Alawite) Syria to Lebanon; a brake on Tehran's ability to reach into the Arab world; and the 
reemergence of Saudi Arabia—the party's main benefactor—a key player in Lebanon."175  The 
Sunnis see the Syrian war as "a gift from heaven," because it represents "the beginning of the end 
of an implacable foe held responsible for the Sunni community's historical decline as well as for 
the assassination of their leader Rafik Hariri."176  
The association of Sunnis and Shiites with the Syrian war has put the Christians in both 
alliances in a difficult position. Aoun, Hezbollah's ally, has adopted an anti-Sunni rhetoric and 
described the fall of the Assad regime as the "fall of democracy" of which "Christians will be the 
first victims."177 This is the stance that Aoun followers have adopted. An interview by Interna-
tional Crisis Group with one Aoun supporter echoes his leader's logic:  "The Syrian regime halt-
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ed Sunni aspirations in Lebanon. If Sunnis were to rule Syria, they would ally themselves with 
those in Lebanon. Nothing would then stop Sunni domination over the country."178 
Hezbollah has benefited from these fears and used the opportunity to exacerbate them by 
depicting its immediate Sunni opponent, the Future Movement, as harboring Islamic fundamen-
talists. An International Crisis Group interview with Hezbollah officials confirms this: "The Fu-
ture Movement has contributed to transforming moderate Islamists into extremists, rebellious 
against the state, and defiant of other communities."179    
The Future Movement has expressed strong political solidarity with the Syrian opposition 
and adopted a very strong rhetorical stand against the regime. While the group has denied 
providing military assistance to the Syrian rebels, reports have circulated that Future Movement 
representatives are using Turkey as "a substitute arena for the support of Syrian armed groups." 
Reports say that Future Movement representatives have visited Ankara to oversee the distribu-
tion of weapons.180 While Christians allied with the March 14 may also fear Sunni extremism, 
their leaders justify it as a reaction to Shiite extremism. Sami Gemayel, of the Christian Phalan-
ges party opposed to Hezbollah, said the militancy of Salafists is "a natural reaction to Hezbol-
lah's arms."181 
The divisions between the March 8 and March 14 camps, the association of Sunnis and 
Shiites with the Syrian war, and rising tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon, have 
acted collectively to undermine the stability of the Lebanese state and jeopardize inter-sectarian 
relations and "national unity." As demonstrated below, the divergent political outlooks of the 
various Lebanese sects are not compensated for on the social level. While the consociational 
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government guarantees confessional representation on the political level, social sectarianism 
guarantees confessional autonomy on the socio-cultural level. Both act in unison to hamper so-
cial and national integration. 
2.4 Social Sectarianism 
Agencies of socialization in Lebanon, such as the family and the school, remain, to a 
large extent, sectarian. The debate over civil marriage legislation and the constant disagreement 
over the teaching of Lebanon's history are good examples that illustrate how political sectarian-
ism and social sectarianism interact to hamper national integration. Ralf Crowe argues rightfully 
that "Any explanation of Lebanese politics will be incomplete unless the role of religious atti-
tudes and organizations are taken in account. Even more, several aspects of the formal organiza-
tion of government officially reflect the religious structure of the society."182   
The Lebanese Constitution provides for personal status laws on marriage, divorce, custo-
dy, inheritance, etc. to be governed by religious institutions, not by the state.183 This substantiates 
Crowe's argument that the "multi-religious societies in the Middle East have [for centuries] tend-
ed to be collections of semi-autonomous communities, each of which lived according to its own 
custom and frequently in a distinct fashion. Thus, religion became the primary carrier of values 
and determining a whole way of life."184 
The question of civil marriage legislation reemerged in January 2013 triggering a nation-
wide debate after a Lebanese couple, a Sunni and a Shiite, decided to marry in a civil ceremony 
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by opting to remove their confessional identities from their civil status records.185 While a notary 
was able to marry the couple, the state had, until April 25, 2013, refused to register the marriage. 
According to the Interior Minister, the problem was not about the marriage's legitimacy as much 
as it concerned a problem in society. 186 The problem the Interior Minister was referring to was 
the inability of the Lebanese government to pass legislation that would alienate religious leaders.  
While the Maronite and Orthodox churches were, to varying degrees, more accommodat-
ing of civil marriage legislation, Muslim clerics, both Sunnis and Shiites, categorically opposed 
it.187  The most vociferous condemnation of civil marriage came from the country's highest Sunni 
authority, Mufti Mohammed Rashid Qabbani, who called any Muslim who approves it an apos-
tate. A more radical statement came from Salafists, who called civil marriage "adultery" and 
children of such marriage "illegitimate."188 Shiite clerics voiced similar views to their Sunni 
counterparts. Lebanon's Higher Shiite Council expressed staunch refusal of the legislation, stat-
ing that, even it were an option, civil marriage would imply adopting a new system of governing 
personal status that would transcend sectarian lines—a requirement which would violate the ac-
cepted social ties between sects.189 After much debate, the Interior Minister took the bold and 
unprecedented move and registered the marriage, making it legitimate. This move set a precedent 
which, theoretically, allows Lebanese people to marry civilly, only if they choose to remove their 
religious affiliation from their public records.190   
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Why would a question as simple as civil marriage cause such a stir in Lebanon, a secular 
and modern country? Because if legalized, civil marriage would mean that the Lebanese state 
would, for the first time, recognize Lebanese citizens in a structure independent of religious affil-
iation. For some, this jeopardizes sectarian identity. In fact, the bride's family was the first to dis-
approve of her marriage, stating that "her actions did not reflect their own religious beliefs… as 
they are committed to what Islam says, particularly in terms of personal issues."191 
Divisions over civil marriage run deeper than the religious leadership. Civil society 
groups have repeatedly gathered in Beirut's Martyrs' Square to voice their support for civil mar-
riage192and resorted to social media to demand "more equal rights between men and women."193 
On the other hand, young people often give conflicting views on the matter. Some oppose the 
law as, in their words, "religion is our reference in life, whether Muslims or Christians;" that “the 
religious system should not be unnecessarily undermined.” Others support reform, stressing the 
importance of religious coexistence and that "civil marriage eases reaching common grounds be-
tween Muslims and Christians."194   
The varying views on civil marriage confirm that religiosity is a defining aspect of Leba-
nese culture. A study by the Beirut Center for Research revealed that 87 percent of the Lebanese 
people across confessions practiced their religious rituals and faith on a permanent or occasional 
basis. Moreover, the study showed that 72.8 percent voted in favor of religious courts as opposed 
to 12.8 percent who voted for civil courts.195  
Michael Young, writing on his experiences in Beirut, mentions the "pervasiveness of the 
outwardly devotional, of public manifestations of faith…that religiosity seems everywhere pre-
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sent physically – on trinkets, lockets, wristbands, key rings, bumpers, pocket flashlights, lighters, 
and wherever else one can affix the image of a saint or a Quranic verse."196  The dedication is 
surprisingly stronger among the youth. He explains that "the rise in overt Lebanese religiosity, 
like the rise in sectarian polarization, is one consequence of the breakdown of confidence in the 
state and its social contract." Moreover, it may be connected, especially among the Christians, to 
a "sense of communal decline."197 Charles Harb, a psychology professor at the American Univer-
sity of Beirut, who specializes in identity and group dynamics, maintains that "these symbols are 
also there to declare or [to make statements] and perceive someone's identity with a particular 
group. It's a symptom of group division. The power and resources are based on sectarian alliance 
and group identity."  In his view, people "claim space" by showing religious logos and stickers 
such as "King of Kings" in reference to Jesus Christ or stickers depicting Mecca.198 
Just as the Lebanese family is sectarian, so, too, is the education system. As another im-
portant agency of political socialization, schools do not facilitate social integration. While public 
schools suffer from lack of resources and equipment, the majority of private schools are run by 
religious institutions that are attended by students of the same faith.199 Christian schools, such as 
the Jesus and Mary School, aim, among others, to "nurture young men and women who 
are vessels of the Christian living faith."200 Sunni schools, such as Al-Iman (The Faith), teach 
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memorization of the Holy Quran and aim to spread religious, educational, and cultural quality.201 
Shiite schools, such as Al-Imam (The Imam), aims to spread the word and wisdom of Imam 
Mahdi and "work to embody his method intellectually and behaviorally…to lay the foundations 
of religious values and Islamic ethics in the Lebanese society."202Moreover, the failure of the ed-
ucation system to agree on a common history education curriculum across all schools has re-
mained an obstacle to social and national integration. While historians have often disagreed as to 
the events that shaped Lebanon's ancient history, they disagree even more over Lebanon's more 
recent history, which extends from independence until the end of the civil war in 1990. In the 
words of the Minister of Education, "After more than 20 years...the teaching of history in Leba-
non remains, as it has always been, subject to the interests of various political groups."203 In fact, 
children learn their history from their parents and their communities, as the absence of a common 
curriculum makes reading Lebanon's history open to different interpretations.  Studies show that 
students identify with historical figures from their own sectarian background.204 Ohaness 
Goktchian, a professor of political science at the American University in Beirut, argues that chil-
dren are being brought up indentifying themselves "with their communities and not their na-
tion… History is what unites people. Without history we can't have unity."205Describing the Leb-
anese as a people lacking a collective memory, Lebanese historian Antoine Messara stresses the 
need for "one narrative," a "unified version of history." Goktchian maintains that the Lebanese 
did not share values and traditions and had an education system "which contributes to the divi-
sions among us."206 
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The intersection between social sectarianism and plural consociationalism has produced a 
sociopolitical structure which invites foreign intervention in Lebanese affairs and subjects the 
Lebanese democracy to constant precariousness. The sectarian consociational political system 
reflects a sectarian social system in which religious institutions are prominent and where sects 
are protective of their cultural identity and autonomy. The allegiance to communal leaders in-
stead of the state renders the state weak and incapable of forcing decisions that contradict with 
the interests of the various sectarian groups.  
Despite its frailty, the Lebanese plural democracy is the freest in the Arab world. What 
explains this freedom, Michael Young argues, is the sectarian system itself. In Young's words, 
"The sectarian system, its faults notwithstanding, has ensured that the society's parts are stronger 
than the state, and where the state is weak, individuals are usually freer to function."207 Young 
maintains that while Lebanon is not the only sectarian country in the Middle East, it is the only 
country where the state is weaker than the religious communities. Where the state was stronger, 
like in Iraq or Syria, state ideologies were used as instruments of total control resulting in the 
suffocation of freedom.208     
It is against this background that a study of the Lebanese media ought to take place. 
Because the media reflect the social and political environments within which they operate, it is 
important to understand the sociopolitical structures as well as the power dynamics that shape the 
Lebanese plural democracy and define the relationships among its various sects. The next chap-
ters analyze the media within this framework: how consociationalism is reflected in the media; 
how divisions between the March 14 and March 8 alliances and their power brokers are translat-
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ed into media discourse; and how such discourse reflects identity struggles among the three main 
communities. The figure below illustrates the framework of analysis: 
 
Figure 3. The Media in the Lebanese Sociopolitical Framework 
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 CHAPTER 3: LEBANESE MEDIA PLURALISM AND THE POLITICO-SECTARIAN 
DIVIDE 
Lebanon's plural sociopolitical system and the persistent foreign intervention in its do-
mestic affairs have forged a mediascape whose nature is paradoxical. On the one hand, Lebanon 
stands out in the Arab world as the center of free expression, with a press, since its very begin-
ning, serving as a platform for a multitude of voices and opinions. 209 Its television networks 
have provided forums for public debate, not to mention their highly diversified social and enter-
tainment programs that cater to various audience tastes and needs, both terrestrially and through 
satellite.210 On the other hand, both print and broadcast media in Lebanon often revert to sectari-
an discourse to the extent of threatening the country’s political and social stability. In recurrent 
crises, the media become mired in political and sectarian feuds and serve as instruments of sec-
tarian mobilization.211  
Until the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), the Lebanese media—the press specifically212 
were said to have been the vanguard of political, ideological, and cultural expression in the Arab 
world.213 The late 19th century Lebanese polymath and founder of the Beirut Public Library, Vis-
count Philippe de Tarrazi, once described Lebanon as the true cradle of Arab journalism for be-
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ing, since the founding of the first daily Hadikat Al-Akhbar (The Garden of the News) in 1858, 
the center of abundant and diverse publications.214   
During the civil war, Lebanese media took sides in supporting the warring Christian or 
Muslim factions and became heavily embroiled in the conflict to the point of incitement and 
propaganda. Right-leaning dailies, including Annahar (The day) and Lisan El-Hal (The Mouth-
piece) and left-leaning dailies, such as Assafir (The Ambassador) and Al-Muharrer (The Editor), 
were said to have “transformed their allegiances to thinly disguised communal causes. The left-
ists turned discreetly to championing the cause of the [pan-Arab, pro-Palestinian] Muslim com-
munity while the rightists turned into outright defenders of the [pan-Lebanese] Christian 
cause."215  
During the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, from 1990 until 2005, Lebanese media were 
subjected to heavy censorship. Publishing critical news about Syria’s role in Lebanon was off 
limits to journalists, and in certain cases caused them to be arrested, fined, or their news outlets 
periodically suspended or closed.216 Instead, the Pax Syriana imposed an almost unanimous dis-
course that echoed, to varying degrees, across the various Lebanese dailies and televisions. It 
was a pan-Arab discourse accentuating the “resistance” against the “enemies” of Lebanon and 
the Arabs—Israel, and the United States in general. The discourse particularly emphasized sto-
ries on the Iraq war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Hezbollah’s operations against Israel in 
South Lebanon.  
However, the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, precipitated by international fu-
ror over the assassination of Sunni leader and Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, caused further uncer-
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tainty in the Lebanese sociopolitical and media landscapes. While Lebanon restored a degree of 
its political sovereignty and media freedom, the inter-sectarian fears, which had been dormant 
during the 15-year Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, resurfaced, adding new dimensions to the 
abiding struggle over Lebanon’s identity. 
 The assassination of Hariri divided the Lebanese people between those who accused Syr-
ia of the assassination and those who absolved Syria. It equally engendered an atmosphere of 
doubt, apprehension, and hostility among the various sects. This state of affairs was exacerbated 
by intervention in Lebanon by several foreign actors including the United States, France, and 
Saudi Arabia, who supported the anti-Syrian government headed by Hariri's son, Saad Hariri, 
which formed in the wake of the Beirut Spring. Syria and Iran, on the other hand, supported the 
opposition, led by Hezbollah.217 Moreover, other events aggravated Lebanon’s political scene:  
the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, the international tribunal over Hariri's assassina-
tion, the constant Sunni-Shiite clashes in various parts of Lebanon, and the current spillover from 
the Syrian war—all have raised questions about the viability of Lebanon’s plural politics. Sur-
veys conducted following Hariri’s assassination showed that the various Lebanese communities 
distrusted each other, and that some of them would not hesitate to defend themselves with weap-
ons.218 
How are the media, now with their freedom relatively restored, reflecting the socio-
political climate of the post-Syrian era? Do they present themselves as agents of integration, or 
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do they perpetuate the ambiguity and instability plaguing the Lebanese social and political sys-
tems? This and later chapters will attempt to provide answers to these queries. 
3.1 Media Consociationalism 
The consociational system that has governed Lebanon since the end of the civil war has 
paved the way for a media climate of a plural and consociational nature. A recommendation 
made through the Taef Agreement to reorganize all information media resulted in the adoption of 
the Audio-Visual Media Law, which was the legal mechanism that legitimized sectarian domina-
tion over the media. Each of the sects had a legally running television and radio station serving 
as its mouthpiece. This system seemed to keep a balance of power among the various communi-
ties, creating a form of media consociationalism.   
The Audio-Visual Media Law (AVML) passed in 1994 and implemented in 1996 called 
for reorganization all the information media in Lebanon "under the canopy of the law and within 
the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of 
ending the state of war."219 Such regulation was needed in the aftermath of the civil war, when 
more than 150 radio stations and 40 television stations were operating without licenses.220 The 
law, which, among other things, prohibits journalists from insulting the head of state, key gov-
ernment figures, or inciting sectarian strife, was “the first of its kind in the Arab world,” because 
it revoked the monopoly of state television over broadcasting and legalized private broadcast-
ing.221  
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The outcome of the regulation, however, was not licensing based on professionalization, 
skill, or merit. It was rather meant to secure representation of the different confessional interests 
led by the country's most powerful political and sectarian leaders. The private stations that first 
received licenses were Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI), representing 
the Maronite Christians; Future TV, representing the Sunni Muslims, NBN, representing pro-
Amal Shiite Muslims, 222 and Murr TV (MTV), representing the Greek Orthodox Christians. Sta-
tions that followed in receiving licenses were Al-Manar (The Beacon), representing the pro-
Hezbollah Shiites; Al-Jadeed (New TV), a pan-Arab network; and more recently, Orange TV 
(OTV), representing another group of the Maronite Christians. While all these stations received 
local and "foreign" funding, Tele-Liban (TL), the only government-owned station, lacks substan-
tive funding and has been declining since the end of the civil war. Politicians and businessmen 
were more interested in investing in private stations than in helping Tele-Liban develop into a 
powerful national outlet representative of all.  The station today suffers from lack of equipment 
and insufficient staffing. While Tele-Liban is the only non-partisan station in Lebanon, it does 
not draw large audiences.223 In the words of NBN journalist Yacoub Alawiya, "State media do 
not reflect any political line and are very weak.” 224 The distribution of media licenses across the 
sectarian, socio-political spectrum reflects the plural nature of the society, where groups’ alle-
giance is to their communities and not to the state; where, as Rabushka and Shepsle maintain 
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"communal loyalties contend for ultimate political authority and loyalty.”225 This explains to 
some degree why—among other things— Tele-Liban rates the lowest in viewership.226  
The AVML has been often applied selectively and unpredictably to further the interests 
of the politicians in power. Its ten-member regulatory body, the National Audiovisual Council 
(NAVC) tasked with allocating licenses has no executive authority; decisions to grant or revoke 
licenses lie primarily within the Council of Ministers. This has led to the circumvention of the 
law in some cases and its strict implementation for political ends in others. For example, the law 
prohibits an individual or family from owning more than 10 percent in a television company in 
order to "prevent political parties from having TV networks." 227 In practice, however, it is not 
the case. Nabil Dajani describes it as "congruent with the special socio-political structure of the 
Lebanese society."228 Most private stations are directly or indirectly owned by politicians who 
are also sectarian leaders. MTV (Murr TV) is owned by Gabriel El-Murr; an influential Greek 
Orthodox politician; NBN, owned by Nabih Berri, the speaker of parliament and leader of the 
pro-Amal Shiites; Future TV, owned by the Hariri family, whose father and son are influential 
Sunni leaders and were both prime ministers;  LBCI, formerly owned by the Lebanese Forces, 
leaders of a large Maronite following; Orange TV, owned by Aoun and his movement, who rep-
resent another Maronite following; Al-Manar, owned by Hezbollah, the Shiite party; and Al-
Jadeed (New TV) owned by an independent Sunni businessman (previously by the Communist 
party), making it relatively more independent, albeit politicized.229 The majority of shareholders 
in these networks are from the same religious group—a practice also prohibited by the law. For 
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example, Orthodox Christians have owned more that 70 percent of MTV's corporate shares; 
Maronites have owned 55 percent of LBCI’s shares; almost half of NBN shareholders have been 
Shiite Muslims; Sunni Muslims have owned 59 percent of future TV’s shares, and Hariri family 
members and relatives have owned more than 43 percent of the station's shares.230  
However, stations have not always been transparent on the question of ownership. Media 
ownership, as Lebanese media expert Magda Abu Fadil maintains, is “a contentious issue in 
Lebanon because full disclosure of who really has how many shares in any given organization, 
and what foreign interests are involved, are hard to trace under the current legal regime."231 Since 
these stations are, above all, commercial enterprises, they rely on advertising for funding. But, 
given the low figures of advertisement money spent on television networks,232 critics suspect that 
stations rely on other means for funding. This is referred to as "invisible money" or “political 
money,” a practice that also existed before and during the civil war, where money is generated 
both locally and from foreign sources. Countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Syria, Egypt, 
the PLO, Libya, Iran, European countries and the United States, are all believed to have provided 
Lebanese media with money. 233 According to a report compiled by Lebanese and other media 
professionals and academics, "Media executives from various sectors meet with government of-
ficials from the contributing country and promise in return for a given sum of money to refrain 
from criticizing the donor in question."234 Despite the fact that no evidence exists to support the-
se claims, this practice is "common knowledge among media professionals and critics."235  
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The use of the AVML for political ends has not been uncommon. A famous case is the 
2002 shutdown of Murr TV (MTV). MTV was among the first stations to receive a license, but it 
was forcefully closed after its owner, Gabriel El- Murr, was accused of using the channel to 
promote his campaign for the June 2002 parliamentary elections—an act prohibited by the 
AVML. El- Murr had run for the elections and won against a member of his family who was 
supported by Emile Lahoud, the pro-Syrian president at that time. As El- Murr was a fierce critic 
of Syria, and as Syria was off limits to media discussion, MTV had to be closed. It reopened in 
2009, four years after Syria withdrew from Lebanon.  
On another famous case in 2003, the government cut the satellite link of Al-Jadeed (New 
TV). The station, owned by Tahseen Khayat, an ally of Qatar and a rival to Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri, had planned to show a controversial episode on the program "Bila Raqib" (Without Sur-
veillance), in which Saudi opposition figures were invited to discuss sensitive issues that had to 
do with the Saudi government, Hariri's ally and close friend. Because the program was to be 
broadcast on satellite, Hariri feared the show might damage relations with Saudi Arabia, who had 
warned against airing the show and threatened to cut aid to Lebanon. Hariri took the action that 
cut New TV's satellite link. However, the channel was reconnected by an order from President 
Emile Lahoud, who saw New TV as a means to attack Hariri, his rival. 236 The New TV case also 
illustrates the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. As Fandy contends, "The accusations and 
counter-accusations between Future TV and New TV before the assassination of Hariri replicat-
ed the Saudi-Qatari animosity, with a Lebanese tinge."237 
Politics also played a role in securing a license for NBN even before the network exist-
ed— a move that guaranteed that the Shiite speaker of parliament had a media platform. Al-
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Jadeed, (New TV) on the other hand, which had already been established when the law was im-
plemented, was at first denied a license on grounds that its application was not in order. It got its 
license in 2000.238 While Al-Manar was first refused a license, its critics believe that the late Syr-
ian president Hafez Al-Assad intervened and convinced the Lebanese government that the station 
was needed for Lebanon's war against Israel. 239  
The Audio Visual Media Law was the mechanism that not only legitimized sectarian mo-
nopoly of the media but also constituted a playground for politicians competing for power. As 
Naomi Sakr contends, “Laws with vaguely worded prohibitions relating to notions of security, 
national unity, and reputation can be applied according to the personal interpretation of the peo-
ple in power, whenever they are inconvenienced by media reporting."240   
3.2 The Pro-Syrian, Anti Syrian Divide and Lebanese Media Polarization 
The period following the assassination of Hariri opened a new era for the Lebanese me-
dia. After 15 years of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, the Lebanese media regained a degree of 
sovereignty and freedom to be an effective agent of national and social integration much needed 
after years of civil war and Syrian guardianship. In the first days following the assassination, the 
media seemingly played a role in the construction of national unity. According to Ali Hamade, a 
political show host on Future TV and editorialist in Annahar (The Day), television [during the 
Beirut Spring] "played the major role in mobilizing people and getting them onto the street. It led 
the politics."241 Lina Khatib maintains that television during that period was instrumental in em-
phasizing a national togetherness that seemed to be felt among the Lebanese despite their various 
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sects.  While she cautions against overestimating the role of television in the process of demo-
cratic transformation, Khatib argues that Lebanese television, at least for a short-lived period of 
time, was able to create a sense of national unity that had not been felt since the end of the civil 
war. This took place, as she explains, through an emphasis on religious togetherness by showing 
people of different religions holding their religious symbols and converging on Hariri's gravesite 
for prayer. Television also emphasized images of the Lebanese flags that dominated the scene in 
downtown Beirut as opposed to previous years when the Lebanese had no sense of belonging to 
their nation. As she puts it, "The Lebanese flag was resurrected during the Beirut Spring as a 
symbol of the pre-war nation. It finally gained acceptance as a sign of national unity, its presence 
symbolizing the need for the Lebanese to come together at a time of national crisis. Television 
camera crews clearly contributed to this as they picked up on the imagery in covering the 
events." 242   
The national togetherness was short-lived. The Beirut Spring, with all the hopes it raised 
for the Lebanese people, was like a mirage that seemed within reach, but in reality, was far away. 
The events which unfolded after Hariri's assassination proved once again that sectarianism was 
deeply embedded in the Lebanese psyche and the media were soon to expose it and amplify it. 
The televisions of the post-Hariri period (2005-present) have been divided into two fiercely op-
posed camps reflecting the divisions between the political and sectarian leaders:  an anti-Syrian, 
pro-March 14 camp, grouping LBCI, MTV, and Future TV; and a pro-Syrian, pro-March 8 
camp, grouping Al-Manar, NBN, OTV, and Al-Jadeed (New TV).  Since Hariri’s assassination, 
they have been used as platforms of provocative sectarian discourse.  Pro-Syrian, March 8 media 
outlets promoted Hezbollah and Syria and accused their opponents of “treason” and of serving 
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American and Israeli interests. Anti-Syrian, pro-March 14 outlets, on the other hand, accused 
their opponents of serving the interests of Syria and Iran. 243 Almost all media relied on sectarian 
inflammatory language and mobilization techniques, such as video clips, ads, hate speeches by 
leaders, heated debate shows, and heavily editorialized news bulletins. 
Table 2. Media Channels and Political Affiliation 
March 8/Pro-Syrian March 14/Anti-Syrian 
Orange TV LBCI 
Al-Manar Future TV 
NBN MTV 
Al-Jadeed (New TV)  
 
The post-Rafik Hariri period did not only witness an increase in the number of political 
programs; people who wanted to get an objective opinion, as one former head of programming at 
Future TV mentioned,  had to watch more than one bulletin a day "because you can't get the full 
picture from just one channel. They each show their own perspective."244 However, journalists 
agree that people tend to get the news from within the borders of their political and sectarian me-
dia.  Commenting on viewership, Al-Balad daily journalist Ali Dahe said that “The Shiites most-
ly watch Al-Manar or NBN, while the Sunnis watch Future TV.”245 In fact, according to Sami 
Hamad of the Lebanese Media Information Services, Lebanese people do not get to hear all 
points of view, as Al-Manar, for example, is not broadcast in the predominantly Sunni North, 
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while Future TV is not available in the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut.246  
Sometimes journalists cannot even have access to news due to restrictions resulting from the po-
litical leaning of the media outlet they work for. While Al-Manar reporters, for example, have 
exclusive access to Hezbollah-controlled Shiite areas, they do not usually report from the Beirut 
Sunni-dominated neighborhood of Tareek Al-Jadeedeh, where clashes between Sunnis and Shi-
ites often occur.247 
The involvement of the media in political and sectarian feuds has sometimes culminated 
in inflammatory and precarious situations. When pro-government Sunni parliament member 
Walid Eido was killed in a car bomb as part of a series of assassinations aimed at anti- Syrian 
officials,248 NBN's coverage of the event revealed the station’s extreme association with the pro-
Syrian, March 8 camp. The presenter, whose microphone was mistakenly kept on live while she 
was not on the screen, was heard saying: "What took them so long?" speculating with a colleague 
which politician might be killed next so that the Mach 8 alliance would be able to control the 
government.249 
Other sectarian incidents turned violent. Clashes between Sunnis and Shiites in Beirut in 
May 2008 triggered attacks by Hezbollah militants on the Hariri-owned media.  Accusing the 
Hariri media of "stoking the flames of sectarianism and discord," Hezbollah unplugged Future 
TV, Future News (then) and Radio Orient (Hariri's radio station) and set the building of their 
newspaper Al-Mustaqbal on fire.250  
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Besides using inflammatory discourse, television stations have diverged considerably in 
their reporting of important stories. Pro-and anti-Syrian media, for example, were selective in 
their coverage of two important events that happened on the same day: the third-year commemo-
ration of Hariri's killing and the assassination of a top Hezbollah commander. Pro-march 8 sta-
tions, including Al-Manar, NBN, and Al-Jadeed focused on the killing of the Hezbollah com-
mander, holding Israel responsible for the crime. They almost ignored or even criticized Hariri’s 
commemoration event in downtown Beirut, where anti-Syrian, March 14 supporters, rallied. Us-
ing the right camera angles, they reported low turnouts as a sign that the March 14 group was 
losing popular support.   Pro-March 14 media, on the other hand, emphasized the commemora-
tion event and criticized the speech which the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, made at the 
funeral of the slain commander.251 Unlike their pro-Syrian counterparts, Future TV and LBC re-
ported a turnout of up to one and a half million people at the Hariri commemoration. The divi-
sions in the media climate reflected political and sectarian divisions in the country.  LBCI's re-
portage was descriptive of the Lebanese condition: 
More than half of Lebanon was on the streets, but the tragedy is that Lebanon is in fact 
two squares, two souls, two speeches and two projects. Both sides' escalation in rhetoric 
seems to be a reflection of the escalation in the international and regional confrontation. 
Lebanon seems to face a dangerous division that warns of a new form of confrontation.252  
Divergence in reporting was also clear in the prejudiced media coverage of the heated 2009 par-
liamentary elections. A report by the European Union’s Elections Observation Mission revealed 
that the stations' coverage of the elections matched their political and sectarian affiliations. Ac-
cording to an electoral law implemented for the first time in 2009, all media were required to of-
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fer all candidates equal airtime and print space and were prohibited from supporting any one 
candidate.253 However, the media did not respect the law. Al-Manar, OTV, and NBN gave more 
coverage of the March 8 group, "with Al-Manar and OTV commenting negatively on the March 
14."254 Al-Manar and OTV devoted 68 and 66 percent of news coverage respectively to the 
March 8 group, and 23 percent to the March 14. This was followed by NBN, which gave 62 per-
cent to the March 8 and 26 percent to the March 14. Al-Jadeed gave almost equal coverage to 
both blocs but was critical of the March 14. This contrasts with the coverage by the pro-March 
14 stations, with Future TV devoting 66 percent of news coverage to March 14 politicians, while 
only 22 percent to opposition parties. MTV and LBCI gave 57 and 52 percent to March 14 and 
30 and 33 percent to opposition parties, respectively.255 One Future TV producer complained that 
his station had first adhered to the directive of the Interior Ministry and was giving politicians of 
different affiliations equal airspace. However, when they (his station) saw that other stations did 
not respect the law, Future TV “went ahead and campaigned—[because they] were dragged into 
this.” 256 
All television stations broadcast political talk shows with guests of different political and 
sectarian affiliations invited to discuss current events. Debates covering sensitive topics—Syria 
specifically— often result in quarrels and even assaults. In November 2011, MTV’s program 
"Bimawdu'eeyah" (Objectively) became a hit after a heated debate turned violent between Mus-
tapha Alloush, of the Hariri Future Movement, and the pro-Syrian, Fayez Shukr, of the Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party, who argued about Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad. The debate inten-
sified when Alloush called the Syrian president "a liar, a tyrant, and a criminal." Defending As-
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sad, Shukr hurled obscenities at Alloush and insulted his mother. In the escalation of curses, 
Shukr threw his glass of water across the table, picked up his chair, ready to throw it at his oppo-
nent. He had to be restrained from beating Alloush.257 In another incident in February 2013, a 
talk show on Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV almost turned to violence when guests were discussing 
the escalation of the war in Syria. Salem Zahrani, who heads a Lebanese media center and who 
supports Assad, flung two glasses of water at Assaad Bechara, who disapproved of the policy of 
the Syrian regime. The host intervened to stop the fight.258  
The Lebanese media, despite their opposing political agendas, tend to agree—or appear 
to agree—over the hatred of Israel as the common enemy. For example, all outlets, pro-and anti-
Syrian, provided extensive coverage of the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, empha-
sizing the material and human destruction caused by the Israeli aggression. In January 2013, an 
anti-Israeli Lebanese militant made the headlines in Lebanese media when a French court re-
voked an earlier decision to release him after 28 years in a French prison. The Leftist militant, 
George Abdallah, was accused of killing an American Lieutenant and an Israeli diplomat in Par-
is.259  However, the court postponed its decision to release him to a further date pending the de-
portation order from the French Interior Ministry. The delay caused uproar and demonstrations in 
Beirut, with accusations that the French decision was affected by American and Israeli interfer-
ence.260 While Al-Manar and Al-Jadeed were the stations that most staunchly covered the story, 
other media provided extensive coverage. Some of them, including LBCI, led with the story on 
their prime-time evening news bulletin.261  
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3.3 A Closer Look at Four Television Networks 
        In this section, four private television stations whose discourse is analyzed in the next chap-
ter are discussed. These stations— OTV, Future TV, Al-Manar, and LBCI— provide a panoram-
ic view of the general media climate in Lebanon. They represent the main Lebanese sects— the 
Maronites, Shiites, and Sunnis, and they may be categorized as polar types: on one pole, OTV 
and Al-Manar represent pro-Syrian, March 8 discourse; and on another pole, LBCI and Future 
TV represent the anti-Syrian, Mach 14 discourse (while Future TV is fiercely anti-March 8, 
LBCI has not been so all the way).  
3.3.1 Orange TV  
Since it was established in 2007, Orange TV (OTV) has served as the platform which 
Maronite leader Michel Aoun has used to promote his agenda. Located in the Christian area of 
Sin el-Fil, OTV takes its name after the orange color logo of Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement.262 
The network was launched when Aoun saw an urgent need for "unbiased" news.263 Aoun has re-
peatedly attacked other Lebanese channels, including LBCI and Future TV, accusing them of 
biased and unprofessional reporting when covering news about him and his allies.264 Carrying 
the logo "For the People, By the People," the network claims to promote "modernism, freedom, 
and democracy" and "address the challenges facing the nation through objective analysis and ef-
fective solutions."265 Its news and political programming director said OTV has only one com-
petitor; "the truth." 266 Aoun, who was interviewed after the opening of the channel, said "there 
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would be no interference in news or political programming," and that he would not "beg" for 
money from any country to avoid owing any allegiance,267 an allusion to OTV's rival, Future TV, 
believed to be financed, among others, by Saudi money.268  
Despite its claims for objectivity, OTV has bluntly promoted Aoun's politics and those of 
his protectors and allies in the March 8 camp. It has particularly supported the pro-Syrian, March 
8 alliance, with Hezbollah at its head, and adopted a particularly anti-Sunni rhetoric. This rheto-
ric is manifested through constant attacks on Hariri and through reports insinuating that there is a 
constant danger of Sunni extremism in Lebanon and the region. In the words of Michael Young, 
"Aoun [when he's cornered] resorts to attacks against Sunni prerogatives to rally the Chris-
tians."269 In fact, Aoun's political agenda, which had previously promoted a national discourse, 
has since 2006 shifted in favor of a pro-Christian discourse justified by the argument of the Ihbat 
(frustration) of the Christians; that the Christians are marginalized (by the Sunnis in Aoun’s per-
spective) and misrepresented (through the adoption of electoral laws that have promoted the in-
terests of the Sunnis at the expense of the Christians). A Sunni state minister recently accused 
Aoun of "constantly provoking the Sunni sect" and causing sectarian agitation.270 Dar el Fatwa, 
Lebanon's highest Sunni authority, demanded an apology from Aoun for "offending Muslims" 
after he and his TV station claimed that alcohol was found in the car of a slain Sunni cleric.271 
Aoun's Christian rival, Samir Geagea, accused him of waging a “battle of ethnic cleansing 
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against Sunnis through portraying them as extremists.”272 In following the same approach, OTV 
has repeatedly presented a negative view of Sunnis. One example is its report on the death of a 
Lebanese priest who passed in a blaze at his archdiocese allegedly from a fire caused by electri-
cal problems. The report claimed that the death was possibly "the continuation of a string of fun-
damentalist attacks on churches witnessed recently in other countries," a fact which caused the 
interior minister to warn OTV against "irresponsible media behavior" aimed at scaremonger-
ing.273 The anti-Sunni rhetoric is even embedded in non-political reports. For example, when 
OTV broadcast an around-the world report at the end of one of its bulletin before the New Year, 
it made sure to include a story on Sunni extremism:  
Celebrating New Year's Eve is prohibited to Muslims. This is one of the new fundamen-
talist Islamic Fatwas in Kyrgyzstan. In this state situated in the middle of Asia, a number 
of Sunni clerics prohibited Muslims from participating in New Year celebrations as they 
considered this celebration to be costly and having no connection with Islam in any 
way.274  
While none of the other television stations reported this story that day in light of its insignifi-
cance to Lebanon, it fell within the parameter of OTV's anti-Sunni campaign.  
Echoing the voice of its leader, OTV has launched a staunchly Christian ethnocentric 
campaign by promoting a new electoral law proposal ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled 
for June 2013. Aggressively defended by Aoun and other Christian groups, the law, if passed, 
would enable members of parliament to be elected exclusively by voters from their own sect. 
This will give the chance for Christians, who, on the whole, have complained of misrepresenta-
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tion, to elect the Christian MPs of their choice. The law has divided public opinion with the Sun-
nis, Druze, and independent Christians particularly rejecting it on grounds that it would exacer-
bate sectarianism and lead to further national disintegration.275 Aoun, however, has repeatedly 
claimed that the Christians of Lebanon have been marginalized and their MPs elected to office 
through Muslim votes.276 In promotion of the law, OTV showed a video of two minutes and four 
seconds titled "Fair Representation is a Right; Don't Miss it,"277 which shows citizens standing 
before a camera, revealing their religion and sect and the region they are from. They call for a 
new law that would make their voice heard and that represents them: "I am Jennifer, a Maronite 
from Kahhaleh, Aley; I am Roman Catholic from Baalbeck, Hermel; I am Roman Orthodox from 
Rashaya; I am Ralf, an Evangelist, from Kfour, Nabatieh; I used to vote out of obligation; I will 
not vote as long as the law does not represent me, [etc.]" 
Despite being a propaganda tool of Aoun politics, OTV, like all other private stations, is a 
profit-driven business. The station offers a variety of entertainment, educational, and social pro-
grams that cater to various tastes. The station has a number of political shows, including “Bila 
Hasaneh” (Without Impunity), “Hiwar Al- Yawm” (Talk of the day), and “Bayna Assoutour” 
(Between the Lines), whose hosts invite politicians to discuss news on Lebanon and the region. 
The station equally broadcasts a news bulletin in the Armenian language for the Lebanese Arme-
nian minority, some of whose leaders are allied with Aoun's bloc in parliament.  
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3.3.2 Al-Manar TV 
Al-Manar TV stands out as a highly ethnocentric Shiite station with a pan-Arab and Is-
lamic discourse. From its inception in 1991 (it became a satellite channel in 2000), it has be-
longed to Hezbollah both politically and culturally.278  
Located in a Shiite and Hezbollah dominated neighborhood of a southern Beirut suburb, 
Al-Manar proudly calls itself "the station of the Arabs and the Muslims."279 It describes its pro-
grams as stemming from its Arab and Islamic culture and milieu and from its Arab and Islamic 
values. The station's priorities are "the rightful causes of our Umma," of which the Palestinian 
cause, the "Zionist occupation" of south Lebanon, and the "pulse of the Iraqi street that is re-
sistant to American occupation," are central.280 Shareholders in Al-Manar are all supportive of its 
policy, and its high ranking executives are usually important figures in the party of Hezbollah.281    
Al-Manar's content is highly anti-Semitic. It is Hezbollah's tool in launching its “psycho-
logical warfare against the Israeli enemy”282 and mobilizing Arabs and Muslims against Israel 
and what it calls American hegemony and Western imperialism. Al-Manar's approach succeeded 
in winning Arab audiences with a report showing that the station rated number10 among the sta-
tions watched most during the 2006 July war between Hezbollah and Israel.283 Al-Manar's media 
have antagonized several countries, and many have banned its transmission from their airwaves. 
America has called the network "a mouthpiece of hatred and violence, "promoting suicide at-
tacks against U.S troops.284 
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Al-Manar’s programming is mostly propagandistic and reliant on one dominant media 
frame: resistance against oppression. Whether it is oppression from "imperialist" powers or from 
local rivals, the discourse of oppression is associated with the Shiite sect and deeply embedded in 
their culture and their past. Thus, reports showing Israeli aggression against Palestinians, Ameri-
can attacks in Iraq, or commemoration of the battle of Karbala, where the Shiites mourn the kill-
ing of their Imams, are emphasized.285  
While Al-Manar’s programming includes social and entertainment programs, the station 
stands out as having a large number of religious programs. There are at least 17 different reli-
gious programs that are distributed through the whole week. To mention a few, “Thalika Al-
Kitab” (That Book), “Fiqh Al-Hayat” (Jurisprudence of Life), “Khitab Al-Qaed,” (Discourse of 
the Leader) “Ana W’al-Hussein” (The Hussein and I), “Nafahat Qur'aniyah” (Qur'anic inspira-
tions,) are all programs that deal with interpreting and applying  the Holy Quran to daily life and 
featuring speeches by Shiite clerics that are meant to teach Muslims how to live righteously, 
etc.286  
As a propaganda media organization, Al-Manar features numerous political programs. 
The network presently airs at least 10 political programs, (this figure excludes the high number 
of political documentaries). These may be talk-shows, live or taped speeches by the leader of 
Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, or other Shiite politicians and clerics. Popular programs include 
“Hadith Assa’a,” (Talk of the Hour), “Matha Ba’d” (What’s Next), and “Bayna Qawsayn” (Be-
tween Brackets), which all address local and regional political issues that are of concern to Leba-
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non.287 What is common about these shows is that they often feature guests who espouse a strong 
anti-Jewish and anti-American rhetoric. Other programs are sociopolitical. For example, “The 
Victorious: History of the Resistance in Lebanon,” is an Al-Manar production that tells the story 
of the “heroic acts” of resistance fighters against Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the lives of 
the inhabitants of the south who suffered that occupation. 
Al-Manar produces several programs that focus on the resistance. These constitute an 
important component of its psychological war. For example, “Our martyrs, Hallmark of History” 
is a daily show that commemorates Hezbollah militants who die while fighting the Israeli "ene-
my." It shows militants reading their will before going to battle. Much of what is read by the mil-
itants before their death reveals Hezbollah's ideology and mission. For example, one of the mili-
tants, reading his will, reveals clearly the organic relationship between Hezbollah and Iran:  
My brothers, I sincerely ask Allah to prolong the life of Imam Khomeini, the leader, re-
viver, and honor of the Islamic nation, the motive to the Muslims, and the guarantee to 
the continuity of the nation until the appearance of Imam Mahdi who will spread justice 
in the world after it was filled with injustice and oppression. 288 
With modern and highly-equipped studios, Al-Manar is believed to receive indirect financial 
support from Iran. According to Avi Jorish, "Iran provides an estimated $100-200 million per 
year to Hezbollah, which in turn transfers money to Al-Manar, making Iranian funding of the 
station indirect."289 Jorish maintains that this indirect form of funding "was confirmed by former 
Al-Manar program director Sheikh Nasir Al-Akhdar, who asserted that Al-Manar receives a 
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large portion of its budget through subsidies offered by Hezbollah."290Al-Manar also receives 
funding from Muslim communities in Europe, Canada, and the United states. The channel solic-
its donations under "The Intifada in the Occupied Palestine Name," "The Palestinian Uprising," 
and "The Resistance Information Donation Fund."291  
Al-Manar's biased reportage towards the March 8 camp and the Alawite Syrian regime 
clearly reflects Hezbollah's strategic alliance with Syria and Iran. The 2011 Media Sustainability 
Index Report on Lebanon states that Al-Manar has "dropped any pretense towards objective re-
porting of the killing of protesters in Syria by its allies in the Assad regime, repeating the re-
gime’s mantra that the Syrian uprising was driven by Salafists or Sunni fundamentalists."292   
3.3.3 Future TV 
Established by the Hariri family in 1993 and located in a Sunni dominated area of West 
Beirut, Future TV has been considered a Sunni counterweight to the Maronite-dominated 
LBCI.293 Due to Hariri's closeness to the Saudi royal family, it is assumed that much of his busi-
ness and political money has come from the Saudi kingdom. Recent reports on rival LBCI 
claimed Hariri's son, Saad Hariri, received $4 billion from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to support his 
companies, including Future TV. Hariri, however, denied the reports.294 
During the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, Future TV, like other channels, obeyed Syrian 
orders. As Maamoun Fandy puts it, "Hariri's closeness to Syria could explain Future TV's self-
censorship and deference to Damascus."295 Its programming was pan-Arab, highlighting the Pal-
estinian struggle, Hezbollah's role liberating the south of Lebanon, the American war on Iraq, 
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and was defensive of the role of Syria in Lebanon.   The turning point in Future TV's discourse 
was the killing of Hariri, which the Sunnis blamed on Syria. However, it was not only the killing 
of Hariri as a leader and influential figure in the region that caused the shift. The killing was con-
sidered an attack against the Sunnis of Lebanon by a Shiite Alawite regime. For the first time, 
the Sunnis, who had persistently spoken in the name of their Arabness, their inseparable identity 
from Syria, shifted to adopting a pan-Lebanese discourse. As Hariri was not the first Sunni lead-
er to be allegedly assassinated at the hands of the Syrian regime, the Sunnis felt persecuted. 
Some argue that Sunnis were "harassed and assassinated because the Alawite regime in Syria 
feels threatened by powerful Sunnis and their potential effect on Syria’s own Sunnis."296The re-
sult was an open accusation by the network of the Syrian regime of killing Hariri and a propa-
ganda campaign against Syria and its Lebanese allies which started in 2005 and continues to this 
very day.  
More recently, the station openly took the side of the Sunni Free Syrian Army in its war 
with the Al-Assad regime. Since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, Future TV has reported 
daily on the news, not only on its regular news broadcasts, but also on a daily program dedicated 
to the Syrian conflict. Under the headline of "Syria: The Beginning of the End, 2013," Future TV 
has emphasized the atrocities that the Syrian regime was allegedly committing against its people 
and showed how the Free Syrian army was scoring victories signaling the end of the Assad re-
gime. In one of its reports, Future TV told the following story: 
The tighter the grip on the Assad regime, the more brutal it becomes. Video footage 
leaked from the cell phone of one of the Assad "braggers" reveals hostages brutally treat-
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ed at the hands of the Assad regime. [The report runs against footage showing Al-Assad 
troops allegedly beating and kicking the hostages on their heads amid blood]297 
Another report described Al-Assad in derogatory terms, highlighting a massacre Al-Assad alleg-
edly committed against people saying prayers: 
Every day of the Syrian revolution, Bashar Al-Assad adds hundreds of dead and wounded 
souls to his account. His brigades committed another appalling massacre when his planes 
shelled the Hirak region in Daraa, which led to the killing and wounding of tens of people 
who were exiting the Big Mosque after saying their prayers.298  
Besides its position on Syria, Future TV has directed a fierce news campaign against Aoun and 
his media outlet. This was manifested through sarcastic reports and interviews with politicians, 
lawyers, and civil society activists who spoke against the electoral law Aoun was propagating. 
All interviews conducted emphasized that the law will lead to "fragmentation of the Lebanese 
entity to conflicting sects and confessions… this is the law of the assassination of moderation… 
the law of the rise of extremism."299 A more vicious attack on Aoun comes regularly in one of 
Future TV's most popular programs, Daily News Analysis. DNA serves as a platform for pro-
Hariri host, Nadim Koteish, to defend Hariri and the March 14 alliance against the pro-Syrian, 
March 8 alliance, of which Aoun is an integral part.   
While Future TV constantly promotes the Hariris and their movement, the station has at-
tempted to emphasize a discourse of "national unity and coexistence," Rafik Hariri's main slo-
gan.300 During Hariri's first premiership between 1992 and 1998, Future TV's programs focused 
on attracting Arab viewers by being "a marketing tool used by the prime minister to present Leb-
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anon as a center of civil peace in the region with tourist attractions worthy of hefty investments 
from Gulf Arabs."301 After Hariri's assassination, the station became the primary voice of the an-
ti-Syrian, March 14 opposition, which included Christian, Sunni, Shiite, and Druze factions. As 
Hamade puts it, "Future became the platform for all opposition factions [launching] a massive 
campaign playing hundreds of clips, songs, shows, anything to mobilize the people. If you were 
at home watching the images of the Lebanese flags 24 hours a day, you might stay at home for 
the first few days but eventually you felt compelled to go down and join the demonstrations."302 
Future TV's less sectarian discourse, however, does not absolve it from being a fiercely propa-
gandistic instrument, for its opponents accuse it of being a Sunni mouthpiece. Like OTV and Al-
Manar, Future TV's news bulletin is heavily editorialized and politicized. However, the bulk of 
its programming, as with other profit-driven private stations, is focused on social and entertain-
ment news.  
3.3.4 Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI) 
Although an organ of the Maronite Christians, LBCI, in the years after Hariri's assassina-
tion, has leaned towards moderation. Established in 1985 during the civil war and operating from 
the Christian area of Adma, LBCI was the media platform of the Maronite supporters of the 
Christian Lebanese Forces. However, when the leader of the Forces, Samir Geagea, was impris-
oned in 1990 for political reasons, LBCI's ownership was transferred to Geagea's associate and 
co-founder, Pierre Daher. The latter converted the station from partisan politics to a revenue-
generating entertainment station. After launching its satellite transmission in 1996, LBCI be-
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came, for a period of time, the most popular station in Lebanon and the Arab world, especially 
for the "soft-porn nature of its programming."303 
When Geagea was released from prison, he reclaimed ownership of the station,304 
prompting a legal dispute over LBCI's ownership between Geagea and Daher in November 
2007.305 Daher maintained that the issue was not over ownership but over who controlled LBCI's 
news and political programs, accusing Geagea of wanting to control the station politically. In his 
words, "It is a battle over media freedom and over the freedom of a media institution that doesn't 
believe in partisanship or political restraints."306  
The Lebanese Forces, who have not had an aggressive media channel to promote their 
agenda particularly since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, resorted to online media 
as a temporary fix while awaiting their original station. They established Lebanese Forces Tele-
vision Station (LFTV). During the launching of the network, Geagea complained that some polit-
ical factions were "dragging Lebanese media down using it as a mere tool for political propagan-
da filled with misperceptions, slanders, allegations, and personal offences." He said the network 
would not replace the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, stressing that LBCI would return to 
its original owners.307  
During the Syrian hegemony, LBCI suffered, like other media outlets, from Syrian moni-
toring and censorship of political programming.  Its board members included pro-Syrian politi-
cians and business men. To protect itself from Syrian pressure, LBCI sought alliances with Saudi 
media entrepreneurs, including princes Al-Walid bin Sultan and Al-Walid bin Talal. In 2002, 
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LBCI entered into a joint venture with Al-Hayat newspaper, owned by the Saudi prince, Khaled 
bin Sultan. The venture resulted in the production of a televised newscast.308 In 2003, prince Al-
Walid Bin Talal bought 49 percent of the station' shares, a move prohibited by law as foreigners 
are not allowed to own shares in Lebanese media. The exception was made because of Bin 
Talal's importance and his blood relation to a former Lebanese prime minister.309 
The LBCI-Saudi connection helped the station acquire a pan-Arab reputation, which 
counter-balanced its generally pro-Western style.310 Its varied programming, particularly during 
the holy month of Ramadan, has attracted a large Muslim audience. One Saudi entrepreneur even 
said that he was able "to influence LBCI's programming and curb the un-Islamic nature of its 
shows."311 While his claims may be exaggerated, it is a fact that the Saudi influence on LBCI 
increased after Al-Walid bin Talal bought half of its shares. LBCI’s ad revenues, for example, 
took a direct hit following the airing of a controversial episode on "Ahmar bel Khat Al- Arid" 
(Bold Red Line), when the show interviewed a man from Saudi Arabia bragging about his sex 
life on camera, where talking about sex in public is considered a "sin."  While the show’s ratings 
skyrocketed, the man was dragged to court, the show was suspended for four months, and the 
LBCI offices in Jeddah were shut down.312 
While LBCI has been characterized as leaning towards the March 14 alliance, it has also 
covered the opposing side— a fact which makes the station harder to brand. One of its lead re-
porters, Denise Rahme Fakhri, sued LBCI, accusing the station of laying her off because of her 
political support for Geagea. 313 However, the station is still regarded as leaning toward the anti-
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Syrian, pro-March 14 side. One of the most vicious attacks waged at LBCI was the assassination 
attempt in 2005 targeting one of the station's most prominent anti-Syrian, Maronite journalists, 
May Chidiac. A bomb exploded from under Chidiac's car seat causing her severe injuries. 
Chidiac blamed the attempt on the Syrian regime.314  
LBCI runs a number of very popular political and social talk shows including “Naharkom 
Said” (Good Day), and “Kalam Ennas”(People's Talk), considered the leading talk show in Leb-
anon.315 However, the bulk of its programs are drama, reality television, and social and enter-
tainment programs.  
3.4 The Lebanese Press 
While this study is primarily concerned with television, a brief look at the print media 
will give a more comprehensive view of the overall media climate. Compared with its Arab 
neighbors, the Lebanese press stands out for its ability to report and criticize freely as well its 
resistance to government efforts to silence it. It is protected by Article 13 of the Lebanese Con-
stitution, which guarantees “the freedom to express one's opinion orally or in writing, the free-
dom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association.”316 Lebanon's news-
papers are, on the whole, noncommercial and their content "usually carries clear political and 
ideological undertones." 317A wide range of publications includes a good number of Arabic dai-
lies, weeklies, and monthlies that provide a rich variety of reportage. 318 There are also three 
French language dailies, one in English, and one in Armenian. Popular Arabic dailies include 
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Annahar (The Day) and Assafir (The Ambassador); they are deemed to have the highest circula-
tion with 45,000 daily.319  Al-Akhbar (The News) is gaining popularity for its unconventional and 
scoop style reportage. However, because publishers don’t reveal circulation figures, experts es-
timate that no Lebanese newspaper sells more than 10,000 copies on its best day, with an average 
of 7,000 to 8,000 a day.320  The low circulation figures imply that newspapers can hardly survive 
from sales and advertisements and, therefore, seek other sources of funding, which normally 
come from "outside sources."321 
Since the first daily Hadikat Al-Akhbar (The Garden of the News) in 1858, Lebanon grew 
to become the center of Arab thought and free expression. The country witnessed a proliferation 
of dailies which reflected the diversity and contradictions associated with the local sociopolitical 
spectrum as well as the ideological divisions in the Arab world. Between 1943 and 1975, the 
press was characterized by "dynamism, diversity, relative freedom, and the attraction of Arab 
intellectuals and dissidents to Beirut." 322 Newspapers were at the heart of media life since radio 
and television were state-owned channels of communication.323 As Hannah Ziadeh points out, "It 
was a place where what could not be said from Baghdad to Rabat could be splashed as a headline 
and where journalists like the late Samir Kassir, were prepared to pay the ultimate price for 
standing up for the truth."324 
 While freedom of the press is protected, the press law, which dates back to 1962, bars 
publications from threatening national security, national unity, state frontiers, or insulting senior 
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Lebanese officials or foreign heads of state. This has resulted in occasional government interfer-
ence by banning certain publications or fining journalists. However, on the whole, and through 
measures of self-regulation, the press has been able to protect itself. Magda Abu Fadil maintains 
that "Lebanon’s media laws have worked to buffer excessive governmental or corporate interfer-
ence in the media’s affairs." She cites the cases of Annahar and Assafir, which, under the protec-
tion of the law, "challenged harassment—and sometimes censorship—by taking their cases to the 
courts and safeguarding their rights."325 However, the main force that shields the press against 
government intervention is the plural nature of the society and the caution to preserve sectarian 
balance. As Caroline Attie explains, "The necessity of maintaining a political balance among 
Lebanon's multi-confessional groups sustained the freedom of the press and accounted for the 
government's reluctance to exercise censorship."326 
The Lebanese press has continuously reflected and actively participated in the Lebanese 
identity crisis: previously, by joining the Arabism-Lebanism divide of the civil war years, and 
presently, through taking sides in the pro-Syrian/Iranian (March 8), anti-Syrian/ Iranian (March 
14)  divide.  Because of the free environment in which it operates, and the association of local 
groups with foreign causes, foreign governments today, as in the past, have used the Lebanese 
press to promote their agendas. As Dajani points out, "The tendency of Lebanese journalists to 
speak for specific sectarian groups and to promote their interests led newspapers in Lebanon to 
concentrate more on the presentation of views and opinions than on news and facts. This gave 
outside powers and interests the opportunity, through the Lebanese media, to play active roles in 
the affairs of Lebanon."327 For example, the Arab nationalist discourse adopted by Egyptian 
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President Jamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s created divisions in the Lebanese press between pro-
Nasserite and anti-Nasserite dailies. As Murawic points out, "When Colonel Abdel Nasser want-
ed to sell an idea and did not want his domestic organ, Al-Ahram (The Pyramids) to be the 
source, a Nasserite daily in Beirut took care of it."328 Also, anti and pro-Nasserite political parties 
at the time had their own publications, including Al-Amal (Hope) of the Maronite Phalange party, 
and Sawt Al-Uruba (The voice of Arabism) of the Arab Nationalist Party. There were equally 
pro-Western dailies, such as Annahar (The Day) and Lissan Ul-Hal (The Mouthpiece). During 
the war, the Lebanese press had patrons. For example, Addoustour (The Constitution) and Al-
Watan Al- Arabi (The Arab Nation) were financed by Iraq, while Al-Hawadis (The Events), by 
Saudi Arabia.  William Rugh maintains that "Annida (The Call), Asharq (The Orient), Assafir 
(The Ambassador) and Al-Kifah (The Struggle) had connections and probably received subsidies 
from Russia, Syria, Libya and Iraq, respectively."329     
While most newspapers today are not transparent about their political funding, some have 
openly acknowledged that they receive political money. The editor of the pro-March 8 daily 
Addiyar, Charles Ayyoub, acknowledged in an editorial that his newspaper receives funding 
from political sources, including Hariri, Hezbollah and Syria.330 Similarly the pro-Syrian Al-
Akhbar (The News) was said to have had received money from Qatar. When Qatar publicly de-
nounced the Assad crackdown in Syria and withdrew its funding from Al-Akhbar, the newspaper 
suddenly began publish pieces criticizing the Gulf kingdom, previously a subject off limits to its 
journalists.331 Those who opposed the political direction of Al-Akhbar, including its deputy direc-
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tor Khaled Saghieh, felt compelled to resign in protest over the paper’s bias in support of the 
Syrian regime. 332 Political money was also needed at a time of severe financial constraints in the 
media industry, as several newspapers and television stations could no longer rely on advertising 
alone and had to lay off a huge number of employees. 333 
The association or dissociation of Lebanese journalists with and from political agendas 
sometimes cost some their lives. In December 2005, the Christian Orthodox editor of Annahar, 
Gebran Tueni, was killed presumably by Syrian forces for his harsh criticism of Syria's policy in 
Lebanon and for calling on Syria to leave. Similarly, Samir Kassir, a columnist for Annahar and 
a critic of Syria, had also been killed for the same reasons five months earlier.334  
The political rift between supporters and opponents of Syria characteristic of the present 
political climate in Lebanon has been clearly expressed in the press. The Hariri owned Al-
Mustaqbal (The Future) became the mouthpiece of the anti-Syrian, anti-Iranian, March 14 camp. 
Founded in 1996 at the height of Syrian presence in Lebanon, Al-Mustaqbal had, up until the as-
sassination of Hariri, adopted a pan-Arab and pro-Syrian discourse. After Hariri's assassination, 
the newspaper, as other Hariri-owned media, shifted its discourse to become the harshest and 
most vitriolic critic of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah. Another generally anti-Syrian daily is Annahar 
(the Day).  Established in 1933 by Ghassan Tueni and his Greek Orthodox family, Annahar has 
been characterized by a liberal pro-Western orientation without denying its roots and Arab affili-
ations. Fandy calls the daily "the Greek Orthodox representation of the opposition voice in Leba-
non, which, for decades, has publicly denounced Syria's presence in the country." 335The daily's 
former editor, the late Gebran Tueni, was renowned for his aggressive defense of Lebanon's 
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freedom and for his "open letters" to the Syrian regime. In one letter, dated March 23, 2000, five 
years before the military withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon, Tueni addressed Presi-
dent Bashar Al-Assad saying: "You must realize that many Lebanese are not at ease with Syrian 
policy in Lebanon or with the presence of Syrian troops in our country."336 Following the assas-
sination of Hariri and others in 2005, Tueni intensified his critical rhetoric of Syria and directly 
accused it of the crimes. In an editorial on December 8, 2005, Tueni told Syrian regime that it 
"should know…that despotic regimes and tyrants who committed massacres against humanity 
were pursued, prosecuted, and they collapsed."337  It was only four days later that Tueni was as-
sassinated in a car explosion.     
Despite its anti-Syrian orientation, Annahar, after 2008, gradually reshaped its coverage  
towards more balance. As observers have pointed out, the paper now "is neither fish nor fowl."338 
It has tried to adopt a moderate approach that covers a variety of points of view. Its editorial 
team is varied and includes writers of all political leanings.   
The polarized discourse of the other end also has its press voice in Assafir (The Ambas-
sador) and Al-Akhbar (The News). Assafir has, since its founding in 1974, followed a pan-Arab 
line. During the civil war, Assafir supported the Palestinian forces against the Lebanese Chris-
tian warring factions; during the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, Assafir was supportive of Syr-
ia's policy; in the post-Syrian era, the daily has, on the whole, been the mouthpiece of the Hez-
bollah-led March 8 camp and has supported the Hezbollah-led ‘Islamic resistance’ against Israel 
and, more broadly, against the United States. Al-Akhbar, on the other hand, describes itself as 
leaning to the left and belonging to the camp of the opposition to American "imperialism." A 
relatively young daily, it has succeeded at attracting attention due to its sensational news cover-
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age and lookout for scoops. Its first issue came out on August 14, 2006, 33 days after the begin-
ning of the July War.339 Its editorial chairman, Ibrahim Al-Amine, stated that it aims to have 
"the U.S. ambassador wake up in the morning, read it, and get upset.” The paper is known to be 
heavily supportive of Hezbollah and Syria despite the fact that it is occasionally critical of the 
politics and ideologies of this camp.340 Al-Akhbar's managing editor said that the daily has an 
anti-imperialism project in its resistance to neoliberal economic policies and its support for 
Hezbollah’s fight against Israel.  While its opponents accuse it of receiving financial support 
from Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, its managing editor denies these accusations, claiming that 
funds come from a private London banker.341 
The Lebanese mediascape is, thus, reflective of a complex sociopolitical environment 
where both local and foreign factors intersect. The plural and consociational character of the me-
dia echoes that of the political system, which guarantees that every main community is repre-
sented and possesses a media outlet. This system has secured the balance of power among the 
sects and shielded the media from government control. However, it has also placed media pro-
fessionals under the mercy of their political and sectarian patrons, which raises questions about 
their true freedom. Since the Lebanese polity is constantly susceptible to foreign intervention, the 
media, which are owned by sectarian and political leaders, are often enmeshed in local and geo-
political disputes. This has prevented them, on the whole, from promoting the nation-building 
much needed after the end of the civil war. However, this is not to argue that they should have 
necessarily done so, for the issues that the Lebanese polity and the media have had to deal with 
in the post-Syrian era are too heavy to cope with. The political rift between the pro-Syrian, 
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March 8 camp and the anti-Syrian, March 14 camp is the driving force behind the media today. 
All political news published is molded within this polarized framework. The four television net-
works discussed earlier, each of which is allied to a political party with a different agenda, reflect 
the deep sociopolitical divisions in the country. Moreover, the allegiance of the sectarian groups 
to foreign powers and their drive for profit invites "political money," which foreign powers, such 
as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran and Qatar, have used to win Lebanese editorial support.  The follow-
ing chapter will critically analyze television discourse as presented on the four television net-
works discussed above. Its purpose is to delve deeper into the nature of the discourse in order to 
evaluate its function in the present sociopolitical setting.  
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CHAPTER 4: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: HOW FOUR NEWS STORIES ARE            
REPORTED IN LEBANESE MEDIA 
The news stories analyzed in this chapter reflect critical and controversial issues currently 
preoccupying the Lebanese political and media scenes. The four television networks chosen for 
the analysis—Orange TV (OTV), Al-Manar, Future TV, and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corpo-
ration International (LBCI)—have covered the stories extensively, and, as mentioned earlier, are 
the networks that represent the schism characterizing the overall political climate in Lebanon. 
OTV and Al-Manar represent pro-Syrian, Maronite and Shiite discourse; Future TV and LBCI 
represent anti-Syrian Sunni and Maronite discourse. While the analysis is focused on television 
discourse, a look at newspaper discourse, in some cases, will help provide supplementary evi-
dence for a more comprehensive analysis.  
The first story, "The Orthodox Law," revolves around debate over an electoral law that 
will govern parliamentary elections in June 2013. The debate has raised political and sectarian 
tensions between the Christians and the Sunnis and between the Sunnis and the Shiites, who are 
competing over fair representation of their communities in the body politic. This story is a pow-
erful illustration of the latent fears and mutual alienations characterizing Lebanese inter-sectarian 
relations. It is significant because it occurs at a point of heightened religiosity and sectarian 
awareness both in Lebanon and the region.  
The second story, "Reporting the Syrian War," illustrates how Lebanese media have re-
ported the war in next-door Syria, an event with local impact and geopolitical significance. The 
analysis probes whether and how local sectarian and political divisions in Lebanese society take 
geopolitical dimensions.  
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The intersection of the local and the geopolitical is further emphasized in the third story, 
"Sunni Radicals." This story describes the rise of Sunni radical groups in parts of Lebanon as a 
result of the association of Lebanese Sunni and Shiite groups with their co-religionists fighting in 
Syria. It is significant because it describes the strategic importance such an association represents 
for these two sects in terms of their power struggle and identity.  
The fourth story, "Wage Protests," demonstrates a socio-economic condition. Unlike the 
previous three, it does not reflect identity struggles; it illustrates worker unions' attempts at pres-
suring the government for wage increases. It is equally significant because it directly concerns 
people's basic needs. The analysis probes how the media report a socio-economic issue that af-
fects people's lives and whether the discourse is similar to, or different from, that used in the pre-
vious three stories.           
Following Van Dijk's method of Critical Discourse Analysis, a close reading of the sto-
ries will focus on three dimensions: semantic macrostructures or "global meanings" that will be 
depicted from the story leads; semantic microstructures, or local meanings of the news stories, 
with a focus on argumentative techniques, naming choices and the creation of in-group, out-
group identities; and identification of "context models" or belief structures that justify the use of 
a particular language in a defined social environment.342 The purpose of the analysis, as Van 
Dijk explains, is "to understand the discursive structures of argumentation [by making] explicit 
their functional roles in the communicative manipulation of other minds in socio-cultural con-
texts."343 Thus, an analysis of the news reports should reveal the argumentative structures and 
their role in the reinforcement or attenuation of sectarian beliefs and attitudes within the present 
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sociopolitical context. Each discourse analysis is preceded by a presentation of the story and a 
thorough explanation of the political context against which it is examined.  
 
4.1 The Orthodox Law 
4.1.1 The story                                                                                                                                                                               
Lebanese politicians have debated an electoral law that would govern forthcoming par-
liamentary elections scheduled for June 2013. If passed, the law would allow people to vote for 
parliament members who are exclusively from their sect. Maronite parliamentarians, for exam-
ple, would only be elected by Maronite voters; Sunni MPs by Sunni voters, and Shiite MPs by 
Shiite voters, etc. This practice would be a first in Lebanese elections, as members of parliament 
cannot access office only through the votes of their co-religionists; they must secure a plurality 
of the total votes from voters of all sects.  While the Orthodox Law, as the project came to be 
called, seems to have united—at least for a while—the majority of the Christian groups despite 
their political feuds, it has particularly angered the Sunnis and Druze, who fear that their blocs in 
parliament, which include non-Sunnis and non-Druze, would shrink.344  
The Christian rhetoric, most aggressively articulated by General Michel Aoun, has 
stressed the urgent need for the Orthodox Law on the grounds that the current electoral law de-
nies Christians fair representation because Christian lawmakers are elected mostly by non-
Christian voters. The Sunni and Druze rhetoric, communicated primarily by the Sunni-dominated 
Future Parliamentary Bloc, equated the law with isolationism and backwardness. It raised fears 
that the Law might turn people into "sectarian villages not united by national interest," which 
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"gives the wrong message about Lebanon.”345The Orthodox Law has deepened the sectarian 
abyss engulfing the Lebanese sociopolitical climate and ignited a media war epitomized by the 
faceoff between the Christian OTV and the Sunni Future TV. Before analyzing the reportage of 
the story, quick mention should be made of the electoral system in Lebanon and the socio-
political context within which the story has developed.  
4.1.2 The Context 
The Lebanese electoral system was designed to secure equal representation between 
Christians and Muslims. This formula reflects the consociational accord that the Taef Agreement 
stipulated to alleviate tensions among the sectarian groups. The 128 seats in the Lebanese par-
liament are distributed among Christians and Muslims on a 50:50-ratio.346 While elections take 
place in various electoral districts according to a single list Party Bloc Vote system,347 voters 
may cross-list candidates from competing lists within a district as long as the sectarian balance is 
not affected.348The candidates that receive a plurality of the total votes represent their community 
in parliament.  Candidates, however, are not only elected by their co-religionists; while they are 
opposed by their co-religionists, they must seek support from outside their faith to be elected. 
This system was devised to increase cross-sectarian cooperation and minimize sectarian cleavag-
es. 349For example, eight deputies run to fill the seats of one of the five electoral districts: two 
Druze, three Maronites, two Sunni, and one Catholic. These deputies may run independently or 
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346
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in joint electoral lists. The voters in this particular district, regardless of their sectarian affiliation, 
vote for these eight members.  
This system, however, has not favored all groups. Political and sectarian leaders have 
continuously quarreled over the issue of electoral districting, as electoral districts, in all post-
civil war elections, have been purposefully gerrymandered to favor certain leaders or serve the 
interests of anti-and pro-Syrian groups. For example, anti-Syrian Christians have complained 
that constituency boundaries have been gerrymandered to allow the election of Shiite parliamen-
tarians from Shiite-dominated constituencies with strong Hezbollah influence, while allocating 
many Christian parliamentarians to Muslim-majority constituencies, forcing Christian politicians 
to be elected by Muslim votes and represent Muslim interests.350In order to guarantee victory, 
sectarian leaders who are normally "ideologically" opposed form coalitions just to win seats.  
This, as Imad Salamey argues, reflects "the meager role that ideology plays in political party 
platforms in comparison with the wheeling and dealing between the sectarian political elite."351  
One reason behind the Christian fervor toward the Orthodox Law is a need to exhibit a 
sense of presence amid insecurity. In the words of Tarek Mitri, "The anxiety of Christians in the 
Arab world is evident. It arises from the effects of their dwindling numbers, the economic and 
political failures of the national states, and fears in the face of rising Islamism. Preoccupation 
with survival affects both their reading of history and their reflections on the future."352 Moreo-
ver, the rise of Christophobia witnessed in many Muslim countries where Christian minorities 
are said to be persecuted and killed,353 along with the rise of Sunni fundamentalism in countries 
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of the Arab Spring, most notably Syria, and the association of Sunni Salafists in Lebanon with 
the Syrian Sunni opposition, has alarmed many Lebanese Christians. On the other hand, the ris-
ing power of the Shiites in Lebanon, demographically, politically, and militarily, as well as their 
association with Iran and Syria, has equally worried Lebanese Christians. This partly explains 
the almost unanimous stance on the Law by the majority of the Christian groups (excluding in-
dependent Christians who fiercely oppose the Law). Surprisingly, the Lebanese Forces and the 
Phalanges sided with their rivals, the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah, insisting that the 
Orthodox Law would provide fair Christian representation. One Al-Monitor analyst explains why 
the Phalanges, who are opposed to Aoun, voted in favor of the Law. In his words, they "view 
Muslims, Sunnis, Shiites, and Druze from the same angle when it comes to the "usurped rights of 
Christians" in parliament."354 The Law is also said to be to Hebzollah's advantage if undertaken 
on the basis of Proportional Representation—which worries the Future Movement, who believes 
that Hezbollah resorted to this law to secure a majority in parliament.  
4.1.3 Discourse Analysis    
A. A careful reading of Orange TV's presentation of the story reveals Christian fears from 
a presupposed Sunni dominance. In the opening introduction of the news bulletin on January 15, 
OTV's anchor made the following statement:  
Why this support for the Orthodox Law? Numbers have revealed many truths, most im-
portantly that 450,000 Christians will be delivered from the hegemony of the Future 
Movement [the Sunni-led movement].  Also it [the law] gives Christians the chance to 
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vote for whomever they wish in parliament and prevents Christian MPs from being elect-
ed through non-Christian votes, which makes them hostages to other groups. 355  
The discourse focuses on the Christian point of view that corresponds to a belief system preva-
lent among Christians who support Aoun. The discourse implies that a strong wave of Sunni 
fundamentalism surging in Lebanon and the region poses a threat to minorities. The discourse, 
however, focuses on Sunni hegemony and ignores another potential threat some other Christian 
groups are concerned with: Shiite hegemony. The discourse's disregard of this other presupposed 
threat is justified by the political and strategic alliance between Aoun and Hezbollah. This con-
text model, which demonizes Sunnis in the eyes of some Christians, has been building up in 
Aounist Maronite discourse since 2005 and has been used as a tool by Maronites to legitimize 
their political choices. It is by building on the fears and Ihbat (frustration) of the Christian minor-
ity that their leaders are able to maneuver their political actions.  
The first argumentative point explains why there is support for the Orthodox Law. By us-
ing numbers as supportive evidence, the point's function is to prove that Christians are, in fact, 
under the mercy of the Sunni Future movement. The truth and the number 450,000 are used as 
drama enhancing tools to imply that there is truth that ought to be revealed. The use of delivered 
is meant to emphasize their forced submission and eventual freedom if the Law if passed. The 
use of hegemony suggests that the Sunnis are rising in power and, therefore, should be feared and 
quelled.  
The second argumentative point is meant to show that Christians have a choice and can 
be delivered from this supposed hegemony if they support the Law. The idea that the Law will 
prevent Christian MPs from being elected by non-Christian votes is a rhetorical contrast meant to 
emphasize the gap between the Christian MPs in parliament and who they actually represent. 
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This is further emphasized by the metaphor hostages to other groups to imply that the Christians 
are the victimized group in Lebanon and they are denied a free will by unjust electoral laws that 
have worked in favor of other sects. While the argument does not blatantly mention the phrase 
hostages to the Sunnis (although it implies it), as such discourse would be extremely inflammato-
ry, the word other groups serves as a euphemism or tactical disclaimer to save face. The theme, 
summary, or "global meaning" one may retrieve from this lead may be articulated as follows: the 
Sunnis are a threat; the Christians are victimized; the Law is the salvation. Local meanings are 
highly argumentative and drama enhancing but are constructed in a way that corresponds to a 
belief system or "context model" that is socially appropriate to the Aounist Maronites.   
B. Future TV's discourse demonized Aoun, portraying him as the source of Lebanon's 
troubles. As the Law would not be to the advantage of the Hariri-led Future Movement, the dis-
course presented the Law as unfair and regressive. A report broadcast on Future TV on January 
19, 2013 articulated this view of the Law:  
For the General [Aoun] and his media, Lebanon is not a nation but confessional cantons. 
It is the Aounist TV channel that is propagating the Orthodox Law under the logo of fair 
representation. In reality it is only deceiving people, who, according to the orange logic, 
have become rival tribes…It is the intimidation of the ‘other’—the Sunni—in the 
Aounist mind.356 
The lead names Aoun the General. This naming choice is not uncommon when referring to 
Aoun. In normal situations, he is mostly referred to as General Aoun, or General Michel Aoun, 
or Aoun upon second reference. The use of the General in this structure implies irony and sar-
casm. Aoun, in the eyes of his adversaries, is a failed general. His adversaries mock him for hav-
ing lost every war he waged, creating divisions among the Christians, weakening their position 
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vis a vis other sects, inciting sectarian tension among Christians and Sunnis, and siding with his 
formers adversaries, Syria and Hezbollah.357 The naming of his TV channel as "Aounist" implies 
derogation, as it associates the network with the man they mock, as well as accuses the channel 
of propagating a project, which is, in fact, deceiving people.  
The lead makes the following argumentative point: For the General and his media, Leb-
anon is not a nation, but confessional cantons. This clearly accuses Aoun and his media of prop-
agating a rhetoric that undermines "national unity," an ideal emphasized in the Taef Agreement. 
But Aoun, in this presentation, is the one doing the undermining.  In fact, the word canton has 
not traditionally been highly regarded in Lebanese political discourse. Politicians have refrained 
from proposing it as a solution to the Lebanese predicament because of a general tendency to 
view such a solution as undermining national unity and emphasizing sectarian divisions.358 The 
phrase orange logic is used to mock Aoun's thinking. While orange is the color of Aoun's logo, a 
logic that is orange is a metonymy meant to reduce Aoun to the logo that his adversaries contin-
uously mock.359  
To emphasize Aoun's role in dividing the Lebanese people, the hyperbolic phrase rival 
tribes is used. It implies than Aoun wants to bring his people to a state of nature where tribes 
compete for power. It also serves as persuasive imagery, portraying Aoun's logic as anti-
civilizational.  
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The above discourse shows that Future TV, in a way, absolves Christians from being the 
cause of division and puts the blame exclusively on Aoun. The sectarian discourse is mitigated 
by adding the phrase in the Aounist mind. This is meant to say that only Christians who support 
Aoun subscribe to this logic of intimidation, not necessarily others. The discourse accuses Aoun 
of deceiving his followers and intimidating other groups.360 This way, Future TV does not jeop-
ardize the relations of its patrons with other Christian parties.  
This story's theme focuses on Aoun as the out-group; the threat to national unity.  The lo-
cal meaning, like in the OTV broadcast, is based on highly argumentative language and corre-
sponds to a belief system that is acceptable to an audience supportive of the Future Movement 
and Christian allies opposed to Aoun.   
C. Al-Manar echoed Hezbollah's voice in supporting the Law. Hezbollah, Aoun's ally, 
supported the Orthodox Law on the basis of Proportional Representation. This formula alarms 
the Future Movement because it would give the Islamic party advantage over others. Hezbollah's 
leader, Hassan Nasrallah, stated that the Future Movement does not want proportionality because 
"such an option would reveal their true electoral weight."361 The fact that Christian parties allied 
with the Future Bloc voted for the Law is gratifying to Hezbollah because he sees his main Sunni 
rival isolated. This is how an Al-Manar presenter articulated Hezbollah's gratification on January 
19, 2013:  
The Future Bloc is alone and isolated. The fear of isolation has pushed it to intimidate 
others by describing the Law as "the deadly sin and the suicidal project." The blue 
movement turns everything black whenever its interests are threatened.362  
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The discourse is vindictive. By describing the Future Bloc as alone and isolated, Al-
Manar mocks its adversary for being stabbed in the back. The Bloc is supposedly isolated be-
cause its Christian allies—the Lebanese Forces and the Phalanges—voted in favor of the Ortho-
dox Law. By directly quoting the Future Bloc, who described the Law as a deadly sin and a sui-
cidal project, Al-Manar implies that that the Future Bloc, whose fear of isolation is intimidating 
other groups, is threatening to take action. This is emphasized further with a rhetorical contrast: 
the blue movement (in the reference to the blue color of their logo) turns everything black. This 
may be understood as demonizing the Sunni-led Future Bloc who, according to the discourse, 
may become dangerous if its interests are jeopardized.   
D. The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBCI), in contrast to the three networks 
discussed above, does not seem to rely much on hyperbolic argumentation and rhetorical 
flourish. While there is a tendency to editorialize the news, LBCI's discourse is closer to 
balanced. Here's how a news anchor read the opening to a news bulletin on January 15, 
2013:   
For the first time, there seems to be an unbridled craze to know which electoral law will 
be decided upon. No agreement has yet been reached because of mutual vetoes. The Or-
thodox Law was approved by three major Christian parties, but it collides with categori-
cal refusal by the Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party [the Druze party]. 
If adopting the Law is difficult, what is the alternative that will bring about fair represen-
tation?363 
Most Lebanese news reporting tends to analyze events rather than simply report them. However, 
the above lead was more balanced and less partisan. The use of the phrase unbridled craze is an 
overstatement to emphasize the importance of the electoral law in determining power relations 
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among the sects. However, instead of accusing one side or the other, the discourse shows that 
both "parties to the conflict" are responsible because of mutual vetoes. The use of the verb col-
lide emphasizes the strong refusal of the law by the Future Movement and the Progressive So-
cialist Party. It may imply that they are the ones complicating the negotiations. However, this 
lead leaves the question of the Law open to the viewer to investigate. In a way, it engages the 
public rather than leads them to believe one truth or another. The global meaning or theme in this 
lead is deadlock over law. Semantic structures are more informative than argumentative. The 
context model against which this story is told is a political situation characterized by severe disa-
greement over a major issue that will have a tremendous impact on the Lebanese people.  
The Orthodox Law story provoked predictably mixed opinions in the Lebanese press. 
The mouthpiece of the Future Movement, Al-Mustaqbal (The Future), reflected the Movement's 
fears of a potential Hezbollah domination in case the Law is passed. In a piece titled "Hezbollah 
Does Not Want to Give the Christians their Rights; It Wants to Dominate the Country," Salah 
Taki Dine warned Christians against siding with Hezbollah on the Law because it would only 
give Hezbollah advantage over any other group.364 This is the line of thought of the Future 
Movement, as communicated by one of its members, Ahmad Fatfat: "What is happening in the 
electoral laws is a conspiracy by Hezbollah to control the country through putting its hand on 
parliament. A Proportional Representation system would allow Hezbollah to eliminate others and 
control all the country's political foundations." 365 Other pieces called the Law "a bastard," and "a 
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plot aimed at reviving Christian fanaticism," showing the Law as regressive and as harming na-
tional unity. 366   
As an organ of the Future Movement, Al-Mustaqbal predictably fought the Law. In con-
trast, Assafir (The Ambassador), Al-Akhbar (The News), and Annahar (The Day), despite their 
pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian political leanings, published mixed views. The pan-Arab, leftist daily, 
Assafir, published opinions that condemn sectarianism. In "Neo-Sectarianism," Samir Makhlouf 
bemoaned the Lebanese condition, blaming Lebanon's predicament on both internal and external 
factors. He accused the supporters of the Orthodox Law of "neo-sectarianism…those who wear 
the mask of modernity, only to hide beneath it sectarian thinking."367 Similarly, Nasri Sayegh of 
Assafir wrote that, "The Orthodox project did not fall from the sky; it is the legitimate child of 
sectarianism and sectarian oppression."368 On the other hand, being also a daily that leans to the 
March 8 alliance, it was expected to come across articles that support the Law. Eli Ferzli, the 
pro-Syrian politician who first proposed the Orthodox Law and who contributes to the daily, 
wrote that the Law served two functions: "to corner the Hariri-led opposition and embarrass the 
Christian leadership in the March 14 alliance for their failure to get approval of the law from 
their non-Christian allies."369 While Al-Akhbar leans towards the March 8 group, it is also recog-
nized for being bold and critical. For example, an article by Zeinab Hawi called the Orthodox 
Law "an expose of pure Christian fanaticism," and she ridiculed the Law campaign launched by 
OTV as "the campaign of orange shame."370 Similarly, Nassif Azzi, in "A letter to Christians," 
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warned against the dangers of the Law while Adonis Akra, in "The Orthodox Project Defeats all 
deadly Bets," strongly defended it as suitable and fair for a country run by consensus.371 Annahar 
(The Day) also published a variety of views, some of which treated the topic analytically, while 
others proposed solutions. Nabil Bu Monsef, in "Fear of Tomorrow," wrote that the Orthodox 
Law was the result of communal feelings of fear and marginalization; he argued that both Mus-
lims and Christians had the responsibility to come up with laws that would be fair for all par-
ties.372 
The above analysis substantiates the sectarian separatism that underlies divisions over the 
Orthodox Law. Orange TV used polarized Maronite discourse articulated on the premise of “de-
fending the Christians against a Sunni threat;” Future TV used polarized Sunni discourse articu-
lated on the premise of ‘defending the country against Christian radicals like Aoun;” Al-Manar 
used polarized Shiite discourse articulated on the premise of ‘defending the country against the 
Future Movement;" LBCI used balanced Maronite discourse framed on the idea that the country 
is struggling in the middle of deadlock over an electoral law.   
4.2. Reporting the Syrian War 
4.2.1 The Story 
The Syrian uprising has become the deadliest and longest episode of the Arab Spring. 
Begun as a peaceful protest demanding regime change, the conflict developed into a brutal civil 
war that has been unfolding for more than two years, killing nearly 70,000 people and displacing 
thousands of others.373 The Alawite Syrian regime has refused to accede to the demands of the 
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protesters, mostly Sunnis. The refusal was met by an armed opposition called the Free Syrian 
Army, which is being assisted by Sunni and Salafist Jihadists from many countries of the Arab 
world with tacit American, Arab, and Turkish support.374 The Syrian regime, on the other hand, 
has been receiving assistance from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah fighters from 
Lebanon, and Shiite Islamists from Iraq.375 Prospects of peace seem farfetched as Syria is backed 
by Russia and China, both privileged with veto power at the UN Security Council. The Assad 
family, who has ruled Syria for more than four decades, belongs to the Alawite sect, a minority 
offshoot of Shiite Islam. While there are other minorities including Christians, Druze, and 
Ismai'lis, the Sunnis make the majority of Syrians.376 To analyze how the different media are re-
porting the Syrian war, it is important to understand the attitudes of the different Lebanese sec-
tarian and political groups regarding Syria: The Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Christians.  
4.2.2 The Context 
The Sunnis' relation with the Syrian regime, and its ally, Hezbollah, has dramatically de-
teriorated since the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The Sunnis accused the Syrian regime and its 
Lebanese protégé of killing Hariri and standing behind other assassinations, the most recent be-
ing that of an influential Sunni Brigadier General.377The political war waged by the Syrian re-
gime against Lebanon's Sunnis succeeded at bringing down Saad Hariri's government in January 
2011 and replacing it with a pro-Syrian prime minister. By maneuvering political and electoral 
alliances through its Lebanese allies, the Syrian regime was able to maintain control over the pol-
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itics of its Lebanese counterpart, even after it withdrew from Lebanon in 2005.378 The growing 
strength of Hezbollah has further alienated the Sunnis, who have adopted a defensive discourse 
borne out of a feeling of marginalization and persecution. For example, a clash between Sunnis 
and Shiites in 2008 and the seizing by Hezbollah of Sunni streets in West Beirut was a humiliat-
ing blow to the Sunnis loyal to Hariri.  Moreover, the plight of the Sunnis in Syria prompted 
Sunnis of Lebanon to support their fellow Syrian Sunnis.379  The fact that Hezbollah fighters are 
assisting the Syrian regime in quelling the Sunni rebels has added to the alienation of Lebanese 
Sunnis.  On the other hand, the Shiites' involvement in the Syrian war is both existential and stra-
tegic. Hezbollah claims it is defending the 14 Shiite villages along the Syrian-Lebanese border 
and that it has a duty to do so.380 However, reports have said that Hezbollah considers any threat 
to Syria as a threat its existence since the fall of the Syrian regime would constrain Iran's ability 
to supply the Islamic party with weapons.381  
The Christians, even those allied with Hezbollah, are uncomfortable with Lebanese inter-
vention in Syria’s internal conflict. They believe such intervention will drag Lebanon into the 
Syrian war, exacerbate the Sunnis-Shiite rift threatening stability in the country, and draw Leba-
non further into the broader regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran.382 Nonetheless, 
Christians are divided on the events in Syria. While March 14 Christians have been betting on 
the fall of the Syrian regime, March 8 Christians—the Aounists specifically— have adopted a 
more favorable stance toward Syria, from the point of view that a strong Alawite regime in Syria 
would prevent Sunni fundamentalists from rising in Lebanon.383 
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4.2.3 Discourse Analysis 
The analysis begins with a comparison between two versions of the same news story on 
the Syrian war as they were presented on Future TV and Al-Manar. As is shown below, the sta-
tions' reportage of the same story diverged considerably: Future TV accused the Syrian regime of 
committing horrendous crimes against innocent civilians; Al-Manar absolved the Syrian regime 
from any responsibility of the crimes.  
A. Future TV 
Lead: Killings and systematic destruction do not suffice for Bashar Al-Assad's 
regime to crush the Syrian revolution. It is resorting today to the starvation of 
what is left of a Syrian people who withstood the monstrosity of its brigades. 
For the second consecutive day, Bashar Al-Assad is bombing the bread ovens 
where queues of civilians are standing.  
Report: Targeting bread ovens has become a habit of the Syrian regime; for it has be-
come accustomed to bombing its citizens who are looking for their daily bread since the 
beginning of the Syrian revolution. This is Hilfaya; here, the echo of the carnage, the lat-
est of the carnages of the Syrian regime. [There are] one hundred casualties between 
women, children and men. The aircrafts of the Assadian [Syrian] regime aim their mis-
siles at the ovens of Hilfaya in Hama to kill whoever had hoped to return home carrying 
a loaf of bread, which has become very rare these days. 384 
The predominant belief system articulated in this report is that the Syrian regime headed by Ba-
shar Al-Assad murderous. This belief is prevalent in the Lebanese psyche to varying degrees, as 
the people remain divided politically over Syria. However, the Lebanese civil war and the assas-
sinations believed to be undertaken by the Syrian regime against Lebanese people generated ap-
                                                           
384
 Future TV Prime-Time News Bulletin, December 26, 2102.  
141 
 
 
prehension of Syria. This belief is very dominant today among the Hariri Sunnis who have com-
plained of persecution by the Syrian regime and the Shiites in general. By saying that killing and 
destruction do not suffice and that the regime is resorting to other means, namely the starvation 
of what is left of a Syrian people who withstood the monstrosity of his brigades emphasizes the 
brutality of the regime and adds drama to emphasize his victimized people who are also "heroes" 
for withstanding his aggression.  
A clear argumentative point is evident where the storyteller draws the conclusion that 
Syrian regime has the habit of bombing its citizens. His supporting evidence is presented with 
rhetorical flourish by telling the story of people trying to get their daily bread amid bombs. The 
discourse is laid out against images of bread ovens, destruction, and corpses.  The use of the term 
Assadian is telling. In Arabic, Al-Assad (the family name of the Syrian president) means The 
Lion. When "Assadian" is used, in Arabic, Al-Assadi, means "as the lion." This technique is used 
to imply irony and sarcasm: a regime as strong as lion that kills its own people.  The story is 
based on a rhetorical contrast: the Assad regime is monstrous, a greedy murderer; the people are 
poor, hungry, victimized. 
The same argumentative techniques were used in the Hariri-owned Al-Mustaqbal. An 
editorialist compared the Syrian regime to a monster. In the author's words, the Assad regime 
"dwells in the blood of the most innocent—the blood of children; through this crime implement-
ed systematically and with determination, the regime wants to tell the Syrian people that they 
have to live humiliated and degraded."385 Ali Noun, a contributor to Al-Mustaqbal, argues that 
Bashar Al-Assad, if he could, would start fires everywhere. "It has become his only bet—
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exploding the region starting from his closet neighbor, Lebanon, who is by nature, prone "to 
dancing at the precipice of volcanoes."386  
B. Al-Manar 
Lead: According to Syrian sources, armed men attacked the town of Hilfaya in 
Hama and committed crimes against the town's people killing a number of 
women and children and filmed the act in order to use it to put the blame on the 
Syrian army.  
Story: Hilfaya saw itself suddenly under international media attention after news had cir-
culated that Syrian missiles hit queues of civilians buying bread. According to images, 
there is no trace of air bombing as there is no sign destruction or a hole which was sup-
posed to be caused by an air missile.   
The Syrian Arab News Agency confirmed that armed men attacked Hilfaya and commit-
ted a massacre to accuse the Syrian army of it, [which happened] in conjunction with the 
visit of Al-Akhdar Al-Ibrahimi to Damascus. 387 
By attributing the information to Syrian sources, the presenter provides a degree of credibility, 
although it is not clear who or what these Syrian sources are. However, by saying that the armed 
men filmed the act in order to use it to put the blame on the Syrian army, she absolves the Syrian 
regime from responsibility. This absolution is emphasized further when the storyteller mentions 
that images show no sign of destruction resulting from the bomb. By using a conspiracy theory 
approach, the storyteller links three developments to lead the viewer into believing her own in-
terpretation of the story. By saying that the town of Hilfaya was suddenly under media attention; 
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that images show no trace of an air missile;" that the attack happened in "conjunction with the 
visit of Al-Akhdar Al-Ibrahimi to Damascus," 388 and by using attribution again to the Syrian Ar-
ab News Agency, the storyteller wants the viewer to believe that the enemies of the regime are 
committing crimes but are making them look like the Assad regime perpetrated them at the same 
time that a peace envoy was arriving in Syria amid international media attention. In other words, 
Al-Assad's enemies have orchestrated the event to make him look bad to the world.  
Al-Manar has used an approach which, on the surface, looks more professional than that 
of Future TV: the level of rhetorical flourish is much less; the information is attributed. Howev-
er, a more careful reading reveals that Al-Manar has constructed the discourse in such a way as 
to communicate a pro-Syrian view of the event. Its sources are either from the Syrian Arab News 
Agency which is government owned, or are unattributed. The story lacks the point view of the 
opposite side. The viewer is not given the choice to decide which version of the story to believe.  
The conspiracy approach reflected in the story on Al-Manar coincides with the same con-
spiracy approach adopted by the pro-Hezbollah daily Al-Akhbar, where several reports linked the 
conflict in Syria to an international game of geopolitics.  Georges Haddad said the war in Syria, 
just like others of the Arab Spring, was "part of a divisive American policy in the region." His 
analysis of the war coincides with the conspiracy logic that Iran, Syria, and Lebanon are targets:  
The opposition groups in Syria (the Free Syrian Army) and some Islamic and secular 
gangs are nothing but a battalion of the world Islamic army in the leadership of America 
and Turkey….America and NATO, through political, financial, and media support from 
the gulf countries, are working on gathering the largest number of "Islamic volunteers" 
from all over the world to form an Islamic army, serve as an arm to NATO, which will be 
added in phases to the Turkish army. The primary task of this Islamic, Turkish, transat-
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lantic army is to limit Russian presence in the region and make comprehensive peace 
with Israel, to open a decisive battle with Hezbollah and its allies in Lebanon, then turn 
to Iran.389  
Similarly, Ibrahim Al-Amine of Al-Akhbar describes the opposition in Syria as "the least ethical 
in the history of all contemporary oppositions," whose leaders are volunteers in the service of 
outside forces.390 
 Christian media have also been closely following the Syrian conflict. Unlike the Sunni 
and Shiite media, their discourse is less polarized, as the Christian communities may not be as 
directly involved in the conflict as their Sunni and Shiite counterparts. However, OTV showed 
commitment to its alliance with the pro-Syrian March 8 group by focusing on the supposed 
threat by the Sunni Free Syrian Army.  
C. Orange TV 
According to the French Press Agency, at least 20 people were killed in the course of 
bombing in different regions of the country. This, as the Syrian Arab News Agency con-
firmed that the Syrian army destroyed terrorist nests in Rif Adlab and arrested a number 
of terrorists. The Syrian army also forestalled infiltration attempts of terrorists from 
Lebanon in Rif al Kusayr and arrested one of their leaders.  
This as it was reported that the commander of the military police, Abdel Aziz Jassem 
Alshalal, defected from the Syrian army through a video tape posted on YouTube.391  
OTV's information in this story comes from two sources: The French Press Agency and the Syrian 
Arab National Agency. While the report has not used sources from the Free Syrian Army to provide 
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counter evidence, it has attributed sources to AFP, which is not party to the Syrian conflict. This is 
meant to provide a degree of credibility. However, there is an implicit anti-Sunni discourse, which, 
at close reading, may be detected: by mentioning that the Syrian army "forestalled infiltration at-
tempts of terrorists from Lebanon," while disregarding any accounts from the opposite side corre-
sponds to the Aounist discourse that Sunnis are a threat (they are infiltrating the border into Syria 
and dragging Lebanon into war) and that the Syrian army who "forestalled the terrorists' attempts" is 
doing the right thing. This, in turn, justifies Aoun's alliance with Hezbollah and Syria, which has 
angered some of his followers and decreased his Christian following.392   
Regarding the defection of the Syrian general, OTV stops at the news without giving any 
details as to why the general defected. This may be interpreted as attempt to avoid exposing the 
Syrian regime.  
D. LBCI  
The Syrian opposition said that tens of people were killed in the Kahtaniya farm as a re-
sult of what it called "a massacre the regime forces committed" and they announced that 
they started operations aimed at forcing the regime forces out of two camps in Wadi Al- 
Dayf and Hamidiya.  The Syrian Arab News Agency said that the regime forces arrested 
a number of terrorist groups and that the Syrian forces reestablished control over three 
Alawite villages in Hama. 
The commander of the military police in the Syrian army announced that he defected 
from the army because of what he said was "the army's deviation from its main mission 
to protect the country and its becoming gangs who kill and destroy." A Syrian security 
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source underestimated this defection and said that the commander was going to retire 
soon and that he defected to be a hero. 393 
In reporting the killings, LBCI presents attribution from both sides to the conflict. It directly 
quotes the opposition in describing the massacre committed by the regime forces. However, it 
equally presents the point of view of the regime by attributed information to the Syrian Arab 
News Agency. While the word terrorist is uttered, it clearly refers to the way the official Syrian 
government news agency (SANA) presents them, not LBCI, since they have previously referred 
to them as the Syrian opposition or the Free Syrian Army. Unlike OTV, which did not elaborate 
on this news, LBCI quoted the commander for the reason behind his defection. However, it also 
sought another version from a Syrian security source to establish balance.  
The above analysis shows that Future TV bluntly portrays the Syrian regime as a murder-
er; Al-Manar, by contrast, defends it and absolves it. OTV’s discourse lacks balanced coverage 
while LBCI reports the story by providing information from both sides to the conflict.  
4.3. Sunni Radicals 
4.3.1 The Story 
On March 1, 2013, the Lebanese media focused on three significant events that happened 
concurrently. Radical Sunni Islamists detained in a Lebanese prison, held hostage members of 
the Internal Security Forces. The Islamists were rioting amid demands for general amnesty. The 
media reported that around 13 ISF members were held in one of the prison's sections and re-
leased shortly after. The Islamists had been detained on charges of affiliation with Fath-Al-Islam, 
a terrorist organization.394  
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This, as a fiery Salafist sheikh opposed to Hezbollah, Ahmed Al-Assir, gathered his sup-
porters in a rally in the southern city of Sidon to protest claims that Hezbollah had rented apart-
ments near Al-Assir's mosque and used them as a depot for arms. Fearing the protest might esca-
late into sectarian clashes, Lebanese army troops and tanks were heavily deployed in the town 
where the sit-in was being held.395 
Meanwhile in Beirut, Sunni men were reported to have harassed and insulted a Sunni 
Sheikh while giving his sermon in a mosque in downtown Beirut. According to some media re-
ports, the men forced the Sheikh to step down from his podium while others reported that they 
urged him not to mention Saad Hariri in a negative way.396 
4.3.2 The Context 
The above incidents are examples of the rising Sunni fundamentalism manifesting in 
Lebanon as a result of the association of Lebanese Sunnis and Shiites with the Syrian war.  Sunni 
anger has encouraged radical Salafist groups to rise to prominence, with leaders adopting an ag-
gressive rhetoric against Syria and its ally, Hezbollah, which has appealed to large audiences. 
One of the most prominent and controversial Salafist sheikhs is Ahmad Al-Assir, who has gath-
ered a large Sunni following. Viciously critical of Hezbollah and Iran, he refers to Hezbollah as 
the Iranian project in Lebanon. He has regularly held demonstrations against the Syrian regime 
and Hezbollah in defense of the Sunnis. He and his men carry arms which they justify as a secu-
rity measure in the face of the "the Iranian occupation," in reference to Hezbollah. The resent-
ment felt among Sunnis is articulated by the prominent Sunni cleric, Omar Bakri, who contends 
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that Sunnis are coming out of chains…the blood of the innocents in Lebanon and Syria will not 
pass without accountability.” 397  
Amid these tensions, Sunni militants operate freely in several Sunni regions of Lebanon. 
Some of them belong to Fath Al-Islam (Conquest of Islam), a dangerous radical Sunni group, 
who fought battles in 2007 against the Lebanese army in a Palestinian refugee camp north of 
Lebanon. In Tripoli, severe clashes between Sunnis, loyal to the Syrian opposition, and Shiites, 
loyal to the Syrian regime, have been taking place since the beginning of the war in Syria. 398 
The Sunnis see the war as an opportunity to limit Iran and Hezbollah's influence in the region.  
Hezbollah, on the other hand, accused the fiery Sunnis preachers of inciting sectarian strife and 
warned them not to provoke the Shiite party.399 
4.3.3 Discourse Analysis 
           All four stations reported the three events in one introduction at the beginning of the news 
bulletin. This practice is common in Lebanese news making, where journalists connect between 
events to establish a framework for interpretations and conclusions. The incredibly lengthy leads 
were shortened for the purpose of the analysis and only the information that is directly related to 
these three events was retrieved.  
A. In the opening introduction of its prime-time bulletin on March 21, 2013, LBCI 
linked all three events as possibly part of a coordinated scheme:  
The country today seemed like walking in a mine field: Al-Assir in Sidon, the Islamists 
in Rumieh prison, and attempts at removing the orator from the podium at the Moham-
med Al-Amine Mosque in downtown Beirut. Sheikh Al-Assir is persistent with his daily 
sit-in until the truth about the two apartments that he accuses Hezbollah of using comes 
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out. And building B in Rumieh prison still enjoys a sort of self-rule. However, the more 
dangerous question is the concurrence of these events. Did they all happen at the same 
time coincidentally or are they coordinated movements among different Islamic factions 
in more than one area in Lebanon?400  
The lead begins with a personification: "The country walking in a mine field." This imagery is 
drama enhancing and reveals a worrisome state of affairs. The three events are announced con-
secutively: Al-Assir in Sidon, the Islamists in Rumieh, and attempts at removing the orator in a 
mosque in Beirut. The parallel structure characterizing these phrases suggests that the events may 
be coordinated. This is reiterated in the question whether they happened coincidentally or wheth-
er they were coordinated. While the discourse does not directly accuse one side, it tends to raise 
the doubts that fundamentalists and Hariri supporters who attacked the mosque may be working 
together.  
B. OTV, unlike LBCI, directly accused the Sunni fundamentalists:  
Suddenly, as if a pass code was given to the Islamists. The zero hour started early in the 
day and tensions were moving in tandem in more than one Lebanese region. The head-
line of the events was written by Al-Assir of the city Sidon, which overcame a crisis. 
Tensions were both in the Rumieh prison and downtown Beirut, as the sanctity of 
mosques was not safe from attacks by a group of men from Tarik Al-Jadeedeh [A Sunni 
area in Beirut]. The situation is not far from exploding, especially now that Tripoli 
sources revealed that Takfiri groups [hard-line Sunnis] are receiving arms, including 
tanks and rocket launchers through the city's port.401     
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The very first statement sets the framework or theme of the lead: the Islamists are coor-
dinating operations across the country. According to the discourse, Al-Assir wrote the headline. 
This implies that he is the mastermind of the operations. The lead presents the prison riots and 
the mosque attacks in one sentence implying that they are part of the same plot. The discourse 
becomes more polemical with the phrase: the sanctity of mosques was not safe from attacks by 
men from Tarik Al-Jadeedeh. This rhetorical contrast is meant to emphasize the purity of 
mosques as opposed to the supposed savagery of the men from Tarik Al-Jadeedeh, an area in 
Beirut where many Hariri supporters reside. This puts the blame on Hariri and the Islamists for 
supposedly hurting their own people. However, by stating that the mosques are sacrosanct and 
vulnerable to fundamentalist attacks, OTV saves face and shows open mindedness to the Muslim 
religion. In other words, OTV is saying that its problem is not with Sunni Islam, but with Sunni 
fundamentalists—a way to defend itself against accusation that it is anti-Sunni.  
 
C. Al-Manar, similarly, linked all three events and directly blamed the Future 
Movement for standing behind them:  
Sidon today was held hostage and turned into a military barricade. Other regions wit-
nessed similar tensions which the Head of the Security Forces described as "planned" and 
"synchronized." Roads in Tripoli and Akkar [regions in north of Lebanon]were blocked 
while mobilization at the Rumieh prison resulted in the holding of Fath Al-Islam mili-
tants of 13 members from the Internal Security Forces hostage, incurring severe wounds 
on some of them. What is even more dangerous happened at the Mohammed al-Amine 
Mosque in downtown Beirut. Members from the Future Party forced the mosque's orator 
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to stop his speech and leave. They were angered by what they considered a critique by 
the sheikh of their own sheikh, Saad Hariri.402  
The global meaning retrieved from this lead may be stated as follows: The Future Party is har-
boring Sunni fundamentalists and is the force behind all instability. This is evident by linking the 
tensions in Sidon, to the blocking of roads in other Sunni areas, to the attack on the mosque, 
which is directly blamed on the Future Party. The use of the sentence Sidon was held hostage is a 
personification meant to victimize the city of Sidon, which witnessed tensions triggered by its 
own inhabitants: the Sunnis. This is meant to emphasize that Sunnis are harming themselves.  
Mentioning that the events were planned and synchronized and attributing the news to an official 
source is meant to provide a stronger, more credible statement. The news dramatically acceler-
ates until it reaches the most dangerous part: that the preacher in a prominent Sunni mosque in 
Beirut was attacked by members from the Future Movement. After listing the events, Al-Manar 
exposes the supposed culprit. According to the Shiite station, Future members were angered by 
an alleged critique by the Sheikh—who was giving the sermon—of their own Sheik, Saad Hariri. 
This rhetorical contrast may be understood as emphasizing the difference between the first 
Sheikh, who is the victim, and the second Sheikh, who is the victimizer. Victimizing the first 
sheikh mitigates the anti-Sunni discourse, which Al-Manar is criticized for and is further empha-
sized in the news report that followed this lead, where Al-Manar interviewed Sunni clerics in 
Beirut who condemned the act.403It is noticeable, however, that the news makes no mention of 
the Salafist Sheikh, Ahmad Al-Assir, whose name was on every channel that day. Neither does 
the report which follows this lead, and which tells in more details the events in Sidon, makes 
mention of him. This tactic may be used to avoid discussing the question of the Hezbollah-
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owned apartments which Al-Assir accused Hezbollah of using, and which was the main cause of 
the rally is Sidon.  
D. Future TV, on the other hand, linked the tensions in Sidon to unlawful activities by 
Hezbollah and credited Al-Assir for acting responsibly and averting escalation of 
tensions:      
Tensions were high in Sidon because of a demonstration Sheikh Ahmad Al-Assir 
had called for in protest of apartments Hezbollah has occupied to deploy arms near 
the Bilal bin Rubah Mosque. Meanwhile, a number of Islamist prisoners held hos-
tage 13 members of the Internal Security Forces at the Rumieh prison, protesting 
regulations on visitor searching. This, as Hezbollah pursued its interference in the 
Syrian conflict causing a wave of indignation. We begin in Sidon, which refused to 
ignite flames of sedition after Sheikh Ahmad Al-Assir canceled a demonstration 
which he had called for after the Friday prayers in front of the apartments that be-
long to Hezbollah amid unprecedented security deployments.404  
 This lead does link the first two events; however, it clearly emphasizes the role of Hezbollah in 
the tension; that Al-Assir was protesting Hezbollah's use of apartments near a Sunni mosque—a 
fact which alarms Sunnis, who fear that Hezbollah might attack them. While there is mention of 
the Islamist prisoners, it is directly followed by a statement that Hezbollah pursues its interfer-
ence in the Syrian conflict causing a wave of indignation. While this tactic may be meant to di-
vert attention from the two events perpetrated by Sunnis, it is also meant to emphasize that radi-
cal Sunni resurgence in Lebanon is caused by Hezbollah's activities in Lebanon and Syria. Fu-
ture TV also personifies Sidon, who refused to ignite flames of sedition, attributing noble quali-
ties to the Sunni city and crediting Al-Assir for acting judiciously by canceling the demonstra-
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tion in order to avert sectarian clashes. Regarding the attack on the Sunni Sheikh, Future TV re-
frained from including this news in the bulletin introduction. To reduce its importance, it men-
tioned it in a window during the newscast:  
A number of worshipers asked the orator before giving his sermon at the Mohammed Al-
Amine mosque in downtown Beirut not to attack Saad Hariri while giving his speech. 
The army command said in a statement that no armed men were in the mosque, denying 
what some media networks have propagated.405 
Unlike Al-Manar and other stations which devoted a whole report to this incident, Future TV 
barely mentioned it. The tactic was to reduce the event to an almost insignificant occurrence. 
While Al-Manar said the Future members used force against the orator, Future TV said they 
asked the orator not to attack the man. This gives a totally different idea of the men, who, ac-
cording to Future TV, were not offensive. The lead also provides official evidence that the men 
were unarmed, unlike what Al-Manar had implied.  
The rise in Sunni radicalism received mixed reactions from the press. For example, while 
Future TV refrained from showing Al-Assir as a culprit, the Future Movement denied any affilia-
tion with him. As reported in Al-Mustaqbal, the secretary general of the Movement said the 
March 8 group was using Al-Assir's moves to corner the pro-Hariri Sunnis.406 Another article, 
"Moves by Al-Assir and Hezbollah Supporters Expose Sidon to Danger,” does not openly accuse 
Al-Assir but insinuates at his role in promoting instability in Sidon.407  
However, there is also a tendency to justify the rise of Sunni fundamentalism as a reac-
tion to Hezbollah activities. Ali Hamade, one of the staunchest anti- Syrian journalists and an 
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Annahar opinion writer, argues that the Sunnis feel oppressed as a result of the policy of Hezbol-
lah. They feel subjected to a new phase of political, moral, and national elimination at the hands 
of the Shiite party, who is dominating the country trying to make Lebanon an Iranian protec-
torate in the strategic sense.408 
The above analysis shows that four stations shed the light on the supposed "threat" by 
Sunni radicals. While LBCI communicated this threat through a question for the audience to an-
swer, OTV directly accused Al-Assir for allegedly orchestrating the events, and Al-Manar direct-
ly accused Hariri of causing the instability. Future TV, in contrast, connected the events to Hez-
bollah and absolved Al-Assir and Hariri from them.   
4.4. Wage Protests 
4.4.1 The Story 
Between February 19 and March 21, 2013, school teachers, public sector employees, and 
their representative unions held several sit-ins and strikes calling on the government to increase 
their wages. Protesters came from all regions in the country and vented their anger at the gov-
ernment for failing to refer the wage hike to Parliament for approval.409 
4.4.2. The Context 
The protests came at a time of severe economic conditions in Lebanon. While the cabinet 
had previously approved a new salary scale for the public sector, the decision was put on hold 
due to lack of financing as well as opposition from business associations and economic bodies 
who argued that such a move would increase the government's deficit.410 The unions accused the 
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government of bowing to the pressures of the business groups and economic bodies.411 Teachers 
and workers' unions spoke on behalf of the "oppressed, the wronged, the marginalized Lebanese 
[workers]," vowing that anybody who "antagonizes people or stands in the way of their dignity 
and decent living [will lose].412 
4.4.3 Discourse Analysis 
The media across the politico-sectarian spectrum covered the story on a daily basis since 
it started in February. All four news networks provided similar coverage of the story. The dis-
course, unlike in the previous three stories, is neutral. The excerpts below show how all four sta-
tions reported the story on March 21, 2013.  
 
 LBCI: Thousands of union supporters marched to the Presidential Palace hours ahead of 
a conclusive cabinet session was to decide whether to refer their demands to parlia-
ment.413 
OTV: While the cabinet was in session, the Unions Coordination Committee marched 
towards the presidential palace stressing it would not retract its stances. 414  
Future TV: Hours ahead of the conclusive cabinet session, public service employees and 
private schools teachers marched from the extreme North and South to Beirut to partici-
pate in the largest demonstration the unions have ever held since they started their 
strike.415  
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Al-Manar: On the 31st day of their open strike, the unions marched towards the Presi-
dential Palace demanding the cabinet to refer the wage hike issue to parliament.416  
Unlike the leads in the previous stories, all four leads are relatively short and straight to the 
point. They state the who, what, where, when, and why. They are closer to the summary leads 
used in traditional Western media. The global meaning in all four leads is clear:  a unions’ march 
to pressure the cabinet to act on wage increases. The local meanings are non-argumentative. 
In the reports that followed these leads, reporters covered the protests by recording 
speeches by union representatives and by interviewing protesters. Emphasizing the positive role 
of the unions’ action, LBCI quoted a protester saying, "This is one of the most beautiful scenes 
which show national unity. This shows group spirit that builds the nation. We are demanding our 
children's rights; the rights of the poor people.” 417 Similarly, OTV highlighted the role of the 
unions’ strike in building national solidarity:   
Crowds from various parties and sectarian affiliations, in one voice, called on the cabinet 
to refer the case [the wage hikes] to parliament. One woman was quoted as saying: "We 
don’t know the people behind is if they are Christian or Muslim, March 8 or March 14; 
the unions have united us. 
Just like sectarian politics, socioeconomic issues are also main concerns for the Lebanese. As Su-
leiman Taki Din of Assafir points out, "Lebanon today has two faces: pressing social issues on the 
one hand and sectarian politics on the other."418 However, the unions' action was praised in the 
media as a positive step towards a better future. Fawwaz Trabulsi of Assafir stressed the diversity 
of the protesters, "[who were] of  all ages and sectarian backgrounds, from both city and country-
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side all standing together…It was a perfect manifestation of this country's unity, its aspirations for 
a better future, and its sense of responsibility toward the coming generation.”419 Ibrahim Haidar of 
Annahar, on the other hand, urged the unions to protect themselves against political, sectarian, and 
party interferences.420  
The results of the story analyses may be summarized in the table below: 
Table 2: Story Analyses 
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CHAPTER 5:  THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE LEBANESE POLITICO- EXIS-
TENTIAL CRISIS 
"We are before an existential Lebanese crisis. This 
crisis is not new; it is old and carved in the flesh and 
womb of history. "(George Obeid)421  
 
5.1. The Function of Lebanese Media Discourse: Discussion of Findings  
The analysis of the stories in chapter four was performed with the purpose of understand-
ing the function of their discursive structures in the sociopolitical context within which they are 
presented. More specifically, the analysis was designed to reveal whether the discourse used in 
telling the stories reinforces or attenuates sectarian beliefs.  
The first three stories—"Sectarian Fears," "Reporting the Syrian War," and "Sunni radi-
cals"—illustrate a high degree of sociopolitical and sectarian divisions in Lebanon. With the ex-
ception of LBCI, OTV, Al-Manar, and Future TV, have all used inflammatory language which 
corresponds with the logic of their patrons. Both locally and globally, their discourse was real-
ized through heavy reliance on argumentative strategies. The fourth story—"Wage Protests"—
illustrates a socioeconomic crisis that Lebanese workers across sects are undergoing.  None of 
the four stations adopted a sectarian discourse; instead of editorialized news, the language was 
constructed through simple summary leads that answered the what, where, when, who, why, and 
how. The reason for the different discursive strategies lies in the different nature of the stories: 
the first three stories are related to questions of identity and hegemony; the last story is con-
cerned with basic human needs of living free from want. Based on these findings, which are ana-
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lyzed in line with the sociopolitical framework established in earlier chapters, two conclusions 
may be advanced: 
1. Media discourse in the Lebanese plural democracy was more polarized in the stories 
of identity and hegemony and more neutral in the socioeconomic story. This duality 
in the nature of the discourse corroborates the premise advanced at the onset of the 
study:  that the people in a plural democracy have diverging outlooks to the point of 
lacking a "common social demand;" the place where they can "combine" is the "mar-
ketplace," because making money and living free from poverty is a need that people 
share, irrespective of religion or sect. Reflecting the sociopolitical framework within 
which they operate, the media would, therefore, be naturally inclined to be more rhe-
torical in stories of identity and power struggles and more neutral in stories devoid of 
such themes.  
2. In this context, a normative approach to the evaluation of media conduct in the Leba-
nese plural democracy would be problematic. The sociopolitical framework within 
which the media operate prevents them from being effective agents of national inte-
gration. Being operated by sects with conflicting identity narratives and political 
agendas, the media are automatically enmeshed into power struggles and serve as po-
litical, sectarian, and ideological platforms. Therefore, the role of the media in Leba-
non is better understood if analyzed in conjunction with its sociopolitical framework 
and in the way it reflects conflicting and overlapping communal norms. This conclu-
sion again corroborates the premise advanced by Rabushka and Shepsle in the intro-
ductory chapter: that "the plural state cannot be organized for social normative ends 
since these ends vary with the different cultural norms of the respective communi-
167 
 
 
ties." 422 As is shown in the discussion below, the discourse used by OTV, Future TV, 
and Al-Manar reflects a sectarian battle which may be qualified as both existential 
and political.  
5.1.1 Politico-existential media battles 
How do the first three stories reflect a Christian existential and political battle that OTV 
is fighting? As already mentioned, Christians are the community whose survival in the larger 
Muslim Middle East has constantly been threatened. With the recent surge of Sunni fundamen-
talism in the Arab Spring and the "ethnic cleansing" against Christian communities in Egypt, 
Syria, and Iraq, Christians in several countries of the Arab world feel vulnerable.423 While the 
Sunni threat discourse may not be shared by all Lebanese Christians, it resonates at least among 
a large number of Aoun supporters. Aoun, who claims to be the representative of Christians suf-
fering from Ihbat (Frustration) in Lebanon,424 has repeatedly warned against the extremist Sunni 
threat,425 and his media outlet, OTV, has done the same through news reports and programs em-
phasizing radical Sunni fighters and the surge of Salafism in Lebanon. For example, news reports 
on OTV have repeatedly featured Jabhat Annousra (The Victory Front), a radical group fighting 
along with the Free Syrian Army in Syria, whose members are trained by al-Qaeda. The reports 
have stressed worries that "Annousra men are infiltrating the Lebanese border."426 Another in-
vestigative program is "Khatt Tamess" (Demarcation Line), which presents interviews with 
fighters from the Free Syrian Army, who “kill Alawites and Christians" and who want "to estab-
lish an Islamic emirate in Syria."427 Even OTV's comedy program, "Mish Ma'aoul" (Unbelieva-
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ble) makes fun of Sunni fundamentalists, including Sheikh Ahmad Al-Assir, the radical and revi-
sionist Lebanese Sunni cleric opposed to Hezbollah and Syria, who has called for Jihad in Syr-
ia.428   
Fear for the very existence of Christians may explain why Aoun and his media are pro-
moting the Orthodox electoral Law, which would theoretically give Christians stronger represen-
tation in a country where Muslims are the majority. However, it is not clear whether Aoun, him-
self, was pushing for the Orthodox Law out of fear over the fate the Christians of Lebanon or 
whether his battle for the Law was purely political and aimed at securing personal and party vic-
tories against his rivals in the Future Movement. What makes this question relevant is Aoun and 
OTV's disregard of another supposed threat that equally worries some Christians: Shiite hegem-
ony and Iran's influence in Lebanon.429Aoun was able to convince Christian public opinion that 
his movement and Hezbollah are a “coalition of minorities” in the face of Sunni hegemony. This 
logic is based on the premise that Maronites, as Hilal Khashan explains, "are worried about the 
implications of the Arab uprisings for their own fate as a minority group, whereas Shiites dread 
the consequences the upheaval might have on their pan-Shiite project.”430 Khashan calls the 
Aoun-Hezbollah alliance "hypocritical," because Aoun and Hezbollah were former enemies who 
are now using each other for political purposes. Their coming together, in his words, "does not 
signify ideological affinity or a sense of common cause."431 Aoun's alliance with Hezbollah ex-
plains why his media channel has leaned towards defending the Syrian regime based on the as-
sumption that a strong Alawite regime in Syria would prevent Sunni radicals from accessing 
power in Lebanon.  
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Al-Manar's battle is in line with the Shiite "struggle for power" and survival. This sect 
emerged from a history of persecution in a Sunni-dominated environment and dispossession in 
their own country. Their mobilization since the 1980s and the war against the Israeli “enemy” 
strengthened their communal ties and sense of duty as jihadists fighting for the cause of their 
community and Imams. This role also boosted their confidence as the only force capable of de-
terring Israeli aggression in the region. Shiite ethnocentricity is clear in Al-Manar's program-
ming, which is mostly focused on the concerns of the Shiite community. Their idolization of 
Hezbollah and their "martyrs" is evident in various programs on the resistance, such as “Law 
Huzima Hizbullah” (If Hezbollah were Defeated), “Ayn Alal Adu” (Eye on the Enemy), and 
“Our Martyrs Hallmark of History.” This ethnocentricity, however, raises questions as to the ex-
tent this community identifies with a Lebanese identity and whether their martyrdom is serving a 
Lebanese cause or a purely Shiite one.  
The Shiites' protectiveness of their identity and political role in the face of rising Sunni 
power has manifested itself both locally and regionally. On the local level, Hezbollah has, since 
2005, worked to weaken its anti-Syrian Sunni rivals. This was clear when Hezbollah attacked 
Sunni-dominated areas in Beirut in 2008, and when the Islamic party's ministers resigned from 
the Saad Hariri-led government in 2011, bringing about its collapse.432 Also, Hezbollah staunch-
ly supported the Orthodox Law on the basis of Proportional Representation as such formula 
would give the party political advantage over the Sunnis. The Future Movement has repeatedly 
expressed fears that the Law would give the Hezbollah-led opposition a majority in the next par-
liament.433 On the regional level, Hezbollah has associated itself with the Syrian war as its sur-
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vival largely depends on the fate of its protectors, Syria and Iran.434 In the words of Syrian jour-
nalist and analyst Hakam el-Baba, “Hezbollah is fighting its existential battle; if the regime in 
Syria falls, Hezbollah will be contained and besieged; if the regime in Syria changes, there will 
be a major support for anti-Hezbollah parties in Lebanon.”435 Accordingly, Al-Manar has em-
phasized the Syrian regime's "heroic" acts in the face of "terrorists," in reference to the Syrian 
opposition.  
Building on Shiite and Christian fears of Sunni fundamentalism, Hezbollah has, through 
Al-Manar, focused on two objectives: posing as a friend to Christians and warning of Sunni radi-
calism. In showing open-mindedness to the Christian faith, Al-Manar broadcast a special episode 
on Christmas of 2012, called “Al-Massih Fi Uyunin Muslima” (Christ in the Eyes of Islam), 
which discussed how Muslims perceived Jesus Christ. While they referred to Christ as a prophet, 
they commended Christ as “merciful, loving, and a messenger of world peace.”436 Also Al-
Manar’s coverage of Christmas Eve and Christmas Day featured reports showing Christmas cel-
ebrations in Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria.437Al-Manar's extensive reporting on Christmas holi-
days coincided with the Iranian Embassy's distribution of congratulation letters on the birth of 
“Prophet Jesus son of Mary.” Also the station broadcast speeches by Ayatollah Khamenei com-
mending Christianity and highlighting its common grounds with Islam.438  By contrast, the sta-
tion emphasized the Sunni threat by devoting its news and political talk shows to warning against 
Sunni fundamentalists fighting in Syria. For example, the program, "Bayna Kawsayn" (Between 
Brackets) devoted a whole episode to Jabhat Annousra and its connection to al-Qaeda. On the 
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other hand, Al-Manar occasionally broadcasts shows whose aim is to "mend ties" between Sun-
nis and Shiites. For example, "Fi Rihab Attakrib" (Welcoming Rapport) invites guests to discuss 
ways to create a rapprochement between Sunnis and Shiites and "protect" them against discord 
which Al-Manar blames on the West.  While this program may be a positive step toward social 
integration, it clearly contradicts with Hezbollah's actual policy, which has fiercely alienated 
Sunnis both in Lebanon and the region.  
In this context, Future TV's battle is driven by the "persecution" of the Sunnis. It is waged 
against an enemy that has supposedly persecuted and killed Sunnis both in Lebanon and Syria. In 
Lebanon, the Alawite Syrian regime and its ally, Hezbollah, are accused of assassinating Rafik 
Hariri and antagonizing the Sunni community. In Syria, the regime is killing Sunnis with the 
help of Hezbollah. The Sunnis' political and existential battle has taken radical dimensions with 
the surge of Salafist groups, such as the movement of Sheikh Ahmad Al-Assir, who has mobi-
lized Sunnis in Lebanon and declared Jihad in Syria. His argument, as that of other Salafist 
groups in Lebanon, is that Sunnis have an obligation to defend fellow Sunnis against crimes 
committed by Hezbollah and the Syrian regime.439 While the Future Movement has announced 
its disassociation from Salafist groups, Future TV has adopted the cause of the Free Syrian Army 
in its fight against the Syrian regime. The Syrian conflict receives daily airtime not only in news 
bulletins but also in programs like Suriah Alyawm (Syria Today), where the atrocities committed 
by the Assad "brigades," as the network calls them, are emphasized.  
The Sunnis' political and existential battle is also reflected in Future TV's fight against 
the Orthodox Law.  As the adoption of the Law would weaken the Sunni-led Future Bloc, Future 
TV has focused its news reports and programs on showing the "threat" the adoption of such a 
law would pose to national unity. While the discourse of national unity might be a cover under 
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which Sunni interests are secured, it has sought, through its promotion of the March 14 alliance, 
to present itself as advocating a "national' discourse that corresponds with the idea of national 
unity called for by Rafik Hariri. Future TV regularly broadcasts short video clips promoting 
Rafik Hariri and his son, Saad Hariri, as national leaders.  
In contrast to OTV, Al-Manar, and Future TV, LBCI's discourse tends to be the least ar-
gumentative. The channel's pragmatic model has been evident since Pierre Daher took over the 
station from the Lebanese Forces and turned it from a partisan platform into a profitable busi-
ness. While it has been dubbed as leaning towards the anti-Syrian March 14 alliance, the station 
has regularly covered the pro-Syrian, March 8 group, a fact which raises doubts about its true 
leanings in a media environment where stations are known to be affiliated with political patrons. 
Its decision to cancel an interview with the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, on the 
very popular program "Kalam Enas" (People's Talk)440and its sacking of one of its lead reporters, 
Denise Rahme Fakhry, allegedly for her political support for the Lebanese Forces,441 are evi-
dence that the station might have shifted allegiance. While the true motives behind LBCI's policy 
and its actual leanings are not clear, the station has succeeded at attracting a large viewership, 
ranking first as the most viewed television channel in Lebanon in 2012.442 LBCI's need to appeal 
to a larger audience has necessitated a pragmatic discourse that would be acceptable for all 
communities. While the station does not particularly work as tool of "national integration," it 
regularly produces reports that shed led on vital socioeconomic issues, such unemployment, pov-
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erty, traffic accidents, etc. Moreover, its most popular political program, "Kalam Ennas" (Peo-
ple's Talk) has been praised for the quality of its investigative reporting and balanced discourse.  
The first three stories stand in sharp contrast to the fourth story—"Wage Protests." The 
wage story is devoid of sectarian identity issues. It concerns the basic needs of the individual: his 
right to live free from poverty. Regardless of sectarian and political affiliations, people share this 
need. In fact, socioeconomic issues are concerns that go in parallel with identity issues. One re-
gards basic human rights and the other identity concerns and fear of the "Other." OTV and LBCI 
even focused their reportage on the role of the strikes in encouraging national solidarity. This is 
indicative that the media have the capacity to act as agents of integration when possible. Howev-
er, such role is very difficult in cases of identity conflicts as the norms and the aspirations of the 
communities and the leaders, who control the media, and who are manipulated by foreign actors, 
differ greatly.  
The Lebanese television discourse analyzed is, thus, reflective of the divergent outlooks 
of the three main communities. OTV represents polarized Maronite discourse aimed at securing 
the role of the Aounist Christians in the leadership of the Christian community. To do so, the sta-
tion has emphasized the discourse of Ihbat (frustration) and marginalization of the Christians and 
the need to counter the Sunni threat.  Al-Manar promotes Hezbollah and the Shiites as a commu-
nity resisting Israeli "aggression." None of the other stations undertakes this level of propaganda 
against Israel. While the media in Lebanon are generally "anti-Israel," the naming of this "ene-
my" differs among the various networks.  Other stations may refer to Israel as simply "Israel" or 
the "Israeli enemy;" Al-Manar, by contrast, calls it the "Zionist enemy," or the "Zionist entity," 
and refers to the United States as the "Greatest Satan." Its discourse defends Hezbollah's allies, 
Syria, and Iran because its existence and role in Lebanon and the region greatly depends on the 
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fate of these two regional protectors.  Future TV promotes Hariri politics and is loyal to Hariri's 
patron, Saudi Arabia. It is currently busy with a propaganda war against Syria and its Lebanese 
allies. By emphasizing the discourse of "national unity," it seeks to promote and defend the Sun-
ni community, who feels threatened by Hezbollah and the Syrian regime. LBCI attempts at mod-
erate news-making, but is said to generally lean towards the anti-Syrian camp. Its more balanced 
approach may be the result of the feud between its original owners, the Lebanese Forces, and its 
CEO, Pierre Daher. However, its pragmatic policy and focus on entertainment has attracted a 
larger Lebanese and Arab audience.  
The language that the different media channels have used, is, as Norman Fairclough ar-
gues, a "form of social practice that is part of society and not external to it; it is a social process 
conditioned by other non-linguistic parts of society…Linguistic phenomena are social phenome-
na of a special sort."443 Sectarian discourse in Lebanese media is a natural byproduct of sectarian 
societal values and a fragmented political culture. Through argumentative discourse, the media 
affiliated with the different Lebanese groups have worked to persuade public opinion of their 
own norms and, consequently, have constantly reproduced sectarian beliefs and attitudes.  
The reproduction and exacerbation of sectarian beliefs is more acute during periods of 
crises when the communities feel particularly threatened. Nabil Dajani has repeatedly criticized 
Lebanese media for "accentuating" differences among people, especially in times of conflict. By 
contrast, when the media seek to attenuate divisions, it is only because a political decision was 
made to stop incitement.444 The post-Hariri assassination period is replete with examples of the 
media's ebb and flow. Right after Hariri's assassination, there was a sense of national unity not 
experienced since the years preceding the civil war. For a short period of time, the media, and 
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television specifically, emphasized the sense of unity and togetherness that both political leaders 
and their followers felt and exhibited. However, the discourse of national unity soon ended with 
the political divisions between the March 8 and the March 14 groups. As of late 2006, tensions 
between the March 8 and March 14 camps were intensifying. The crisis turned violent in 2008 
when Hezbollah and Hariri supporters fought street battles in West Beirut leaving up to 100 peo-
ple dead. The media war between the March 8 and March 14 alliances reached its peak in May 
2008, when Hezbollah gunmen attacked Hariri-owned media and unplugged their television sta-
tion, accusing it of "stoking the flames of sectarianism." However, this state of affairs was tem-
porarily reversed after rival Lebanese leaders signed the Doha Agreement in May 2008. The 
agreement, initiated by Qatar, and supported by Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, France, and the United 
States, ended the crisis which had begun 18 months earlier by giving more privileges to the Hez-
bollah-led opposition and agreeing on the election of a president approved by all parties. The 
post-Doha agreement period witnessed a relative appeasement in the media climate, when lead-
ers and their media tools decided to calm things down. Another instance when the media at-
tempted to attenuate differences was after the visit of Hariri's son, Saad Hariri to Syria, in De-
cember 2009 for the first time since his father's assassination. Hariri returned with a more lenient 
attitude towards Damascus, which resulted in an appeased climate between the pro-Syrian, 
March 8 and the anti-Syrian, March 14, and, consequently, pacification in the general media cli-
mate. This state, however, was again reversed with the debate over the Orthodox Law, which 
was translated into a media war that exposed inter-sectarian fears and political struggles.  
Similarly, the involvement of Lebanese Sunni and Shiite fighters in the war in Syria has 
dragged the Lebanese media into the war despite the fact that the Lebanese government has an-
nounced a position of neutrality regarding the Syrian conflict. The fact that the Lebanese media 
176 
 
 
did not respect the government's order shows again that the media operate in conjunction with 
the agendas of their sectarian leaders, who are stronger than the state. In relation to the tensions 
between Sunnis and Shiites, the National Audiovisual Council has recently bemoaned the con-
stant use of sectarian language. It accused media channels of repeatedly using the word "war" in 
the introductory segments of their bulletins and in news coverage, "which leads to escalating the 
situation of sectarian tension."445 The council blamed the media of using "sectarian, inflammato-
ry rhetoric that harmed the country's stability and civil peace."446 One instance that substantiates 
the Council's statements is the law suit that Saad Hariri and his bloc member, Okab Sakr, filed 
against OTV and Al-Akhbar newspaper for allegedly using falsified information that involved 
Hariri and Sakr with the Free Syrian Army. They accused them of not just violating the print 
law, but "forging crime with ulterior motives that threaten civil peace."447 
Despite the complaints by the NAVC, the television networks have not changed their dis-
course. Sectarian discourse is likely to continue because the outlooks of the community leaders 
who own the media and who also rule the country diverge considerably. The patron-client rela-
tionship characteristic of Lebanese sectarian culture and the loyalty to the subgroup and the lead-
er has largely affected the Lebanese mediascape: private television stations owned by sectarian 
leaders are stronger and much more popular than the only state-run television. Moreover, the fact 
that the sects see themselves as sectarian, religious, and ideological extensions of regional pow-
ers, makes the media often enmeshed in local and regional political and sectarian conflicts. This 
explains the polarization of the media along the March 8, March 14 divide. What adds to this 
state of affairs is the media' drive for profit, which has invited foreign powers to invest in Leba-
nese media in return for allegiance. Nabil Dajani maintains that Lebanese media behavior is 
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characterized by a market rather than public service orientation. This results in "confusion be-
tween the freedom of the media to inform people, their freedom to propagate tribal/sectarian 
dogma, and their freedom to seek material profit." Financial need makes the Lebanese media 
"open to overtures of financial assistance from foreign groups in exchange for editorial sup-
port."448 Thus, the media in Lebanon "tend to take the color of the money poured into them…and 
do not hesitate to express interests other than their own and sacrifice credibility for material prof-
it.449 
Amid conflicting identity narratives and divergent sociopolitical outlooks, it is not sur-
prising that the journalism profession in Lebanon lacks a generally accepted code of ethics. 
While certain rules of conduct are found in bodies such as the Penal Code, the Publications Law, 
the Audiovisual Media Law, the 1962 Press Law, and the Military Justice Code, the laws are 
broadly drafted, vague, and inconsistent.450 A project initiated by the Maharat Foundation in co-
operation with UNESCO to devise a generally accepted press code stated that, "There is no effort 
to develop a code of ethics internally within each media institution, and there hasn’t been any 
agreement on one code of ethics which all media institutions can abide by."451 This leaves the 
profession without established guidelines and wrong practice open to various interpretations and 
inconsistent penalization. This, however, does not mean that journalists are uninformed about 
socially responsible journalism. In fact, media professionals constantly bemoan the recurrence of 
irresponsible media behavior. Zahera Harb, a Lebanese journalist and academic, maintains that 
"Lebanese journalism often lacks sufficient ethical foundations and that formal guidance on 
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press standards and boundaries barely exist."452Ahmed Zinedine, a professor of media studies at 
the Lebanese University, argues that "it is certainly not a journalist's job to preach; [his job] is to 
present verified information and commentary, without exaggeration or provocation." Zinedine 
compares Lebanese news reports with European journalism, where "no report exceeds one mi-
nute or one and a half minutes, regardless of its importance."453 This, along with the sectarian 
nature of the Lebanese media, raises doubts about the media's true freedom. Dajani argues that 
the freedom attributed to Lebanese media is a myth. Because the government is weak, the media 
are relatively free from government control. However, they are not free from the control of their 
sectarian patrons. Lebanese journalists are free only as long as their editorial policies do not con-
tradict the political and sectarian color of their institution.454 A recent example is the firing of Joe 
Maalouf, the host of the very controversial program on MTV "Enta Hurr" (You are Free). 
Maalouf used his show to expose government corruption, attack political leaders, advocate for 
social justice, etc. While MTV had supported Maalouf, being a station that calls itself "the voice 
of freedom" and the "voice of the silent majority," it fired Maalouf for "crossing the lines." In the 
last episode before the termination of his show, Maalouf exposed and attacked the mayor of a 
city in Lebanon for allegedly mistreating homosexuals after shutting down a gay bar. Sources 
say that Gabriel El- Murr, the owner of the station, was upset by Maalouf's behavior, which an-
tagonized a mayor who could support El-Murr in parliamentary elections.455  
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5.2 Forums of Debate 
 Despite loyalty to sectarian patrons, the Lebanese media system remains the freest in the 
Arab world. What distinguishes Lebanese media from those in their Arab entourage is their ori-
entation towards controversy and public debate. Both broadcast and print media have served as 
forums for a multitude of ideas and political, ideological, and sectarian affiliations. The plural 
Lebanese polity and the consociational mechanisms that rule it have prevented the rise of an op-
pressive ideology, which, in turn, has allowed diversity to flourish. It is this quality, specifically, 
which bestows upon Lebanon its unique character. In other Arab countries where the state is 
strong, the media have been controlled; in Lebanon where the sectarian communities are stronger 
than the state, the media have been relatively free to operate. Moreover, media privatization in 
the Arab world has been a top-down process while in Lebanon it has been a bottom up pro-
cess.456 Even when Lebanon was under Syrian hegemony, the media, albeit censored, retained a 
degree of freedom not found elsewhere in the Arab world.    
In this context, the freedom available to Lebanese journalists allows them to be advocates 
of some issues of national importance. For example, the highly controversial question of civil 
marriage legislation received considerable media attention in Lebanon between January and 
April 2013, when a Lebanese couple, a Sunni and a Shiite, decided to marry civilly by opting to 
remove their religious affiliation from their civil records. For the first time in Lebanese history, 
the media, with the help of civil society groups, participated in pressuring the government to reg-
ister the marriage. Despite religious opposition, the move set an important precedent for others 
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who can now, theoretically, marry civilly.457  Advocates of civil marriage consider it a step to-
wards the eradication of sectarianism and nation-building because it encourages people of differ-
ent sects to marry. For years, they have struggled with obstinate religious opposition to such leg-
islation. While most news channels covered the story, some journalists fiercely defended it by 
supporting civil society groups in the face of rigid religious refusal. Future TV's host, Nadim 
Koteish, consecrated DNA's episode of January 29, 2013 to criticize the Grand Mufti's objection 
to legalizing civil marriage,458 while Future TV's Paula Yacubian adamantly campaigned for the 
cause.459 MTV has probably been the most aggressive TV station on behalf of civil marriage leg-
islation. The issue was raised on many of the station's most watched programs including, "Enta 
Hurr" (You are Free) with Joe Maalouf, "Sabaa" (Seven) with Serge Zarka, and Bimawdu'eeya" 
(Objectively), with Walid Abboud. While the first two programs took the task of defending civil 
marriage legislation, Abboud's program provided a forum where Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians 
were invited to debate the issue. Although they argued fiercely showing their seemingly irrecon-
cilable views, the debate allowed audiences to see different views on the matter.460  
Other controversial questions are also addressed.  Joe Maalouf, in "Enta Hurr" (You are 
Free), has used his program to attack Hezbollah and the Salafist leader Mohammed Al-Assir for 
dragging Lebanon into strife and ruining its reputation, as well as exposing cases, such as corpo-
rate punishment in schools and government corruption.461 Similarly, LBCI’s very popular 
"Kalam Ennas" (People's Talk) has raised issues facing Lebanon and the region ranging from 
political to economic to social to humanitarian to cultural.462 LBCI’s very controversial "Ahmar 
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Bel Khat Al-Arid" (Bold Red Line) has discussed topics such as homosexuality, trans-sexuality, 
and Freemasonry—all considered taboo in the Arab world. 463 Future TV’s Daily News Analysis 
(DNA), on the other hand, provides host Nadim Koteish with a podium to critically, and some-
times cynically comment on the latest political events.464 Other cases include the bold Al-Jadeed 
(New TV), famous for its scoop reporting and tendency to trigger scandals. Ghada Eid's program 
on Al-Jadeed, "Al-Fasad" (Corruption) has caused many law suits to be filed against both Eid 
and the station for exposing corruption.465 Moreover, in attempts to assume a more public ser-
vice-oriented approach, Al-Jadeed entered into partnership with the United Nations Development 
Program to promote "Live Lebanon" an initiative aimed at development projects. The station's 
job is to raise awareness about living conditions of local communities and incite people to make 
contributions to the initiative. 466  
The above examples are evidence that journalists do have the potential to play a public-
service oriented role. However, such potential is more likely to be invested in societal, cultural, 
and economic issues, and less in politico-sectarian issues enmeshed with identity struggles. 
Whenever such issues are addressed, the Lebanese media only amplify them. With the freedom 
they enjoy, Lebanese journalists address such issues in news, talk shows, and debates, but only to 
exacerbate divisions rather than attenuate them. The intersection of social sectarianism, political 
sectarianism, and the volatile geopolitical setting surrounding Lebanon has caused the Lebanese 
plural democracy to be constantly precarious. This, in turn, continuously affects the media cli-
mate.  As long as Lebanon remains a non-national state; as long cleavages do not cross-cut and 
political culture remains fragmented, as long as the media will remain a weak instrument incapa-
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ble of contributing to national integration. The media, therefore, are better evaluated in the con-
text of the consociational formula that regulates the relationship among the different Lebanese 
communities. For the mediascape associated with this formula does not necessarily induce na-
tion-building; rather, it goes in line with the divisive sociopolitical environment within which it 
operates.  
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study on the media in the Lebanese plural democracy may be expanded in at least 
five ways.  
Newspaper discourse: The study focused on television discourse and mentioned news-
paper discourse only occasionally. Newspaper editorial excerpts were used as supporting evi-
dence for purposes of triangulation.  The argumentative structure of opinion pieces has served as 
substantiation of the sectarian and political inclinations of the newspapers.  What might add val-
ue to the research, however, is a comparative analysis of newspaper headlines, not opinion piec-
es. Story headlines are frames that provide global meanings of newspaper stories. A critical 
comparative analysis of the competing headlines would reveal how a newspaper may communi-
cate a theme under the cover of a legitimate news headline and where the meaning may be de-
tected. Similarly, a quantitative comparative content analysis of certain terms as they are men-
tioned in headlines and stories may reveal the extent to which a newspaper is predisposed to 
communicate a certain belief structure.  
Story selection: The stories analyzed in this study were political and socio-economic on-
ly. The stories were selected for their ability to illustrate controversial and critical issues related 
to identity and power struggles.  A broader choice of stories, including social, educational, and 
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entertainment news, may help give a more comprehensive picture of the overall media climate. 
While the study provides examples where the media have potential to play a public service-
oriented role, it does not probe them in depth nor does it consider the frequency of their cover-
age. A look at different types of stories might reveal whether the media present social, educa-
tional, and entertainment stories in a way geared toward bringing people closer. 
Interviews: Since the research is concerned with the analysis of discourse, it did not in-
clude interviews. With the exception of quotes retrieved from newspapers and other public 
statements, the method was confined to observation, discourse analysis, and other tools of case 
study research. Interviews would have been helpful had the research been more focused on the 
social responsibility question. Because the journalism profession in Lebanon lacks a widely-
accepted code of ethics, interviewing journalists and gatekeepers from the different media might 
reveal whether their understanding and definition of socially responsible behavior differ in line 
with the media they work for. For example, Al-Manar is known to broadcast images of dead bod-
ies resulting from Israeli crimes against Palestinian and Lebanese people. While this practice 
may be deemed unethical in journalism practice, Al-Manar justifies it as a duty to inform the 
world of the atrocities committed by the "Israeli enemy." 467This view is shared by the pan-Arab 
channel Al-Jadeed (New TV). The station's director of news and political programs, Maryam El-
Bassam, said the station "deliberately shows [images of massacres] no matter how cruel and 
graphic they are, so that the whole world can see Israel's crimes and immorality."468 However, 
this reasoning is not echoed by OTV, for example, whose news director said that the station 
"evaluates its images before deciding to broadcast them…and avoids any image that may hurt 
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someone or raise hatred or fear, in accordance with professional standards, even if this was at the 
expense of a breaking story.469   
The media as the independent variable: By basing the study on the premise that the 
media reflect the social and political environment in which they operate, the sociopolitical 
framework was used as the independent variable and the media as the dependent variable. An-
other approach may also be useful; considering the media the independent variable and the socie-
ty the dependent variable. This approach, evidently, would require a separate study with a differ-
ent methodology. An audience study might help determine audience preferences and reactions to 
media messages, and would reveal how media messages impact people's perceptions and actions. 
Online and social media:  The present study could include an analysis of online and so-
cial media. Besides having their television news channels online, all political and sectarian par-
ties have websites and blog sites where they post news and commentary. Popular ones include 
www.tayyar.org, the official website of Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement; www.lebanese-
forces.com, the official website of the Lebanese Forces; Muqawama.org (Resistance.org), Hez-
bollah's online arm, www.14march.org, the online wing of the Future movement-led March 14 
alliance, Now Lebanon, also affiliated with the Future Movement, to name a few. Looking at 
how online media coincide with or differ from local media could serve as substantiating, expand-
ing, or reversing the conclusions advanced in this study.  
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